Author Archives: Dave Kellogg

Aligning Product and Go-To-Market with Metrics

My fellow Balderton Capital EIR Dan Teodosiu and I recently published an article on aligning product and go-to-market teams using metrics, specifically customer-value metrics. In this post, I’ll talk a bit about the article and how we came to write it, with the hope that I’ll pique your interest in reading it.

First, a bit on the authors. The definition of EIR (here meaning executive-in-residence) varies widely — as does the job itself. At Balderton, it means that we are on-staff resources available to help portfolio companies, on an opt-in basis, with the issues that founders and executives face in building a startup. Dan focuses on technology and engineering while I focus on sales and marketing. Dan’s founded two startups as well as having technology leadership roles at Criteo, Google, and Microsoft, and I’ve been CEO of two startups in addition to having served as CMO of three. That means we are both able to see the bigger picture in addition to our purely functional views. Not to be immodest, but I’d have trouble finding two better people to write an article on how to align product/technology and go-to-market. Heck, we even had the expected us vs. them disputes!

I write a lot about aligning sales and marketing (always remember the CRO is the #1 cause of death for the CMO), but I’ve not written before about aligning product and GTM. So this was a new, fun challenge that necessarily led to strategy, organizational behavior, and leadership. Yes, often, the CEO is the cause of the problem. I can’t tell you the number of times I’ve said: “You want to know whose fault this is? Grab a mirror!” But knowing that doesn’t necessarily help the particpants in a mess unless they know how to get out of it. Usually that starts by asking one simple question: why would anyone want to buy this again?

Does any of this sound familiar?


It’s a 2,750-word paper, which should take around 10 minutes to read, and I’d encourage everyone to check it out. We’ve got some nice, juicy historical examples in there where good companies, even great companies, lost the plot, forgot about customer value and wasted tons of resources as a result. Spare yourselves that pain. Or, if you’re in the thick of it already, step up and start asking the one big question: why would anyone want to buy this again?

Navigating the Mythical Sea of Sameness


Every day I hear more and more about the “sea of sameness” from founders, CEOs, CROs, and CMOs. 

The dialog goes something like this:

  • There are so many products out there,
  • They are getting more similar,
  • Customers are more confused than ever,
  • Unable to see the differences between them.
  • Thus, we are lost in sea of sameness.

I believe the first four statements are largely true, though I might challenge statement two.  But the conclusion — that we are inevitably flotsam in a sea of sameness — is where I beg to differ most.

Somewhere along the way, we got lost.  We’ve turned what should have been the problem statement into an invitation to a pity party.  The correct response to differentiation challenges isn’t “woe is me,” but “that’s why we get paid the big bucks.” 

That’s our job.  That’s what we do here:  differentiate similar products in the minds of customers.  See Positioning.  No, it’s not easy.  But the day you think differentiation is impossible is the day you should turn in your marketing gun and badge.  Differentiation is always possible.  If consumer packaged goods (CPG) marketers can differentiate rice or yogurt, then we can darn well differentiate enterprise software.

While we’re at it, none of these arguments are new.  Thirty years ago, when we were building Business Objects, most customers couldn’t tell you the differences between Actuate, Brio, BusinessObjects, Cognos, Crystal, Discoverer, Essbase, Forest & Trees, MicroStrategy, OLAP@Work, Panorama, ReportSmith, Spotfire, TM1, and a dozen other business intelligence tools.  (Yes, markets were crowded back in the day, too.)

It was not because those differences didn’t exist.  It was because you had to be a connoisseur to see most of them.  But most customers aren’t connoisseurs and don’t want to be.  They’re just businesspeople with problems that they’re hoping to solve.

Differentiation is a key duty of product marketing [1]. You do it in three ways:

  • Essence distillation.  First, you need to find the essence of what makes the product different.  Sometimes those differences are general, sometimes they’re specific to given use-cases. The key questions are:   What’s actually different?  What’s not, but maybe the founders wished it were?  What used to be different, but isn’t any more [2]?  What’s different, but only in shades-of-gray and not in black-and-white [3]?  You need to get to the heart of what’s both actually different and differentiate-able, in the sense that you can explain why pretty easily.
  • Emphasis of differentiated features.  Once you understand what’s different, you need to build a message that emphasizes your differentiation.  One standard approach is to “set the agenda” by turning your differentiation list into your buyer’s selection criteria.  One way to do that is to write an Evaluation Guide that explains the key features buyers should be looking for and which prominently includes your key differentiators and why they matter.
  • Selling benefits and consequences.  Every feature has benefits (the good things that happen when you have it) and consequences (the bad things that happen when you don’t).  Great marketers market both.  Think:  alerting is critical to the successful deployment of your conversational intelligence system [4].  Or:  God help you if your data governance platform can’t manage data assets from the modern data stack [5].  

In short:  if you’re shopping for a product in [category], then be sure to find one that includes features ABC.  If you do, you’ll succeed and reap benefits DEF.  If you don’t, you’ll fail and face consequences PDQ.  See my post on how to build a marketing message for more.

Navigating the Sea of Sameness

So how do you navigate the sea of sameness?  Good old-fashioned product marketing.  But if the answer is so simple, one must wonder, why are people talking so much about the sea of sameness today?  Why is the volume so high on this message?

Are products really getting so similar that customers can’t see differences among them?  Or is it something else?

I think the sea-of-sameness conversation is less about changes in markets, and more about changes in marketers.  That is, the staffing profile of today’s software CMOs.

Back in the day, nearly 100% of CMOs came from product marketing backgrounds.  Today, that’s no longer true.  Because pipeline generation is now the sine qua non of marketing, the vast majority of today’s CMOs come from demand generation backgrounds. 

So, when faced with a challenging differentiation problem, it’s a little too easy for them to blame the market and tell the CEO that we’re lost in a sea of sameness. 

When you’re only tool’s a hammer, problems that don’t look like nails are for someone else to solve.  Many CMOs are, in effect, saying that the problem isn’t marketing’s lack of skills in finding and emphasizing product differentiation, but that such differentiation does not exist.

Hogwash.  The fault lies not within our stars but within ourselves.                   

What’s a founder/CEO to do about all this?

  • Beware knee-jerk brand spending.  If you follow this line of reasoning, you then say “well, since we can’t differentiate our product, we’re going to need to differentiate our company.  Ergo, we need to spend a ton on branding.”  While brand spend might be a good thing for your company, it might not be.  But God help you if you think differentiating your company is going to be easier than differentiating your product [6].
  • Hire a strong product marketer.  In most cases they should report directly to you — and not a CMO more interested in pipegen or a product leader more interested in roadmap.  While board members might question this as unusual, you’ll find a better product marketer if they work directly for you and remove a potentially uninterested middleman.
  • Work closely with them.  Great product marketers need to interact with (even, interview) the CEO, founders, and product leaders repeatedly, searching for nuggets, and structuring what they hear.  The process is highly iterative and somewhat subjective.  Hopefully with each cycle you improve both quality and consensus. 
  • Support them.  While the product marketer should be able to hold their own in debates with sales, product, and the e-team, there is no substitute for founder/CEO support when trying to standardize a company on a message.  Think:  “I know this may not be perfect, but it’s very, very good, and we’ve iterated ten times with Sandy.  This is what we’ve decided to go with.”

As a founder/CEO you’re likely to already be hearing about the sea of sameness from your sales and marketing teams.  The question is:  what are you going to do about it? 

Blame the product, and set off on a endless quest for potentially irrelevant differentiation – all while investing more and more of your marketing dollars in branding?  Or hire some product marketers who can distill the essence of what you’ve got today and build on it?

There is no sea of sameness.  Only marketers who don’t know how to differentiate.

Notes

[1] Some product marketers think demonstrating value is the job.  And in some situations (e.g., an early-stage startup selling an entirely new thing) you do certainly need to sell value.  But in more developed markets, the game quickly changes from why buy one to why buy mine?   The reward for successfully selling the concept is typically N competitors all selling something similar.

[2] Companies often cling to lost differentiators, well past their neutralization date.  This is likely due to positive reinforcement from past success and, surprisingly, the fact that it usually still works for a while even though the feature is no longer differentiated.  (A mind is a difficult thing to change.) But eventually customers learn that the differentiation is no more, and you lose both product differentiation and credibility with the customer.

[3] And is harder to demonstrate.  So hard, perhaps, that it’s not worth trying.  This is why I often refer to “graying-out” competitive differentiators.  You don’t need to match them functionally; you just need enough to take their formerly black-and-white difference and turn it gray, changing their claim from “only” to “better.”

[4] And you should be able to explain why.

[5] And yes, you should explain in detail the exact problems that God will need to help you with.  The rhetoric is fine, but only if you can back it up.

[6] If you think tech products all look the same to customers, try tech companies.  They’ve all got hip founders who went to Stanford to MIT, tons of venture capital (and no, they can’t tell Redpoint from Sequoia), modern offices, ping pong tables, youthful energy, a “we’re going to change the world” vision, customer focus and integrity as core values (regardless of whether they actually practice either), and a strong conviction that their people is really what differentiates them.  Think hard about really differentiating your company from a dozen others, in your space or not, and then you might find yourself in a real hurry to go back and differentiate your product.

The First Rule of Messaging: When in Doubt, Be Clear

[Cross-posted from LinkedIn, see note.]

<rant>

I can’t tell you the number of times I applied this rule when I ran marketing from $30M to $1B at Business Objects back in the day. It’s 1:00 AM, I’m doing final edits on a press release or launch deck. Sure, I have some crazy creative idea that I’d like to try. But it’s 1:00 AM and the materials need to be ready tomorrow.

When in doubt, be clear.

I’ll be creative another day. Or, I’ll get my shit together earlier next time and leave myself more time to be creative, try something, get feedback, sleep on it, and make a final decision. Creativity needs feedback and time. It’s inherently riskier. But time’s the one thing I don’t have in this scenario.

Or, I’ll be reading something where I’m lost in the minutiae of differentiation. Christ, I can barely understand it. Should I stick with the writer who’s trying to differentiate or should I kick it up a level and just ensure people understand what it is and why they might buy one?

When in doubt, be clear.

I guess I’ll need to leave differentiation to another day. And put more work into writing the shorter letter that crisply explains why my feature is different from the other product’s. But, once again, I don’t have time.

So, when in doubt, be clear.

So many marketers today get axle-wrapped in jargon, buzzwords, and attempts at differentiation that when people hear your schtick, they glaze over. They have no idea what it is or why they’d buy one. But they know it’s AI-native, next-generation, cloud-native, low-code/no-code, a copilot, and now agentic.

But what was it again? I have no idea.

When in doubt, be clear.

</rant>

Note

As part of my evolving social media strategy I now write short, ranty posts on LinkedIn and usually reserve Kellblog for longer, more well thought out — and hopefully better written — posts. But today I wrote a quick rant that I liked enough that I wanted to post it here for posterity (and indexability). If you want to read all my stuff, please also follow me on LinkedIn because some material only goes there. And if you want to hear all my stuff, please listen to SaaS Talk with the Metrics Brothers, my podcast with Ray Rike.

Who To Hire As The First Salesperson In Your Startup

This is going to sound difficult and run contrary to the industry conventional wisdom, but bear with me. When a B2B SaaS startup is hiring their first salesperson, I think they should look for someone who:

Is a dyed-in-the-wool seller with sales blood coursing through their veins. Their first sales job was in high school and they’ve sold anything from dictionaries to shoes to cars early in their career. When asked, “what’s your favorite part about sales?” they should say “winning.” Not “the process,” or “enabling the team,” or even “money,” but winning. You want to hire the person who will eventually rise to be a CRO managing a large team but who, when they’re approaching retirement, steps down to carry a bag for the last phase of their career — because selling, not managing, was their first love. Such people exist. Go find one.

Has sold to the target buyer before. While many sales skills are generic, you can save six to twelve months of onboarding time by hiring someone who has already sold to your target buyer. CFOs are different from CROs are different from CHROs are different from CCOs are different from CIOs are different from CDOs. Ditto for industries if you’re a vertical SaaS company. Glossing over these differences will do nothing to enhance your sales cycle. As they say in France, vive la difference. Embrace the idiosyncrasies of your buyer because to do so is to truly know and understand them. Certainly, it’s tempting to find “a sales athlete” and assume they can learn about your buyer — and they can — but you’ll lose valuable time teaching them and they’re certain to arrive with precisely zero existing customer and partner relationships for you to leverage. One day, when you’re huge, you may have to hire sales talent unfamiliar with your buyer and build an onboarding program to teach them. But that day is not today.

Has sold deals in your size range before. Size is an excellent proxy for complexity. Simply put, a $20K deal is a lot simpler than a $200K deal which is a lot simpler than a $2M deal. Find someone who has sold deals in your current size range and with some headroom above that. If 30 years in enterprise software taught me one thing, it’s this: deal size is in the eye of the beholder. The candidate must have prior experience selling deals in your current size range, but also be able to “see” how you could do deals that are significantly larger. Never hire someone who’s only done $20K deals before when they’ll be selling your $200K system.. They are going to lose a lot of deals learning the intracies of complex, multi-constituent sales cycles in large organizations. Let someone else pay for that education.

Has the executive presence to work a level above your target buyer. If you’re selling to the VP of FP&A, you want to hire someone with enough polish to meet with the CFO. Or, if you are selling to the VP of Support, you want a seller who can converse with the CCO. This characteristic is hard to quantify, but it goes by words like presence, polish, savvy, and gravitas. Simply put, if you can’t imagine your candidate in a serious conversation with your target buyer’s boss, then don’t hire them. Your seller needs to be looking across at the target buyer’s boss, not up.

Has significant first-line sales management experience. This is my most controversial criteria because with one bullet I wipe out all candidates who are currently individual contributor (IC) sellers. “But the job doesn’t require sales management! For at least a year, all they’ll be doing is selling. Why can’t I just hire an aggressive seller early in their career?” I hear you cry. First, ICs will generally do worse than experienced managers on the polish and presence front. Second, because you are about to put this seller, at a great investment in time and money, through the world’s best onboarding program: 6-12 months of being glued directly to the founder, doing almost every sales call together, doing every customer proposal together, and closing every deal together. There is literally no better sales onboarding program and you don’t want to waste that investment in someone who, at the end of the onboarding, is only equipped to go sell on their own. You want to invest in someone who can say: “Thank you for the amazing training, I am now ready to be unleashed to do what I already know how to do, which is to build, manage, and scale a sales team.” If you get this wrong, you’re stuck with two bad options: (1) promote the IC to a manager and hope they have the aptitude to succeed, or (2) hire them a boss, do a poor job repeating the onboarding you just did, and hope that they succeed and that they don’t drive out the IC you’ve successfully trained.

Is willing to join your company way “too early.” But why would any sane sales manager want to step back into an IC sales job to join your company? Because they see the potential. Because they believe in your vision. Because they believe in you. And because they understand that if they want to be the first sales VP at your company, there’s only one way to do it: join as an IC, get glued to the founder for 6-12 months, and earn it. There is no shortcut. There is no other path. There’s no, “call me back when you’re looking for a sales director in 12 months,” because you won’t be. This also serves as an important test on their commitment to your company’s vision and on their true love of selling. “Carry a bag for 6-12 months, glued to the founder, in order to earn the sales head job? Sure, why not. I love selling.” And, “after that training program, combined with 6-12 months of selling this system myself, I will literally be the best person on earth to build the sales team for this product.”

This is why I say that your first seller should be willing to join the company too early relative to their resume, and be willing to run in a three-legged race with the founder for 6-12 months. That’s the job.

The founder and the first salesperson should be running a three-legged race

Now, I’m not arguing that it’s going to be easy to find this person. But I have done it and I know others who have as well. I can’t take solo credit for the idea, either, as it crystallized in my mind many years ago in a conversation with Moveworks founder Bhavin Shah. I had some of the pieces in place, but it all came together in that chat.

The best argument for this approach, as alluded to above, is what happens if you don’t do this. Hard as this approach sounds, I have worked with many, many companies who ended up either riding a IC salesrep into management well beyond their abilities or one day realizing that they’ve spent two years giving the world’s best onboarding person to the wrong person — and now have to start over.

So while my approach may sound difficult and unpleasant, well, consider the alternatives.

“All Models Are Wrong, Some Are Useful.”

“I have a map of the United States … actual size. It says, Scale: 1 mile = 1 mile. I spent last summer folding it. I also have a full-size map of the world. I hardly ever unroll it.” — Stephen Wright (comedian)

Much as we build maps as models of the physical world, we build mathematical models all the time in the business world. For example:

These models can be incredibly useful for planning and forecasting. They are, however, of course, wrong. They’re imperfect at prediction. They ignore important real-world factors in their desire for simplification, often relying on faith in offsetting errors. Reality rarely lands precisely where the model predicted. Which brings to mind this famous quote from the British statistician George Box.

“All models are wrong. Some are useful.” — George Box

It’s one of those quotes that, if you get it, you get it. (And then you fall in love with it.) Today, I’m hoping to bring more people into the enlightened fold by discussing Box’s quote as it pertains to three everyday go-to-market (GTM) models.

First, it’s why we don’t want models to be too precise and/or too complex. They’re not supposed to be exact. They’re not supposed to model everything, they’re supposed to be simplified. They’re just models. They’re supposed to be more useful than exact.

For example, in finance, if we need to make a precise budget that handles full GAAP accounting treatment then we do that. We map every line to a general ledger (GL) account, do GAAP treatment of revenue and expense, model depreciation and allocations, et cetera. It’s a backbreaking exercise. And when you’re done, you can’t really play with it to learn and to understand. It’s precise, but it’s unwieldy — a bit like Stephen Wright’s full-scale map of the US. It’s useful if you need to bring a full-blown budget to the board for approval, but not so useful if you’re trying to understand the interplay between sales productivity, sales ramping, and sales turnover. You’d be far better off looking at a sales bookings capacity model.

To take a different example, it’s why business school teaches you discounted cashflow (DCF) analysis for capital budgeting. DCF basically throws out GAAP and asks, what are the cashflow impacts of this project? The assumption being that if the DCFs work out, then it’s a good investment and that will eventually show up in improved GAAP results. Notably — and I was really confused by this when I first learned capital budgeting — they don’t teach you to build a 20-year detailed GAAP budget with different capital project assumptions and then do scenario analysis. Instead, they strip everything else away and ask, what are the cashflow impacts of this project versus that one?

In the rest of this post, I’ll explore Box’s quote as it relates to the three SaaS GTM models I discussed in the introduction. We’ll see that it applies quite differently to each.

Sales Bookings Capacity Models

These models calculate sales bookings based on sales hiring and staffing (including attrition), sales productivity, and sales ramping (i.e., the productivity curve new sellers follow as they spend their first few quarters at the company). Given those variables and assuming some support resources and ratios (e.g., AE/SDR), they pop out a series of quarterly bookings numbers.

While simple, these models are usually pretty precise and thus can be used for both planning and forecasting (e.g., predicting the bookings number based on actual sales bookings capacity). Thus, these are a lot useful and usually only a little wrong. In fact, some CEOs, including some big name ones I know, walk around with an even simpler version of this model in their heads: new bookings = k * (the number of sellers) where that number might be counted at the start of the year or the end of Q1. (This is what can lead to the sometimes pathological CEO belief that hiring more sellers directly leads to bookings, but hiring anything else does not, or at least only indirectly.)

Marketing Inverted Funnel Models

These models calculate the quarterly demand generation (demandgen) budget given sales booking targets, a series of conversion rates (e.g., MQL to SAL, SAL to SQL, SQL to won), and assumed phase lags between conversion points. They effectively run the sales funnel backwards, saying if we need this many deals, then we need this many SQLs, this many SALs, this many MQLs, and this many leads at various preceding time intervals.

If you’re selling anything other than toothbrushes, these models are wrong. Why? Because SaaS applications, particularly in enterprise, are high-consideration purchases that involve multiple people over sometimes prolonged periods of time. (At Salesforce, we won a massive deal on my product where the overlay rep had been chasing the deal for years, including time at his prior employer.)

These models are wrong because they treat non-linear, over-time behavior as a linear funnel. I liken the reality of the high funnel more to a popcorn machine: you’re never sure which kernel is going to pop, when, but if you add this many kernels and this much heat, then some percentage of them normally pops within N quarters. These models are a lot wrong — from first principles, by not just a little bit — but they are also a lot useful.

I think they work because of offsetting errors theory, which requires the company to be on a relatively steady growth trajectory. Sure, we’re modeling that last quarter’s MQLs are this quarter’s opportunities, and that’s not right (because many are from the quarter before that), but — as long as we’re not growing too fast or, more importantly, changing growth trajectory — that will tend to come out in the wash.

Note that if you wanted to, you could always build a more sophisticated model that took into account MQL aging — or today use an AI tool that does that for you — but you’ll still always be faced with two facts: (1) the trade-offs between model complexity and usefulness and (2) that even the more sophisticated model will still break when the growth trajectory changes or reality otherwise changes out from underneath the model. Thus, I always try to build pretty simple models and then be pretty careful in interpretation of them. Think: what’s going to break this model if it changes?

Marketing Attribution Models

I try not to write much about marketing attribution because it’s quicksand, but I’ll reluctantly dip my toe today. Before proceeding, I encourage you to take a moment to buy a Marketing Attribution is Fake News mug which is a practical, if passive-aggressive, vessel from which to drink your coffee during the next QBR or board meeting.

Marketing attribution is the attempt to assign credit for marketing-generated opportunities (itself another layer of attribution problem) to the marketing channels that generated them. In English, let’s assume we all agree that marketing generated an opportunity. But that opportunity was created at a company where 15 people over the prior 6 quarters had engaged in some marketing program in some way — e.g., clicking an ad, attending a webinar, downloading a white paper, talking to us at a conference, etc.

There are typically two levels of reduction: first, we identify one primary contact from the pool of 15 and second, we identify one marketing program that we decide gets the credit for the opportunity. Typically, people use last-touch attribution, assigning credit to the last program the primary contact engaged with before the opportunity was created. This will overcredit lower-funnel programs (e.g., executive dinners) and undercredit higher-funnel programs (e.g., clicking on an ad). Some people use first-touch attribution, reversing the problem to over-credit higher-funnel programs and under-credit lower-funnel ones. Knowing that both of those problems aren’t great, some send complexity to the rescue, using points-based attribution where each touch by each person scores one or more points, and you add up those points and then allocate credit across channels or programs on a pro rata basis. This is notionally more accurate, but the relative point assignments can be arbitrary and the veil of calculation confusion generally erodes trust in the system.

The correct way, in my humble opinion, to do attribution analysis is to approach it with humility, view it as a triangulation problem, and to make sure people absolutely understand what you’re showing them before you show it (e.g., “we’ll be looking at marketing channel performance using last-touch based attribution on the next slide and before I show it, I want to ensure that everyone understands the limits of interpretation of this approach.”) Then follow any attribution-based performance analysis with some reverse-touch analysis where you show all the touches over the prior two years, deal by deal, for a small set of deals chosen by the CRO in order to demonstrate the messy, ground-level reality of prospect interactions over time. Simply put, it’s the CMO’s job to decide how to allocate resources in this very squishy world, to make those decisions (e.g., do we do tradeshow X and do we spend $Y) in active discussion with the CRO as their partner and with a full understanding of the available data and the limitations on its interpretability. The board or the e-staff simply can’t effectively back-seat drive this process by looking at one table and saying, “OMG, tradeshow oppties cost $25K each, let’s not do any more tradeshows!” If only the optimization problem were that simple.

But, back to the Box quote. How does it apply to attribution? These models are a lot wrong, at best a little useful, and even potentially dangerous. Hence my recommendations about disclaiming the data before showing it, using triangulation to take different bearings on reality, and doing reverse-touch analysis to immediately re-ground anyone floating in a cloud of last-touch-based over-simplification.

Note that the existence of next-generation, full-funnel attribution tools such as Revsure, doesn’t radically change my viewpoint here because we are talking about the fundamental principles of models. They’re always wrong — especially when trying to model something as complex as the interactions of 20 over people at a customer with 5 people and 15 marketing programs at a company, all while those people are talking to their friends and reading blogs and seeing billboards from a vendor. I believe tools like Revsure can take the models from a lot wrong to a little wrong, and ergo improve them from potentially dangerous to useful. But you should still show the reverse-touch analysis to keep people grounded.

And Box’s quote still applies: “All models are wrong. Some are useful.” And what a lovely quote it is.