Category Archives: convera

Convera Run-Rate Dips Below $1M

Convera reported its third quarter FY09 results yesterday with revenues of $0.239M for the period ending 10/31/08. This means Convera’s run-rate (4x the most recent quarter revenues), has now dipped below $1M.

Here’s a chart of Convera’s revenues from continuing operations for the past 7 quarters (recall that they sold Retrievalware in April, 2007):


Overall, I’d say the burn-the-ships attempt at transition (covered previously here and also again here) from a Federally-focused enterprise search vendor to a hosted ad-sharing-driven vertical search platform is not going well.

In previous reports, the company has said that it derives a high proportion of revenues from a single (unidentified) customer. It seems perhaps that customer is no longer happy:

The decline in revenue is due to a contractual dispute with a significant customer. Revenues from providing services to this significant customer for the three months ended October 31, 2007 included $234,000 of minimum revenues and $270,000 of minimum revenues for the three months ended July 31, 2008. As a consequence of this dispute, we recorded no revenue from the customer during the three months ended October 31, 2008.

Viewed differently, even if that customer were happy, revenues would have been $0.519M, a new record, but nevertheless a small number both in an absolute sense and, more importantly, when compared to operating expenses which came to $6.3M for the quarter.

The company has burned almost $10M in cash since 1/31/08 (i.e., about $1M/month) and ended the quarter with $26.8M in cash. During the same period, the stock has fallen from about $2.12/share to $0.34/share, an 84% drop.

As of this moment, Yahoo!Finance reports a market cap of $19.7M, suggesting an enterprise value of -$7.1M, making Convera worth about 74% of its cash on hand.

The Convera Transition: 1Q09 Results (Updated)

(Updated: I read the earnings call transcript and made a few changes.)

One of the items I’m tracking in this blog is Convera’s burn-the-ships attempt at transition from a Federally focused enterprise search provider to a vertical search platform provider.

(See prior posts: Honey I Shrunk the Company, Fast Hires Autonomy’s Convera Guys, What Happens When You Sell Your Revenue, Honey I Shrunk the Company II)

Yesterday, Convera announced their first-quarter fiscal 2009 (1Q09) financials, so let’s check in and see how things are going:

  • Revenues of $0.40M
  • Year-over-year growth of 24% compared to 1Q08 revenues of $0.32M
  • Consecutive growth of 44% compared to 4Q08 revenues of $0.28M
  • Ending cash and equivalents of $31.4M
  • Cash burn of $5.3M
  • COGS of $1.8M on running the hosted services, suggesting gross margins of -348%
  • 6 new Excalibur-supported vertical sites (for a total of 45)
  • 1 new publisher launching an Excalibur-supported site (for a total of 25)

My analysis:

  • The revenue numbers are still tiny in an absolute sense; usually the law of small numbers would apply, meaning that off such tiny figures we’d see multi-hundred percent growth rates. At 24% compound year-over-year growth, it takes Convera 5 years before they’re doing million-dollar quarters. Yikes.
  • The 44% consecutive growth rate out-pacing the 24% year-over-year growth rate is usually a good sign as it implies acceleration. However, due to the seasonality of software revenues, I believe that year-over-year growth is the more reliable (and easily interpreted) growth metric. Ergo, I put more faith in the 24% than the 44% as the indicator of real growth.
  • That said, an up-quarter from 4Q to 1Q is usually a good sign since software (and to a lesser extent SaaS) companies tend to have back-loaded, seasonal sales that result in a saw-tooth revenue curve where 1QN+1 revenues are often a bit less than 4QN, even when the company is experiencing strong growth.
  • That said, Convera’s 4Q08 was worse than their 1Q08, providing an easy comparison point for the 1Q09 numbers. Simply put: does 44% 1Q09 consecutive growth mean “great 1Q09,” “bad 4Q08,” or a bit of both? (Sometimes, the easiest way to interpret all these relative growth rates is just to make a chart, which I eventually did, and included above.)
  • The cash burn rate is sustainable over the mid-term, but not the long-term. They have $31M in cash ($35M including $4M held in escrow) and they are burning $5M/quarter. At that rate, the cash lasts 7 quarters.
  • Overall customer acquisition to-date seems good, and 25 publishers signed-up is fairly impressive. But, in my opinion, publishers are drawn — like moths to a flame — to the something-for-nothing idea that they can invest little and get a vertical search site. The question is will Convera ever be able to charge enough to run a profitable business? Right now, Convera is subsidizing their customers’ sites to the tune of more than $20M/year. Going forward, they’ll either deliver enough value to extract enough revenue to run a profitable business, or their customers will scatter like cockroaches when they try. Time will tell.
  • The new customer acquisition/deployment figure of 1 suggests deceleration and is, in my opinion, not good.
  • The company says 75 vertical sites are under contract (compared to 45 launched) with 25 publishers. This sounds good and tends to indicate broad acceptance of the strategy.
  • But the earnings call transcript reveals that a single customer accounted for 80% of revenue during 1Q09 and this same customer was 82% of revenue in 4Q08. I sure hope Convera keeps this customer happy, since they’re doing only $100K/quarter in revenues without them. This undercuts the credibility of the claims that support broad success.
  • In the transcript, CEO Pat Condo gives revenue growth guidance for 2Q09 of “over 25%.” It’s not clear if means consecutive or year-over-year growth.
  • There’s a lot of happy talk about traffic both in the press release and in the earnings call transcript. I’ve disregarded it for two reasons: (1) it’s a busy week and I’ve not had time to fully parse it, and (2) the kind of traffic in which I’m most interested turns to revenue and should show up in the financial statements.
  • In the transcript, they say that total 1Q09 expenses net of non-cash charges for depreciation and stock-based compensation were $3.6M. They guide that the same expense metric will run between $2.8M and $3.4M per quarter in the coming year. This, and other comments, suggests they have done some heavy cost-cutting, and thus that the cash will last even longer than my previous calculation suggests.

Overall, I’d say the experiment is still in progress. Convera has plenty of cash to keep it running, so let’s see what happens. Personally I’ll be watching customer acquisition and deployment, revenues, revenue concentration, and cash.

(And, by the way, Convera, you can revise government out of your safe harbor statement; you sold that business to Fast some time ago.)

Ultimately, I’m cynical on the notion of cheap-as-chips vertical search. I believe the answer for publishers is not to focus on lowering costs, but instead to focus on creating value. For more on that riff, read (the end of) this post (Blind Eyes, Industry Analysts and Lessons from B2B) or see my slides from the recent E-Publishing Innovation Form in London, embedded below.

Honey, I Shrunk the Company: Convera Sells Retrievalware to Fast

Two days ago, Norwegian enterprise search vendor Fast Search and Transfer announced an agreement to purchase the Retrievalware business from Convera for $23M. You can find the press release here.

Let’s try to understand what this means.

First, some background on Convera. Technically, Convera is a seven-year old company created through the combination of Excalibur Technologies and Intel’s Interactive Media Services division. I’d always thought of Convera as the re-branding and reincarnation of Excalibur, a search company that has been around for over 20 years. Convera always struck me as a company that historically did well in Federal government (e.g., defense, intelligence), but that never appreciated its own strengths.

Financially, Convera has not done well. For example, in its most recent quarter, 4Q07 (FY ends on 1/31), Convera reported total revenues of $2.8M, down 24% from 4Q06, and a net loss of $9.7M. Retrievalware revenues in 4Q07 totaled $2.6M, down 27% from 4Q06. Looking over the longer term, the FY06 10-K, shows on page 23 that annual revenues have monotonically decreased since 2004, descending from $29.3M to $25.M to $21.0M and, per this press release, to $16.7M in 2007, reducing the company nearly by half over the past 4 years.

I’d occasionally joked that it was perhaps appropriate that the company’s headquarters were on Gallows Road.

Convera has some quirkiness it its history, detailed in this Washington Post story. I’d guess that one reason Convera has not been content simply to be a Federal play is that Herb Allen is a medial mogul, running an exclusive conference in Sun Valley, and arguably the premier investment house in media and entertainment. Hey, when you’re on the Forbes Billionaire List already, why mess around with a Federal play when, with luck, you might convert it to the next Google, and without luck you lose what amounts to a rounding error? When billionaires play, it’s rarely to make pocket change and it’s usually for keeps.

This is speculation on my part, but my guess is that Allen’s involvement is what accounts for Convera’s schizophrenic past, as evidenced by this graphic that I took off their homepage today.

To me, Convera is one small ($10M run-rate), shrinking company with two strategies: vertical search platform and enterprise search engine. Or, I should say, was.

After this deal, it seems that Convera becomes a tiny ($800K run-rate) company with one strategy. While it’s hard to believe — and I’ve had to check the figures a few times to do so — Convera seems to have sold the business that accounts for 93% of their revenues. While I might question their wisdom or sanity, I certainly can’t fault them on commitment.

Let’s flip over to the Fast side of the equation.

Since no MBA who passed quant class would pay $23M for a $10M business shrinking at 24%, there needs to be more going on here. In this IWR blog post, CEO John Lervik says that the deal helps Fast in “aiming at the lucrative government market,” which this InformationWeek story says accounts for about 70% of the acquired business.

That’s consistent with Fast’s recent comments about tactical acquisitions, and I suppose the business argument is that they can try to sell their search technology to the Retrievalware installed base. The success of that strategy will depend on a number of variables:

  • Have Retrievalware customers already and long-ago found alternative paths forward?
  • Are those that remain customers merely interested in keeping existing systems running?
  • Is enterprise search technology the appropriate replacement technology?
  • Will government customers, particularly in the sensitive defense and intelligence sectors where Convera did much of its work, be comfortable buying from foreign suppliers? [See note below.]

In our experience, particularly in Federal government, XML content servers are often a better replacement technology than contemporary search engines. That’s because (1) government likes XML as a storage format since it’s open and standard, (2) the ability in XQuery to express arbitrarily complex queries, (3) the ability to easily hook a series of best-of-breed extraction / enrichment tools together in an open architecture, and (4) government contentbases are often massive in scale and require the ability to run very complex queries against very large contentbases with high performance.

The last point requires obeying “rule 1” of database performance, which troubles search engines because, compared to XML content servers, they have a limited ability to push constraints to data.

As for Convera’s vertical search platform strategy, I’ll say one thing: they have most definitely burned the ships on landing in the New World.

Time will tell whether they go on to greatness or get eaten by the natives. Either way, there’s no going back now.

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Note: I do not claim definitive expertise on whether the US government or sectors of it can or should buy software from US or foreign suppliers. While I do know that the Buy American Act exists, it seems to exclude software in section 25.103 (e). Despite that, I often hear that there are “issues” with foreign suppliers in the more sensitive sectors of government and I would welcome email pointing me to relevant regulations. Meantime, I have disabled comments on this post to avoid repeating a problem I had in the past with what I suspect were competitors testifying anonymously and anecdotally to the contrary. Since it’s my blog, I will share my opinion based on the people I’ve asked this question. Please feel free to send me information (e.g., links to regulations) so I can learn more.

See the FAQ for information on my comment policy.