There are two sayings I like when it comes to the unicorn bubble:
“Too much money makes you stupid”
“Any idea’s a good one when you’ve got $100M burning a hole in your pocket.”
Startups are supposed to be focused. Startups are supposed to need to prioritize ideas and opportunities. Just as startups weren’t supposed to buy Superbowl ads, startups aren’t supposed to have hundreds of millions of dollars to plow through in the name of creating brand mystique either via huge-budget events like Domo’sDomopalooza or would-be viral videos, like the one below.
But wait, you protest, didn’t Salesforce always do aggressive marketing and wasn’t that risk-taking part of their greatness? Well, yes and no. A good part of their early marketing was guerrilla PR done on the cheap. Yes, they also ran big events, but they mostly found a way to pay for them — Salesforce raised $53M in VC before going public. Domo has raised nearly 10x that.
Now, I have no particular beef with Domo. Other than being next-generation BI, I must admit to always having had some trouble figuring out what they do — in part due to the abnormal secrecy they had in their early days. I know they don’t compete with Host Analytics so I have no beef there. I also know they have sexed-up the BI category a bit, and they’ve certainly done a great job of positioning themselves as a cool company and have created a lot of buzz in the market.
But at what cost?
Domo has raised $483M. It does cause one to wonder about their capital-to-ARR ratio, which is a great overall capital efficiency metric and one that no ever seems to talk about.
While I don’t know in Domo’s case, I’d guess for many unicorns that this ratio is 10 to 20x — where the company is running a kind of perpetual motion machine strategy where you generate the Halo Effects hoping to drive the sales that justify the valuation that you got on your last financing. This strategy, as many will discover, works well until it doesn’t. If the epitaph of Bubble 1.0 was about Network Effects, that of Bubble 2.0 will be about Halo Effects. Remember Warren Buffet’s famous quote: “only when the tide goes out can you see who’s swimming naked.”
I know for a reasonably capital-efficient SaaS business the capital-to-ARR ratio might be 2-3x. Perhaps an order of magnitude difference.
Back to our core topic — what’s an example of something that looks like a good idea when you have $483M burning a hole in your pocket that, well, might not look like such a good idea if you were forced to lead a more frugal marketing existence?
How about a YouTube mini-series with Alec Baldwin? That’s exactly what Domo did.
As the new year approaches, it’s time for another set of predictions, but before diving into my list for 2016, let’s review and assess the predictions I made for 2015.
Kellblog’s 2015 Predictions Review
The good times will continue to roll in Silicon Valley. I asserted that even if you felt a bubble, that it was more 1999 than 2001. While IPOs slowed on the year, private financing remained strong — traffic is up, rents are up and unemployment is down. Correct.
The IPO as down-round continues. Correct.
The curse of the mega-round strikes many companies and CEOs. While I can definitely name some companies where this has occurred, I can think of many more where I still think it’s coming but yet to happen. Partial / too early.
Cloud disruption continues. From startups to megavendors, the cloud and big data are almost all everyone talks about these days. Correct.
Privacy becomes a huge issue. While I think privacy continues to move to center stage, it hasn’t become as big as I thought it would, yet. Partial / too early.
Next-generation apps like Slack and Zenefits continue to explode. I’d say that despite some unicorn distortion that this call was right (and we’re happy to have signed on Slack as a Host Analytics customer in 2015 to boot). Correct.
IBM software rebounds. At the time I made this prediction IBM was in the middle of a large reorganization and I was speculating (and kinda hoping) that the result would be a more dynamic IBM software business. That was not to be. Incorrect.
The data scientist shortage continues. This one’s pretty easy. Correct.
The unification of planning becomes the top meme in EPM. This was a correct call and supported, in part, through our own launch of Modeling Cloud, a cloud-based, multi-dimensional modeling engine that helps tie enterprise models both to each other and the corporate plan. Correct.
So, let’s it call it 7.5 out of 10. Not bad, when you recall my favorite quote from Yogi Berra: “predictions are hard, especially about the future.”
Kellblog’s Top Predictions for 2016
Before diving into these predictions, please see the footnote for a reminder of the spirit in which they are offered.
1. The great reckoning begins. I view this as more good than bad because it will bring a return to commonsense business practices and values. The irrationality that came will bubble 2.0 will disperse. It took 7 years to get into this situation so expect it to take a few years to get out. Moreover, since most of the bubble is in illiquid securities held by illiquid partnerships, there’s not going to be any flash crash — it’s all going to proceed in slow motion, expect for those companies addicted to huge burn rates that will need to shape up quickly. Quality, well run businesses will continue attract funding and capital will be available for them. Overall, while there will be some turbulence, I think this will be more good than bad.
2. Silicon Valley cools off a bit. As a result of the previous prediction, Silicon Valley will calm a bit in 2016: it will get a bit easier to hire, traffic will modestly improve, and average burn rates will drop. You’ll see fewer corporate buses on 101. Rents will come down a bit, so I’d wait before signing a five-year lease on your next building.
3. Porter’s Five Forces comes back in style. I always feel that during bubbles the first thing to go is Porter five force analysis. What are there barriers to entry on a daily deal or on a check-in feature? What are the switching costs of going from Feedly to Flipboard? What are the substitutes for home-delivered meal service? In saner times, people take a hard look at these questions and don’t simply assume that every market is a greenfield market share grab and that market share itself constitutes a switching cost (as it does only in companies with real network effects).
4. Cyber-cash makes a rise. As the world becomes increasingly cashless (e.g., Sweden), governments will prosper as law enforcement and taxation bodies benefit, but citizens will increasingly start to sometimes want the anonymity of cash. (Recall with irony that anonymity helped make pornography the first “killer app” of the Internet. I suspect today’s closet porn fans would prefer the anonymity of cash in a bookshop to the permanent history they’d leave behind on Netflix or other sites — and this is not to mention the blackmailing that followed the data release in the Ashley Madison hack.) For these reasons and others, I think people will increasingly realize that in a world where everything is tracked by default, that the anonymity of some form of cyber-cash will sometimes be desired. Bitcoin currently fails the grade because people don’t want a floating (highly volatile) currency; they simply want an anonymous, digital form of cash.
5. The Internet of Things (IoT) starts its descent into what Gartner calls the Trough of Disillusionment. This is not to say that IoT is a bad thing in any way — it will transform many industries including agriculture, manufacturing, energy, healthcare, and transportation. It is simply to say that Silicon Valley follows a predictable hype cycle and that IoT hit the peak in 2015 and will move from the over-hyped yet very real phase and slide down to the trough of disillusionment. Drones are following along right behind.
6. Data science continues to rise as a profession. 23 schools now offer a master’s program in data science. As a hot new field, a formal degree won’t be required as long as you have the requisite chops, so many people will enter data science they way I entered computer science — with skills, but not a formal degree. See this post about a UC Berkeley data science drop-out who describes why he dropped the program and how he’s acquiring requisite knowledge through alternative means, including the Khan Academy. Galvanize (which acquired data-science bootcamp provider Zipfian Academy) has now graduated over 200 students. Apologies for covering this trend literally every year, but I continue to believe that “data science” is the new “plastics” for those who recall the scene from The Graduate.
7. SAP realizes it’s an complex, enterprise applications company. Over the past half decade, SAP has put a lot of energy into what I consider strategic distractions, like (1) entering the DBMS market via the Sybase acquisition, (2) putting a huge emphasis on their column-oriented, in-memory database, Hana, (3) running a product branding strategy that conflates Hana with cloud, and (4) running a corporate branding strategy that attempts to synonymize SAP with simple.
Some of these initiatives are interesting and featured advanced technology (e.g., Hana). Some of them are confusing (e.g., having Hana mean in-memory, column-oriented database and cloud platform at the same time). Some of them are downright silly. SAP. Simple. Really?
While I admire SAP for their execution commitment — SAP is clearly a company that knows how to put wood behind an arrow — I think their choice of strategies has been weak, in cases backwards looking (e.g., Hana as opposed to just using a NoSQL store), and out of touch with the reality of their products and their customers.
The world’s leader in enterprise software applications that deal with immense complexity should focus on building upon that strength. SAP’s customers bought enterprise applications to handle very complex problems. SAP should embrace this. The message should be: We Master the Complex, not Run Simple. I believe SAP will wake up to this in 2016.
Aside: see the Oracle ad below for the backfire potential inherent in messaging too far afield from your reality.
8. Oracle’s cloud strategy gets revealed: we’ll sell you any deployment model you like (regardless of whether we have it) as long as your yearly bill goes up. I saw a cartoon recently circulated on Twitter which depicted the org charts of various tech megavendors and, quite tellingly, depicted Oracle’s as this:
Oracle is increasingly becoming a compliance company more than anything else. What’s more, despite their size and power, Oracle is not doing particularly well financially. Per a 12/17/15 research note from JMP,
Oracle has missed revenue estimates for four quarters in a row.
Oracle provided weak, below-expectations guidance on its most recent earnings call for EPS, cloud revenue, and total revenue.
“While the bull case is that the cloud business is accelerating dramatically, we remain concerned because the cloud represented only 7% of total revenue in F2Q16 and we worry the core database
and middleware business (which represents about half of Oracle’s revenue) will face increasing competition from Amazon Web Services.”
While Oracle’s cloud marketing has been strong, the reality is that cloud represents only 7% of Oracle’s total revenue and that is after Oracle has presumably done everything they can to “juice” it, for example, by bundling cloud into deals where, I’ve heard, customers don’t even necessarily know they’ve purchased it.
So while Oracle does a good job of bluffing cloud, the reality is that Oracle is very much trapped in the Innovator’s Dilemma, addicted to a huge stream of maintenance revenue which they are afraid to cannibalize, and denying customers one of the key benefits of cloud computing: lower total cost of ownership. That’s not to mention they are stuck with a bad hardware business (which again missed revenues) and are under attack by cloud application and platform vendors, new competitors like Amazon, and at their very core by next-generation NoSQL database systems. It almost makes you feel bad for Larry Ellison. Almost.
8. Accounting irregularities are discovered at one or more unicorns. In 2015 many people started to think of late-stage megarounds as “private IPOs.” In one sense that was the correct: the size of the rounds and the valuations were very much in line with previous IPO norms. However, there was one big difference: they were like private IPOs — but without all the scrutiny. Put differently, they were like an IPO, but without a few million dollars in extra accounting work and without more people pouring over the numbers. Bill Gurley did a great post on this: Investors Beware: Today’s $100M+ Late-Stage Private Rounds are Very Different from an IPO. I believe this lack of scrutiny, combined with some people’s hubris and an overall frothy environment, will lead to the discovery of one or more major accounting irregularity episodes at unicorn companies in 2016. Turns out the world was better off with a lower IPO bar after all.
9. Startup workers get disappointed on exits, resulting in lawsuits. Many startup employees work long hours predicated on making big money from a possible downstream IPO. This has been the model in Silicon Valley for a long time: give up the paycheck and the perks of a big company in exchange for sleeves-up work and a chance to make big money on stock options at a startup. However, two things have changed: (1) dilution has increased because companies are raising more capital than ever and (2) “vanity rounds” are being done that maximize valuation at the expense of terms that are bad for the common shareholder (e.g., ratchets, multiple liquidation preferences).
In extreme cases this can wipe out the value of the common stock. In other cases it can turn “house money” into “car money” upon what appears to be a successful exit. Bloomberg recently covered this in a story called Big IPO, Tiny Payout about Box and the New York Times in a story about Good Technology’s sale to BlackBerry, where the preferred stock ended up 7x more valuable than the common. When such large disparities occur between the common and the preferred, lawsuits are a likely result.
Many employees will find themselves wondering why they celebrated those unicorn rounds in the first place.
10. The first cloud EPM S-1 gets filed. I won’t say here who I think will file first, why they might do so, and what the pros and cons of filing first may be, but I will predict that in 2016 the first S-1 gets filed for a cloud EPM vendor. I have always believed that cloud EPM is a great category and one that will result in multiple IPOs — so I don’t believe the first filing will be the last. It will be fun to watch this trend and get a look at real numbers, as opposed to some of the hype that gets circulated.
11. Bonus: 2016 proves to be a great year for Host Analytics. Finally, I feel great about the future for Host Analytics and believe that 2016 will be a wonderful year for the company. We have strong products. We have amazing customers. We have built the best team in EPM. We have built a strong partner network. We have great core applications and exciting, powerful new capabilities in modeling. I believe we have, overall, the best, most complete offering in cloud EPM.
Thanks for your support in 2015 and I look forward to delivering a great 2016 for our customers, our partners, our investors, and our team.
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 These predictions are offered in the spirit of fun and I have no liability to anyone acting or not acting on the content herein. I am not an oracle, soothsayer, or prophet and make no claim to be. Please enjoy these predictions, please let them provoke your thoughts, but do not use them as investing or business consulting advice. See my FAQ for additional disclaimers.
This post shares a collection of thoughts on what I’ve variously heard referred to as “the tightening,” “the unwinding,” “the unraveling,” or “the great reckoning” — the already-in-process but largely still-coming deflation of technology-oriented stock valuations, particularly in consumer-oriented companies and particularly in those that took large, late-stage private financings.
The Four Horsemen
Here are four key signs that trouble has already arrived:
The IPO as last resort. Box is the best example of this, and while I can’t find any articles, I have heard numerous stories of companies deciding to go public because they are unable to raise high-valuation, late-stage private money.
The markdowns. Fortune ran aseriesofarticles on Fidelity and other mutual funds marking down companies like Snapchat (25%), Zenefits (48%), MongoDB (54%), or Dataminr (35%). A unique feature of Bubble 2.0 is publicly-traded mutual funds investing in private, VC-backed companies resulting in some CEOs feeling, “it’s like we went public without even knowing it.”
If those aren’t sufficient signs of bubbledom, consider that mainstream media like Vanity Fair were writing about unicorns and describing San Francisco as the “city by the froth” back in September.
It’s hard to talk about Bubble 2.0 without mentioning the public fascination with unicorns — private tech companies with valuations at $1B+. The Google search “technology unicorn” returns 1.6M hits, complete with two unicorn trackers, one from Fortune and the other from CBInsights. The inherent oxymoron that unicorns were so named because they were supposed to be exceptionally rare can only be lost in Silicon Valley. (“Look, there’s something rare but we’re so special, we’ve got 130 of them.”) My favorite post on the unicorn phenom comes from Mark Suster and is entitled: Why I Effing Hate Unicorns and the Culture They Breed.
As the bubble has started to deflate, we now hear terms like formercorns, onceacorns, unicorpses, or just plain old ponies (with birthday hats on) to describe the downfallen. Rumors of Gilt Groupe, once valued at $1.1B, possibly selling to The Hudson’s Bay Company for $250M stokes the fire.
What Lies Ahead?
While this time it’s different is often said and rarely true, I do believe we are in case when the unwinding will happen differently for two reasons: (1) the bubble is in illiquid assets (private company preferred shares) that don’t trade freely on any market and (2) the owners of these illiquid shares are themselves illiquid, typically structured as ten-year limited partnerships like most hedge, private equity growth/equity, or venture capital funds.
All this illiquidity suggests not a bubble bursting overnight but a steady deflation when it comes to asset prices. As one Wall Street analyst friend put it, “if it took 7 years to get into this situation, expect it to take at least 3.5 years to get out.”
Within companies, particularly those addicted to cheap cash and high burn, change will be more dramatic as management teams will quickly shift gears from maximizing growth to preserving cash, once and when they realize that the supply of cheap fuel is finite.
So what’s coming?
Management changes. As I wrote in The Curse of the Megaround, big rounds at $1B+ valuations come wrapped in high expectations (e.g., typically a 3x valuation increase in 3 years). Executives will be expected to deliver against those expectations, and those who do not may develop sudden urges to “spend more time with the family.” Some CEOs will discover that they are not in the same protected class as founders when these expectations go unmet.
Layoffs. Many unicorns are burning $10M or more each quarter. At a $10M quarterly burn, a company will need to layoff somewhere between 200 and 400 people to get to cashflow breakeven. Layoffs of this size can be highly destabilizing, particularly when the team was putting in long hours, predicated on the company’s unprecedented success and hypergrowth, all of which presumably lead to a great exit. Now that the exit looks less probable — and maybe not so great — enthusiasm for 70-hour weeks may vanish.
Lawsuits from common stockholders. Only recently has the valuation-obsessed media noticed that many of those super valuations were achieved via the use of special terms, such as ratchets or multiple liquidation preferences. For example, if a $100M company has a $300M preference stack and the last $100M went in with a 3x preference, then the common stock would be be worthless in a $500M sale of the company. In this case, an executive with a 0.5% nominal ownership stake discovers his effective ownership is 0.0% because the first $500M of the sale price (i.e., all of it) goes to the preferred shareholders. When people find they’re making either “no money” or “car money” when they expected “house money,” disappointment, anger, and lawsuits can result. This New York Times story about the sale of formercorn Good Technology provides a real example of what I’m talking about, complete with the lawsuits.
Focus will be the new fashion. Newly-hired replacement executive teams will credit the core technology of their businesses, but trash their predecessors for their lack of focus on core markets and products. Customers unlucky enough to be outside the new core business will be abandoned — so they should be careful to ask themselves and their vendors whether their application is central to the company’s business, even in a downturn or refocus scenario.
Attention to customer success. Investors are going to focus back on customer success in assessing the real lifetime value of a customer or contract. People will remember that the operative word in SaaS is not software, but service, and that customers don’t pay for services that aren’t delivering. Companies that emphasized TCV over ARR will be shown to have been swimming naked when the tide goes out, and much of that TCV is proven theoretical as opposed to collectible.
Attention to switching costs. There is a tendency in Silicon Valley to assume all markets have high switching costs. While this is certainly true in many categories (e.g., DBMS, ERP), investors are going to start to question just how hard it is to move from one service to another when companies are investing heavily in customer acquisition on potentially invalid assumptions about long-term relationships and high pricing power.
Despite considerable turmoil some great companies will be born from the wreckage. And overall, it will be a great period for Silicon Valley with a convergence to the mean around basics like focus, customer success, and sustainable business models. The real beauty of the system is not that it never goes out of kilter, but that it always returns to it, and that great companies continue to be produced both by, and in cases despite, the ever-evolving Silicon Valley process.
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This post was inadvertently published on 12/23/15 with an incomplete ending and various notes-to-self at the bottom. While I realized my mistake immediately (hitting PUBLISH instead of SAVE) and did my best to pull back the post (e.g., deleted the post and the auto-generated tweet to it, created a draft with a new name/URL), as the movie Sex Tape portrays, once something gets out in the cloud, it can be hard to get it back.
Back in the day we working on a press release and I was a CMO.
Me: “Somebody, get Randy (the PR director) in here.”
Me: “Randy, what is this press release calling our new offering the ultimate in business intelligence?”
Randy: “Yes and the problem is?”
Me: “The problem is it’s not the ultimate, it’s better than ultimate, it’s beyond ultimate … there must be a word for that … I don’t know, maybe penultimate.”
Randy: “Chief,” he said sheepishly after waiting a minute, “penultimate means one less than ultimate. Ultimate means ultimate. There is no word for one more than ultimate.”
Me: “Oh. Well, God damn it, go make one up.”
It was at that moment that I realized I’d been fully sucked into the Silicon Valley hype machine. Just as unique means unique and requires no modifier like “amazingly,” so does ultimate means ultimate.
Speaking of “amazing,” during my tenure at Salesforce, I used to count the number of amazing’s Marc Benioff would say during a speech. You’d run out of fingers in minutes. But somehow it worked. He was a great — no, amazing — speaker and I never got tired of listening to him.
This is Silicon Valley. The land where one of my competitors can still peddle a cock-and-bull story about how he, as an immigrant limo driver with $26 (and a master’s in computer science), sold a company (where he was neither founder nor CEO), worked as (a member in the office of the) CTO at SAP, and is growing stunningly — no, amazingly — fast (despite a rumored recent down-round and rough layoffs). Fact-checking, smact-checking. If it’s a Man Bites Dog story, people will eat it up. Blog it, hit publish, and move onto the next one.
Maybe I should pitch the equivalent story about me:
Lifeguard and Self-Taught Programmer Who Arrived in California with Only $30, a Red Bandana, and a Box of Bootlegged Grateful Dead Tapes Becomes CEO of Host Analytics
“Dude, I was guarding by the pool one day and this wicked thunderstorm hit and, flash, like totally suddenly I realized the world needed cloud-based, enterprise planning, budgeting, modeling, consolidation, and analytics.”
And we could discuss how I “hacked” on paper tape back in high school: “the greatest part about hacking on paper tape was you could roll bones with it when you were done and literally, like, smoke your program.”
It would be a roughly equivalent story. I’m sure they’d eat it up.
Silicon Valley is a place, after all, where we can create a metaphor for something that doesn’t exist — a unicorn — and then discover 133 of them.
Is our reaction “bad metaphor?” No, of course not. It’s “wow, we’re special, we’ve got 133 things that don’t exist.”
Unicorns (generally defined as startups with a $1B+ valuation) are mostly of a result of three things:
The cost and hassle of being a public company, post Sox. Why go public if you don’t have to?
The ability to raise formerly IPO-sized rounds (e.g., $100M) in the private markets.
A general bubble in late-stage financing where valuations are high enough to create the IPO-as-down-round phenomena
So, hopefully, as the financing fuel that’s stoking the fire starts to die down, the hype bubble will go with it. Until then, enjoy this tweet, which captures the spirit of Silicon Valley today just perfectly:
We will do that by examining the forces, and the winners and losers, surrounding a megaround. Let’s start with a hypothetical example. Company X raises $200M at $1B pre-money, giving them a $1.2B post-money valuation.
Champagne is popped, the financing is celebrated, the tech press bows, and the company is added to many unicorn trackers.
Now what happens?
The CEO is under immediate pressure to invest the additional capital. If you take the rule of thumb that most venture rounds are designed to last 18-24 months, then a $200M raise implies a cash burn rate of $8 to $10M/monthor $25 to $30M/quarter. That is an enormous burn rate and in many cases it is difficult or impossible to spend that much money wisely.
The CEO is under heavy pressure to triple the value of the company in 2-3 years. The investors who do these rounds are typically looking for a 3x return in 2-3 years. So the CEO is under huge pressure to make the company worth $3.6B in 2-3 years.
This, in turn, means the CEO will start investing the money not only in promising growth initiatives, but also dubious ones. Product lines are over-extended. Geographic over-expansion occurs. Hiring quality drops — in an attempt to not fall behind the hiring plan and lose all hope of achieving the numbers.
In cases, money is waste en masse in the form of dubious acquisitions, in the hope of accelerating product, employee, and customer growth. However, the worst time to take on tricky acquisitions is when a company is already falling behind its own hypergrowth plans.
All of this actions were done in the name of “well, we had no hope of making the plan if we didn’t open in 12 countries, hire 200 people, add 3 product lines, and buy those 2 companies.” So we may as well have tried as we would have been fired anyway. At least we gave it our best shot, right?
This often comes to a head in a Lone Ranger moment when the board turns on the CEO. “Didn’t we agree to that hiring plan? Didn’t we agree to those product line extensions? Didn’t we agree to that acquisition?” the CEO thinks. But the board thinks differently. “Yes, we agreed to them, but you were accountable for their success.”
Yes, being CEO can be a lonely job. This is why I call it the curse of the megaround — because it’s certainly a curse for the CEO. But the situation isn’t necessarily a curse for everyone. Let’s examine the winners and losers in these situations.
The founders. They get the benefit of a large investment in their company at low dilution without the downside of increased expectations and the accountability for delivering against them.
The private equity fund managers. Provided the turmoil itself doesn’t kill the company and new, more realistic plans are achieved, the PE fund managers still get their 2+20 type fee structure, earning 2% a year baseline and 20% of the eventual upside as carry. In a “more normal” world where companies went public at $300M in market cap, there would be no way to earn such heavy fees in these investments.
The CEO who is typically taken out back and shot along with any of the operating managers also blamed for the situation.
The company’s customers who are typically ignored and under-served during the years of turmoil where the company’s focus is on chasing an unreachable growth plan and not on customer service.
In the event the company is sold at a flat or down valuation, the common stock holders (including founders and employees) who can see their effective ownership either slashed or wiped-out by the multiple liquidation preferences often attached to the megaround. (People love to talk about the megaround valuation, but they never seem to talk about the terms that go with it!)
The private equity limited partners whose returns are diminished by the very turmoil their investment created and who are stuck paying a high 2+20 fee structure with decade-ly liquidity as opposed to the 1% fee structure and daily liquidity they’d have with mutual funds if the companies were all public (as they would have been pre-Sarbox.)
The private equity limited partners who ultimately might well end up with a down-round as IPO.
In some situations — e.g., huge greenfield markets which can adopt a new solution quickly and easily — a megaround may well be the right answer. But for most companies these days, I believe they are more curse than blessing.
I’m Dave Kellogg, advisor, director, consultant, angel investor, and blogger focused on enterprise software startups. I am an executive-in-residence (EIR) at Balderton Capital and principal of my own eponymous consulting business.
I bring an uncommon perspective to startup challenges having 10 years’ experience at each of the CEO, CMO, and independent director levels across 10+ companies ranging in size from zero to over $1B in revenues.
From 2012 to 2018, I was CEO of cloud EPM vendor Host Analytics, where we quintupled ARR while halving customer acquisition costs in a competitive market, ultimately selling the company in a private equity transaction.
Previously, I was SVP/GM of the $500M Service Cloud business at Salesforce; CEO of NoSQL database provider MarkLogic, which we grew from zero to $80M over 6 years; and CMO at Business Objects for nearly a decade as we grew from $30M to over $1B in revenues. I started my career in technical and product marketing positions at Ingres and Versant.
I love disruption, startups, and Silicon Valley and have had the pleasure of working in varied capacities with companies including Bluecore, Cyral, FloQast, GainSight, MongoDB, Recorded Future, and Tableau.
I previously sat on the boards of Granular (agtech, acquired by DuPont), Aster Data (big data, acquired by Teradata), and Nuxeo (content services, acquired by Hyland), and Profisee (MDM, exited to Pamlico).
I periodically speak to strategy and entrepreneurship classes at the Haas School of Business (UC Berkeley) and Hautes Études Commerciales de Paris (HEC).