Category Archives: Leadership

My Appearance on DisrupTV Episode 100

Last week I sat down with interviewers Doug Henschen, Vala Afshar, and a bit of Ray Wang (live from a 777 taxiing en route to Tokyo) to participate in Episode 100 of DisrupTV along with fellow guests DataStax CEO Billy Bosworth and big data / science recruiter Virginia Backaitis.

We covered a full gamut of topics, including:

  • The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) on the enterprise performance management (EPM) market.
  • Why I joined Host Analytics some 5 years ago.
  • What it’s like competing with Oracle … for basically your entire career.
  • What it’s like selling enterprise software both upwind and downwind.
  • How I ended up on the board of Alation and what I like about data catalogs.
  • What I learned working at Salesforce (hint:  shoshin)
  • Other lessons from BusinessObjects, MarkLogic, and even Ingres.

DisrupTV Episode 100, Featuring Dave Kellogg, Billy Bosworth, Virginia Backaitis from Constellation Research on Vimeo.

 

My SaaStr Talk Abstract: 10 Non-Obvious Things About Scaling SaaS

In an effort to promote my upcoming presentation at SaaStr 2018, which is currently on the agenda for Wednesday, February 7th at 9:00 AM in Studio C, I thought I’d do a quick post sharing what I’ll be covering in the presentation, officially titled, “The Best of Kellblog:  10 Non-Obvious Things About Scaling SaaS.”

Before jumping in, let me say that I had a wonderful time at SaaStr 2017, including participating on a great panel with Greg Schott of MuleSoft and Kathryn Minshew of The Muse hosted by Stacey Epstein of Zinc that discussed the CEO’s role in marketing.  There is a video and transcript of that great panel here.

saastr

For SaaStr 2018, I’m getting my own session and I love the title that the folks at SaaStr came up with because I love the non-obvious.  So here they are …

The 10 Non-Obvious Things About Scaling a SaaS Business

1. You must run your company around ARR.  Which this may sound obvious, you’d be surprised by how many people either still don’t or, worse yet, think they do and don’t.  Learn my one-question test to tell the difference.

2.  SaaS metrics are way more subtle than meets the eye.  Too many people sling around words without knowing what they mean or thinking about the underlying definitions.  I’ll provide a few examples of how fast things can unravel when you do this and how to approach SaaS metrics in general.

3.  Former public company SaaS CFOs may not get private company SaaS metrics.  One day I met with the CFO of a public company whose firm had just been taken private and he had dozens of questions about SaaS metrics.  It had never occurred to me before, but when your job is to talk with public investors who only see a limited set of outside-in metrics, you may not develop fluency in the internal SaaS metrics that so obsess VC and PE investors.

4.  Multi-year deals make sense in certain situations.  While many purists would fight me to the death on this, there are pros and cons to multi-year deals and circumstances where they make good sense.  I’ll explain how I think about this and the one equation I use to make the call.

5.  Bookings is not a four-letter word.  While you need to be careful where and when you use the B-word in polite SaaS company, there is a time and place to measure and discuss bookings.  I’ll explain when that is and how to define bookings the right way.

6.  Renewals and satisfaction are more loosely correlated than you might think.  If you think your customers are all delighted because they’re renewing, then think again.  Unhappy customer sometimes renew and happy ones don’t.  We’ll discuss why that happens and while renewal rates are often a reasonable proxy for customer satisfaction, why you should also measure customer satisfaction using NPS, and present a smart way to do so.

7.  You can’t analyze churn by analyzing churn.  To understand why customers churn, too many companies grab a list of all the folks who churned in the past year and start doing research and interviews.  There’s a big fallacy in this approach.  We’ll discuss the right way to think about and analyze this problem.

8.  Finding your own hunter/farmer metaphor is hard.  Boards hate double compensation and love splitting renewals from new business.  But what about upsell?  Which model is right for you?  Should you have hunters and farmers?   Hunters in a zoo?  Farmers with shotguns?  An autonomous collective?  We’ll discuss which models and metaphors work, when.

9.  You don’t have to lose money on services.  Subsidizing ARR via free or low-cost services seems a good idea and many SaaS companies do it.  But it’s hell on blended gross margins, burns cash, and can destroy your budding partner ecosystem.  We’ll discuss where and when it makes sense to lose money on services — and when it doesn’t.

10.  No matter what your board says, you don’t have to sacrifice early team members on the altar of experienced talent.  While rapidly growing a business will push people out of their comfort zones and require you to build a team that’s a mix of veterans and up-and-comers, with a bit creativity and caring you don’t have to lose the latter to gain the former.

I hope this provides you with a nice and enticing sample of what we’ll be covering — and I look forward to seeing you there.

Eight Words that Can Limit Your Career: “Let Me Get Back To You On That”

As executives there are certain things we are expected to know — in our heads — about our jobs and our functions.  Sometimes I call this “the 3:00 AM test” because someone should be able to wake you up at 3:00 AM in the middle of a sound sleep and you should be able to answer questions like:

  • What’s the forecast for the current quarter? (Sales, Finance)
  • How many MQLs did we generate last week?  (Marketing)
  • How many customer bugs are outstanding?  (Engineering)
  • What’s the monthly PR retainer?  (Marketing)
  • What’s the ending cash forecast for the quarter?  (Finance)
  • How many unique visitors did we get on the website last week?  (Marketing)
  • What are the top three deals in the current quarter?  (Sales)

In another post, I playfully called these the other kind of in-memory analytics, but I was focused mostly on numbers that you should be able to recall from memory, without having to open your laptop, without having to delegate the question to your VP of Ops (e.g., salesops, marketingops), and without having to say the dreaded, cringe-worthy, and dangerous eight words:  “let me get back to you on that.”

The same logic that applies to numbers applies to other basic questions like:

  • What’s our elevator pitch against top-rival?  (Marketing)
  • What’s the structure of the sales compensation plan?  (Sales)
  • Which managers are the top 2-3 hot spots in the company?  (People)
  • What are the top three challenges in your department and what are you doing about them?  (Any)

You see, when you say the dreaded eight words here’s what everybody else in the meeting is hearing:

“I can’t answer that question because I’m not on top of the basics, and I am either not sufficiently detailed-oriented, swapped-in, or competent to know the answer.”

And, worse yet, if offered unapologetically:

“I’m not even aware that this is the kind of question that everyone would reasonably expect me to be able to answer.”

Here are three tips to help you avoid falling into the eight-words trap.

  1. Develop your sensitivity by making a note of every time you hear them, how you feel about the specific question, and how it reflected on the would-be respondent.
  2. Make a list of questions you should be able to answer on-the-spot and then be sure you can.  (If you find a gap, think about what that means about how you approach your job.)
  3. If you feel the need to say the dreaded eight words see if offering a high-confidence range of values will be enough to meet the audience’s need — e.g., “last week’s web visitors were in the 10,000 to 11,000 range, up a few percent from the week before.”

And worst case, if you need to say the dreaded eight words and you think the situation warrants one, offer an apology.  Just be mindful that you don’t find yourself apologizing too often.

Handling Conflict with the “Disagree and Commit” and “New Information” Principles

In every executive team there are going to be times when people don’t agree on certain important strategic or operational decisions.  Some examples:

  • Should we split SDRs inbound vs outbound?
  • Should we map SCs to reps or pool them?
  • How should we split upsell vs new business focus in mid-market reps?
  • Should CSMs get paid on upsell or only renewals?
  • Should we put the new buzzword (e.g., AI, ML, social) into the release plan?
  • Should we change the company logo ?

The purpose of this post is to provide a framework to get decisions made and executed, without certain decisions becoming a form of weekly nagging at the e-staff meeting, a topic of discussion at every board meeting, or worst of all, a standing joke among the team.

The Disagree-and-Commit Principle

The first time I heard disagree-and-commit I thought it was corporate, doublespeak garbage.  What the heck did it mean?  I’m supposed to go to a meeting, say that I believe we should go left, get overrun by the group who eventually decides to go right, and then I’m supposed to say “sure, everybody, just kidding, let’s go right.”  How disingenuous — everybody knows I wanted to go left.  How controlling of the establishment.  How manipulative.  This is thought control!

“You may disagree, but you must conform … (wait, was that our outside voice) …  you must commit.”

(Recall my first professional job was as at a company we referred to as The People’s Republic of Ingres.)

Let’s just say I missed the point.  My older, wiser self now thinks it’s a great, but often misunderstood, rule.  (And that’s not just because now I am the establishment.)

Here’s a nice definition of disagree-and-commit from The Amazon Way via this blog post.

Leaders are obligated to respectfully challenge decisions when they disagree, even when doing so is uncomfortable or exhausting. Leaders have conviction and are tenacious. They do not compromise for the sake of social cohesion. Once a decision is determined, they commit wholly.

I always missed two things:

  • I took commit to mean change your mind (or “get your mind right” in the Cool Hand Luke sense). It actually means committing to execute the decision wholly, i.e., as if it were the one you had voted for.  You can’t undermine or sabotage the decision just to prove yourself right.  This is a great rule.  People aren’t always going to agree, but if you want to work at the company, you must execute our decisions wholeheartedly once they are made.  There is no other option.

 

  • The obligation to disagree.  I love this part because some people lack the courage to speak up in the meeting, and then want to passive-aggressively work against the decision and/or attempt a pocket veto by going to the person who was in charge of the meeting and saying, “well, I didn’t feel comfortable saying this in the meeting, but, ….” Such behavior creates a potential paradox for the executive in charge — particularly if she agrees with the pocket veto argument.  Does she overrule the group decision based on the new argument (and reward dysfunctional behavior) or does she stick with a decision she no longer prefers in order to avoid incenting pocket vetoes.  In my opinion, in 95% of the cases you want say, “Sorry Joe, I wish you’d said something in the meeting because that’s an interesting point, but the decision stands.” Worst case call another meeting.  Never, ever just overrule the decision.

Explicitly embracing the disagree-and-commit principle is one great way to end endless, nagging disagreements:  we met to discuss the issue, we came to a conclusion, I know you didn’t agree with it, but you need to commit to execute it wholeheartedly.  (Else we’re going to have a conversation about insubordination.)  We want a rational culture.  We debate ideas.  But we need to make and execute decisions, and you’re not going to agree with every one.

The New Information Principle

But what if the issue keeps coming up anyway?  Perhaps via periodic serious requests to reconsider the decision.  Perhaps through a series of objections coming from someone not responsible for executing the decision (so “commit” is less relevant) — but who just can’t stand the idea.  Or maybe someone has a personal ax to grind (e.g., I know we’ve talked about this before, but can we please relocate the office) and who just won’t take no for an answer.

The problem is if you always shut down these requests, then you risk creating a big problem with corporate agility.  On one hand you want to shut down the constant nagging about adding data mining capabilities from the data mining zealot. On the other hand, you don’t want to make the subject taboo because maybe your top competitor launched a new data-mining addition last month and it’s hurting you in sales.

So, the principle is simple:  if you want to re-open discussion on something we’ve already decided, do you have any new information that wasn’t available at the time we made the decision?

If the answer is no, we’re not re-opening it here, and we can do at either next quarter’s ops review or next year’s strategy offsite (pending prioritization against other topics).

If the answer is yes, find out what the new information is, and then decide if it warrants an immediate or deferred re-examination of the decision.

With this principle you can keep a firm hand against those who won’t give up on an issue while still being open to new information that might cause the need for a  valid re-examination of it.

Are You a “Challenging” or Simply a “Difficult” Direct Report?

Most managers, save for true sycophants, want to challenge their boss.  Few managers want to be puppet yes-people to the boss.  They’ve worked hard to get where they are.  They bring years of wisdom and experience.  They want to push and challenge.  But many don’t know when or how.  More importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

How often do you think you’re challenging the boss when he/she thinks you’re just being plain difficult?  Challenging direct reports keep their positions and rise with the organization.  Difficult ones get jettisoned along the way.

There are two great ways you can figure out how often you’re being which:

  • Think of things from the boss’s perspective
  • Ask the boss

Think from the Boss’s Perspective

Bosses want to get things done.  Things generally fall into two buckets:  easy and hard.  Easy things may still entail a lot of work and planning, but there’s nothing really conceptually difficult or unknown about them.

Running the company’s presence at a tradeshow you attend every year might be a lot of work, but I’ll consider it easy for this conversation because that work is known.

Deciding to terminate a problem employee is easy.  (Note inclusion of word “problem.”)  If you see a problem, the adage goes, everyone else has probably already seen it for months and the damage done is more than you know.  This decision is hard from a personal perspective — I’ve never met anyone who enjoys terminating people.  But firing someone who routinely misses deadlines, training sessions, and team meetings isn’t hard in this context.

Launching the new version of a product is easy.  Yes, the positioning may be hard, but managing the overall launch process is easy.   It’s hopefully done a few times per year.  Yes, it’s a lot of work and planning, but there’s nothing conceptually difficult about running the process.

Difficult direct reports make easy things hard.  How?

  • Complexification.  When you ask someone the time you discover that there are three types of people in the world:  those who tell you the time, those who tell you how to build a watch, and those who tell you how to build a Swiss village.  Simplifiers go far in organizations, complexifiers get stuck.
  • Lack of follow through.  Bosses want to talk once about a project, agree to it, and then have it get executed.  As my friend Lance Walter always said bosses want “set it and forget it” direct reports.  If you have a question, come ask.  But otherwise I assume you are tracking our agreed-to objectives and they’re going to happen without me having to check and re-check.  Ditto for feedback given along the way.
  • Drama.  Difficult directs tend to take things personally.  They turn criticism of work into criticism of them.  They view a heavy workload as dramatic sacrifice and not a prioritization problem.  They are sensitive to criticism, defensive when questioned or given feedback, and often unable to separate bad performance from bad intent.

The result is that over time the boss starts to loathe the idea of meeting with the direct report which results in a downward spiral of communication and relationship.

Challenging direct reports keep easy things easy.  They get shit done without a lot of supervision, complexification, or drama.  On the flip side, challengers don’t just go along for the ride when it comes to inherently hard things like fixing a break in the sales pipeline, selecting company or product strategies, or working on a competitive campaign strategy.  They weigh in, sometimes challenging the majority or consensus view.  They provide good arguments for why what everyone else is thinking could be wrong.  Their selective Devil’s advocacy helps the company avoid groupthink and the organization make better decisions.  And they do this without going overboard and positioning themselves as the resident contrarian.

Simply put, when you say something to the boss or in a meeting, imagine how the boss will react and then count the ratio between the following two reactions

  • God, what a pain in the ass.
  • Wow, I hadn’t thought of that.

Ratios above 1.0 indicate you are a net difficult direct report.  Ratios below 1.0 indicate you are a net challenger.

Ask the Boss

Since knowing is always superior to guessing, I’ll give you a set of good questions that can help you figure out where you stand.

  1. If you had to rank your direct reports from top to bottom in terms of difficultly, would I fall above or below the median and why?
  2. Can you please list 3-5 things I do that make it difficult to manage me so I can work on them?
  3. To what extent do you find me difficult/contrarian for difficulty’s sake vs. genuinely challenging ideas and helping the company reach better decisions?
  4. When it comes to strategic debates do you feel that I sit on the sidelines too much, participate too much, or strike a good balance?
  5. If there is a pattern of skipped/cancelled 1-1’s (a sign of avoidance) or higher frequency 1-1’s with other directs, then ask why?

Sycophants know they are sycophants.  Challengers usually know they are challengers.  The risk is that you are a difficult when you think you’re a challenger — and that rarely ends well.  So think about, ask, and take appropriate measures to correct the situation.  Before your boss doesn’t want to talk to you anymore.

How To Get Your Startup a Halo

How would you like your startup to win deals not only when you win a customer evaluation, but when you tie — and even sometimes when you lose?

That sounds great.  But is it even possible?  Amazingly, yes — but you need have a halo effect working to your advantage.  What is a halo effect?  Per Wikipedia,

The halo effect is a cognitive bias in which an observer’s overall impression of a person, company, brand, or product influences the observer’s feelings and thoughts about that entity’s character or properties

There’s a great, must-read book (The Halo Effect) on the how this and eight other related effects apply in business.  The book is primarily about how the business community makes incorrect attributions about “best practices” in culture, leadership, values, and process that are subsequent to — but were not necessarily drivers of — past performance.

I know two great soundbites that summarize the phenomenon of pseudo-science in business:

  • All great companies have buildings.” Which comes from the (partly discredited) Good To Great that begins with the observation that in their study cohort of top-performing companies that all of them had buildings — and thus that simply looking for commonalities among top-performing companies was not enough; you’d have to look for distinguishing factors between top and average performers.
  • “If Marc Benioff carried a rabbit’s foot, would you?”  Which comes from a this Kellblog post where I make the point that blindly copying the habits of successful people will not replicate their outcome and, with a little help from Theodore Levitt, that while successful practitioners are intimately familiar with their own beliefs and behaviors, that they are almost definitionally ignorant of which ones helped, hindered, or were irrelevant to their own success.

Now that’s all good stuff and if you stop reading right here, you’ll hopefully avoid falling for pseudo-science in business.  That’s important.  But it misses an even bigger point.

Has your company ever won (or lost) a deal because of:

  • Perceived momentum?
  • Analyst placement on a quadrant or other market map?
  • Perceived market leadership?
  • Word of mouth as the “everyone’s using it” or “next thing” choice?
  • Perceived hotness?
  • Vibe at your events or online?
  • A certain feeling or je ne sais quoi that you were more (or less) preferred?
  • Perceived vision?

If yes, you’re seeing halo effects at work.

Halo effects are real.  Halo effects are human nature.  Halo effects are cognitive biases that tip the scales in your favor.  So the smart entrepreneur should be thinking:  how do I get one for my company?  (And the smart customer, how can I avoid being over-influenced by them?  See bottom of post.)

In Silicon Valley, a number of factors drive the creation of halo effects around a company.  Some of these are more controllable than others.  But overall, you should be thinking about how you can best combine these factors into an advantage.

  • Lineage, typically in the form of previous success at a hot company (e.g., Reid Hoffman of PayPal into LinkedIn, Dave Duffield of PeopleSoft into Workday).  The implication here (and a key part of halo effects) is that past success will lead to future success, as it sometimes does.  This one’s hard to control, but ceteris paribus, co-founding (even somewhat ex post facto) a company with an established entrepreneur will definitely help in many ways, including halo effects.
  • Investors, in one of many forms:  (1) VC’s with a strong brand name (e.g., Andreessen Horowitz), (2) specific well known venture capitalists (e.g., Doug Leone), (3) well known individual investors (e.g., Peter Thiel), and to a somewhat lesser extent (4) visible and/or famous angels (e.g., Ashton Kutcher). The implication here is obvious, that the investor’s past success is an indication of your future success.  There’s no doubt that strong investors help build halo effects indirectly through reputation; in cases they can do so directly as well via staff marketing partners designed to promote portfolio companies.
  • Investment.  In recent years, simply raising a huge amount of money has been enough to build a significant halo effect around a company, the implication being that “if they can raise that much money, then there’s got to be a pony in there somewhere.” Think Domo’s $690M or Palantir’s $2.1B.   The media loves these “go big or go home” stories and both media and customers seem to overlook the increased risk associated with staggering burn rates, the waste that having too much capital can lead to, the possibility that the investors represent “dumb money,” and the simple fact that “at scale” these businesses are supposed to be profitable.  Nevertheless, if you have the stomach, the story, and the connections to raise a dumbfounding amount of capital, it can definitely build a halo around your company.  For now, at least.
  • Valuation.  Even as the age of the unicorn starts to wane, it’s undeniable that in recent years, valuation has been a key tool to generate halos around a company.  In days of yore, valuation was a private matter, but as companies discovered they could generate hype around valuation, they started to disclose it, and thus the unicorn phenomenon was born.  As unicorn status became increasingly de rigeur, things got upside-down and companies started trading bad terms (e.g., multiple liquidation preferences, redemption rights) in order to get $1B+ (unicorn) post-money valuations.  That multiplying the price of a preferred share with superior rights by a share count that includes the number of lesser preferred and common shares is a fallacious way to arrive at a company valuation didn’t matter.  While I think valuation as a hype driver may lose some luster as many unicorns are revealed as horses in party hats (e.g., down-round IPOs), it can still be a useful tool.  Just be careful about what you trade to get it.  Don’t sell $100M worth of preferred with a ratcheted 2 moving to 3x liquidation preference — but what if someone would buy just $5M worth on those terms.  Yes, that’s a total hack, but so is the whole idea of multiplying a preferred share price times the number of common shares.  And it’s far less harmful to the company and the common stock.  Find your own middle ground / peace on this issue.
  • Growth and vision.  You’d think that industry watchers would look at a strategy and independently evaluate its merits in terms of driving future growth.  But that’s not how it works.  A key part of halo effects is misattribution of practices and performance.  So if you’ve performed poorly and have an awesome strategy, it will overlooked — and conversely.  Sadly, go-forward strategy is almost always viewed through the lens of past performance, even if that performance were driven by a different strategy or affected positively or negatively by execution issues unrelated to strategy.  A great story isn’t enough if you want to generate a vision halo effect.  You’re going to need to talk about growth numbers to prove it.  (That this leads to a pattern of private companies reporting inflated or misleading numbers is sadly no surprise.)  But don’t show up expecting to wow folks with vision. Ultimately, you’ll need to wow them with growth — which then provokes interest in vision.
  • Network.  Some companies do a nice and often quiet job of cultivating friends of the company who are thought leaders in their areas.  Many do this through inviting specific people to invest as angels.  Some do this simply through communications.  For example, one day I received an email update from Vik Singh clearly written for friends of Infer. I wasn’t sure how I got on the list, but found the company interesting and over time I got to know Vik (who is quite impressive) and ended up, well, a friend of Infer.  Some do this through advisory boards, both formal and informal.  For example, I did a little bit of advising for Tableau early on and later discovered a number of folks in my network who’d done the same thing.  The company benefitted by getting broad input on various topics and each of us felt like we were friends of Tableau.  While sort of thing doesn’t generate the same mainstream media buzz as a $1B valuation, it is a smart influencer strategy that can generate fans and buzz among the cognoscenti who, in theory at least, are opinion leaders in their chosen areas.

Before finishing the first part of this post, I need to provide a warning that halo effects are both powerful and addictive.  I seem to have a knack for competing against companies pursuing halo-driven strategies and the pattern I see typically runs like this.

  • Company starts getting some hype off good results.
  • Company starts saying increasingly aggressive things to build off the hype.
  • Analysts and press reward the hype with strong quadrant placements and great stories and blogs.
  • Company puts itself under increasing pressure to produce numbers that support the hype.

And then one of three things happens:

  1. The company continues delivering strong results and all is good, though the rhetoric and vision gets more unrelated to the business with each cycle.
  2. The company stops delivering results and is downgraded from hot-list to shit-list in the minds of the industry.
  3. The company cuts the cord with reality and starts inflating results in order to sustain the hype cycle and avoid outcome #2 above.  The vision inflates as aggressively as the numbers.

I have repeatedly had to compete against companies where claims/results were inflated to “prove” the value of bad/ordinary strategies to impress industry analysts to get strong quadrant positions to support broader claims of vision and leadership to drive more sales to inflate to even greater claimed results.  Surprisingly, I think this is usually done more in the name of ego than financial gain, but either way the story ends the same way — in terminations, lawsuits and, in one case, a jail sentence for the CEO.

Look, there are valid halo-driven strategies out there and I encourage you to try and use them to your company’s advantage — just be very careful you don’t end up addicted to halo heroin.  If you find yourself wanting to do almost anything to sustain the hype bubble, then you’ll know you’re addicted and headed for trouble.

The Customer View

Thus far, I’ve written this post entirely from the vendor viewpoint, but wanted to conclude by switching sides and offering customers some advice on how to think about halo effects in choosing vendors.   Customers should:

  • Be aware of halo effects.  The first step in dealing with any problem is understanding it exists. While supposedly technical, rational, and left-brained, technology can be as arbitrary as apparel when it comes to fashion.  If you’re evaluating vendors with halos, realize that they exist for a reason and then go understand why.  Are those drivers relevant — e.g., buying HR from Dave Duffield seems a reasonable idea.  Or are they spurious —  e.g., does it really matter that one board member invested in Facebook?  Or are they actually negative — e.g., if the company has raised $300M how crazy is their burn rate, what risk does that put on the business, and how focused will they stay on you as a customer and your problem as a market?
  •  Stay focused on your problem.  I encourage anyone buying technology to write down their business problems and high-level technology requirements before reaching out to vendors.  Hyped vendors are skilled at “changing the playing field” and trained to turn their vision into your (new) requirements.  While there certainly are cases where vendors can point out valid new requirements, you should periodically step back and do a sanity check:  are you still focused on your problem or have you been incrementally moved to a different, or greatly expanded one.  Vision is nice, but you won’t be around solve tomorrow’s problems if you can’t solve today’s.
  • Understand that industry analysts are often followers, not leaders.  If a vendor is showing you analyst support for their strategy, you need to figure out if the analyst is endorsing the strategy because of the strategy’s merits or because of the vendor’s claimed prior performance.  The latter is the definition of a halo effect and in a world full of private startups where high-quality analysts are in short supply, it’s easy to find “research” that effectively says nothing more than “this vendor is a leader because they say they’re performing really well and/or they’ve raised a lot of money.” That doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t know already and isn’t actually an independent source of information.  They are often simply amplifiers of the hype you’re already hearing.
  • Enjoy the sizzle; buy the steak.  Hype king Domo paid Alec Baldwin to make some (pretty pathetic) would-be viral videos and had Billy Beane, Flo Rida, Ludacris, and Marshawn Lynch at their user conference.  As I often say, behind any “marketing genius” is an enormous marketing budget, and that’s all you’re seeing — venture capital being directly converted into hype.  Heck, let them buy you a ticket to the show and have a great time.  Just don’t buy the software because of it — or because of the ability to invest more money in hand-grooming a handful of big-name references.  Look to meet customers like you, who have spent what you want to spend, and see if they’re happy and successful.  Don’t get handled into meeting other customers only at pre-arranged meetings.  Walk the floor and talk to regular people.  Find out how many are there for the show, or because they’re actual successful users of the software.
  • Dive into detail on the proposed solution.  Hyped vendors will often try to gloss over solutions and sell you the hype (e.g., “of course we can solve your problem, we’ve got the most logos, Gartner says we’re the leader, there’s an app for that.”)  What you need is a vendor who will listen to your problem, discuss it with you intelligently, and provide realistic estimates on what it takes to solve it.  The more willing they are to do that, the better off you are.  The more they keep talking about the founder’s escape from communism, the pedigree of their investors, their recent press coverage, or the amount of capital they’ve raised, the more likely you are to end up high and dry.  People interested in solving your problem will want to talk about your problem.
  • Beware the second-worst outcome:  the backwater.  Because hyped vendors are actually serving Sand Hill Road and/or Wall Street more than their customers, they pitch broad visions and huge markets in order to sustain the halo.  For a customer, that can be disastrous because the vendor may view the customer’s problems as simply another lily pad to jump off on the path to success.  The second-worst outcome is when you buy a solution and then vendor takes your money and invests it in solving other problems.  As a customer, you don’t want to marry your vendor’s fling.  You want to marry their core.  For startups, the pattern is typically over-expansion into too many things, getting in trouble, and then retracting hard back into the core, abandoning customers of the new, broader initiatives.  The second-worst outcome is when you get this alignment wrong and end up in a backwater or formerly-strategic area of your supplier’s strategy.
  • Avoid the worst outcome:  no there there.  Once in awhile, there is no “there there” behind some very hyped companies despite great individual investors, great VCs, strategic alliances, and a previously experienced team.  Perhaps the technology vision doesn’t pan out, or the company switches strategies (“pivots”) too often.  Perhaps the company just got too focused on its hype and not on it customers.  But the worst outcome, while somewhat rare, is when a company doesn’t solve its advertised problem. They may have a great story, a sexy demo, and some smart people — but what they lack is a core of satisfied customers solving the problem the company talks about.  In EPM, with due respect and in my humble opinion, Tidemark fell into this category, prior to what it called a “growth investment” and what sure seemed to me like a (fire) sale, to Marlin Equity Partners.  Customers need to watch out for these no-there-there situations and the best way to do that is taking strong dose of caveat emptor with a nose for “if it sounds too good to be true, then it might well possibly be.”

Do You Want to be Judged on Intentions or Results?

It was early in my career, maybe 8 years in, and I was director of product marketing at a startup.  One day, my peer, the directof of marketing programs hit me with this in an ops review meeting:

You want to be judged on intentions, not results.

I recall being dumbfounded at the time.  Holy cow, I thought.  Is he right?  Am I standing up arguing about mitigating factors and how things might have been when all the other people in the room were thinking only about black-and-white results?

It was one of those rare phrases that really stuck with me because, among other reasons, he was so right.  I wasn’t debating whether things happened or not.  I wasn’t making excuses or being defensive.  But I was very much judging our performance in the theoretical, hermetically sealed context of what might have been.

Kind of like sales saying a deal slipped instead of did not close.   Or marketing saying we got all the MQLs but didn’t get the requisite pipeline.  Or alliances saying that we signed up the 4 new partners, but didn’t get the new opportunities that were supposed to come with them.

Which phrase of the following sentence matters more — the first part or the second?

We did what we were supposed to, but it didn’t have the desired effect.

We would have gotten the 30 MQLS from the event if it hadn’t snowed in Boston.  But who decided to tempt fate by doing a live event in Boston in February?  People who want to be judged on intentions think about the snowstorm; people who want to be judged on results think about the MQLs.

People who want to judged on intentions build in what they see as “reasons” (which others typically see as “excuses”) for results not being achieved.

I’m six months late hiring the PR manager, but that’s because it’s hard to find great PR people right now.  (And you don’t want me to hire a bad one, do you?)

No, I don’t want you to hire a bad one.  I want you to hire a great one and I wanted you to hire them 6 months ago.  Do you think every other PR manager search in the valley took 6 months more than plan?  I don’t.

Fine lines exist here, no doubt.  Sometimes reasons are reasons and sometimes they are actually excuses.  The question isn’t about any one case.  It’s about, deep down, are you judging yourself by intentions or results?

You’d be surprised how many otherwise very solid people get this one thing wrong — and end up career-limited as a result.