Category Archives: SaaS

Book Review: Enablement Mastery by Elay Cohen

I had the pleasure of working with Elay Cohen during my brief stint at Salesforce.com and I reviewed SalesHood, his first book, over four years ago.  We were early and happy customers of the SalesHood application at Host Analytics.  I’m basically a big fan of Elay’s and what he does.  With the average enterprise SaaS startup spending somewhere between 40% to 80%+ of revenue on sales, doesn’t it make sense to carve off some portion of that money into a Sales Enablement team, to make sure the rest is well spent?  It sure does to me.

I was pleased to hear that Elay had written a second book, Enablement Mastery, and even more pleased to be invited to the book launch in San Francisco several weeks back.  Here’s a photo of Cloudwords CEO Michael Meinhardt and me at the event.

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I have to say I simply love salesops and sales productivity people.  They’re uniformly smart, positive, results-oriented, and — unlikely many salespeople — process-oriented.  A big part of the value of working with SalesHood, for a savvy customer, is to tap into the network of amazing sales enablement professionals Elay has built and whose stories are profiled in Enablement Mastery.

I read the book after the event and liked it.  I would call it a holistic primer on sales enablement which, since it’s a relatively new and somewhat misunderstood discipline, is greatly in need in the market.

Elay’s a great story-teller so the book is littered with stories and examples, from his own considerable experience building the impressive Salesforce.com sales productivity team, to the many stories of his friends and colleagues profiled in the book.

Some of the more interesting questions Elay examines in Enablement Mastery include:

  • Why sales enablement?
  • Where to plug it organizationally?  (With pros and cons of several choices.)
  • What to do in your first 90 days in a new sales enablement role?
  • What to look for when hiring sales enablement professionals?
  • How to get organizational (and ideally strong CEO) buy-in to the sales enablement program?
  • How sales enablement can work best with marketing?  (Hint:  there is often tension here.)
  • What is a holistic process map for the sales enablement function?
  • How to measure the sales enablement function?  (And it better be more than instructor ratings on the bootcamp.)
  • How to enable front-line managers to be accountable for their role enabling and developing their teams?  (Elay wrote a whole chapter on this topic.)
  • How to conduct a quarterly business review (QBR)?
  • How managers can use basic Selling through Curiosity principles to coach using curiosity as well?
  • How to build an on-boarding plan and program?
  • What core deliverables need to be produced by the marketing and sales productivity teams?

Elay, never one to forget to celebrate achievement and facilitate peer-level knowledge sharing, also offers tips on how to runs sales kickoffs and quota clubs.

Overall, I’d highly recommend Enablement Mastery as a quick read that provides a great, practical overview of an important subject.  If you’re going to scale your startup and your sales force, sales enablement is going to be an important part of the equation.

Price Qualification: The Tiffany Way

Most salespeople are familiar with so-called BANT qualification:  does the prospect have Budget, Authority, Need, and Timeframe in order to make a purchase?  While Solution Selling purists dislike BANT (arguing that it’s great way to find existing deals that have been already rigged for the competition), most sales organizations today use BANT, or some form of it, for lead qualification and scoring.  Typically, in an enterprise SaaS company, a sales development rep (SDR) will not pass an opportunity to sales unless some form of BANT qualification has been performed.

The purpose of this post is to drill into how you should do price (i.e., budget) qualification, which I believe is far more subtle than it appears:

  • People can sometimes spend far more than they are spending (and/or imagine they can spend) once they realize the total cost of owning their current system and/or the total benefits of owning a superior one.  Great salespeople, by the way, help them do precisely that.
  • SDRs barking average configuration prices or, worse yet, price list items (e.g., “enterprise edition has a base fee of $100K/year plus $2.5K per admin user/year”) can either scare away or anchor bias prospects to given price points.

For example, let’s say that your company sells a high-end planning/budgeting system (average cost $250K/year) and you find a prospect who is spending $50K/year for their existing planning/budgeting system, which isn’t delivering very good results.

  1. It’s inflexible and doesn’t allow the VP of Finance to make the reports the CFO repeatedly requests.
  2. It’s arcane and requires highly paid consultants to come several weeks/quarter in order to make changes and performance maintenance on the basic setup.
  3. It’s slow, so users are frustrated trying to load their budgets, and instead mail them to Finance via spreadsheets, asking Finance to do the loads, creating a significant amount of incremental work for the finance team.

How are we supposed to price qualify this opportunity?  Ask the prospect:

  • How much they want to spend?  Answer:  as little as possible.
  • How much budget they have?  Answer:  $50K.
  • How much they are paying for the existing system?  Answer:  $50K.

As an SDR, are you supposed to pass this ostensibly $50K opportunity to a salesrep who normally does $250K deals [1]?  If you’re smart, you know they have the money — those consultants in problem 2 might run $100K/year, they probably have to hire an extra analyst or two to solve problem 3 at $80K/year each, and problem 1 — which is career threatening for the VP of Finance — is, as Mastercard likes to say, “priceless.”

What’s more, what do you say if the prospect tries to price qualify you?

You know, we don’t have a lot of money for this project so I need to know the typical price of your system?

What do you say then?  $50K and jeopardize the deal downstream when the salesrep proposes $250K?  $250K and possibly scare them off at the start — even though you know the total cost of their existing system might be bigger than that today?

Capture

I’ve always liked Tiffany’s as a reference point for this.  As you may know, most Tiffany’s stores are divided in two.  On one side — typically the smaller, more crowded one — you can buy jewelry from $200 to $2,000.  Then there’s the other side, where the security guard hangs out, that’s bigger and less crowded, and where the jewelry costs from $10K to $200K+.

The thing I find funny about Tiffany’s is that somehow, magically, most people seem to figure out what side they belong on.  And when they don’t, the staff don’t ask you how much money you have — they tell you broad price ranges on each side of the store.

The keywords, in an enterprise software context, being “broad” and “ranges.”  So, in our scenario, I think the best initial answer to the pricing question is:

That’s a hard question to answer at this point.  Each customer and every situation is different.  Our systems scale across a broad range of needs and, as a result, prices typically range from $50K on the low end to $500K+ on the high-end.  Based upon what I know about your situation, I’d recommend that you have a conversation with one of our account managers so we can better understand your challenges, our ability to meet them, and establish a clearer price point for so doing.

Your goal is to neither scare them off nor anchor bias them to a lower price (“sure we can do that for $50K”) that later results in disappointment or, worse yet, a feeling your company can’t be trusted.

Finally, the great part about the Tiffany analogy is that most enterprise software companies actually do have both sides of the store — corporate sales and enterprise sales, often each selling different and appropriately priced editions of the software. While few SaaS companies actually segment between the two based on deal size, they typically use other variables that are intended to act as direct proxies for it.

# # #

Notes

[1] The answer in most SDR models would be “yes, just pass it” so the hard part isn’t the decision to pass it, but how to do so without anchor biasing the prospect to a $50K price.  (“Whoa, the SDR told me you could do this for $50K; he asked how much budget I had and I told him precisely that.”)

 

Slides from My SaaStr Annual 2019 Presentation (5 Questions CEOs Struggle With)

Thanks to everyone who attended my session today at the amazing — and huge — SaaStr Annual 2019 conference in San Jose.  In this post, I’ll share the slides from my presentation, Five Questions SaaS CEOs Wrestle With (and some thoughts on how to answer them).

The folks at SaaStr recorded the session, so at some point a video of it will be available (but that probably won’t be for a while).  When it is up, I will also post it to Kellblog.

In some sense definitionally, there were two types of people in the audience:

  • CEOs, who hopefully received some fresh perspective on these age-old, never-quite-put-to-bed questions.
  • Those who work for them, who hopefully received some insights into the mind of the CEO that will help make you more valuable team members and help you advance your career.

As mentioned, please send me feedback if you have examples where something in the presentation resonated with you, you applied it in some way, and it made a positive impact on your working life.  I’d love to hear it.

Here are the slides from the presentation.

Rule of 40 Glideslope Planning

Enterprise SaaS companies need a lot of money to grow. The median company spends $1.32 to acquire $1.00 in annual recurring revenue (ARR) [1].  They need to make that investment for 14 years before getting to an IPO.  It all adds up to a median of $300M in capital raised prior to an IPO.

With such vast amounts of money in play, some say “it’s a growth at all costs” game.  But others hold to the Rule of 40 which attempts to balance growth and profitability with a simple rule:  grow as fast as you want as long as your revenue growth rate + your free cashflow margin >= 40%.

The Rule of 40 gets a lot of attention, but I think that companies are not asking the right question about it.  The right question is not “when should my growing startup be Rule of 40 compliant?” [2]

For more than half of all public SaaS companies, the answer to that question, by the way, is “not yet.”  Per multiple studies I’ve read the median Rule of 40 score for public SaaS companies is ~31%, meaning that more than half of public SaaS companies are not Rule of 40 compliant [3].

So, unless you’re an absolutely amazing company like Elastic (which had a Rule of 40 score of 87% at its IPO), you probably shouldn’t be unrealistically planning to become Rule of 40 compliant three years before your IPO [4].  If you do, especially if you’re well funded and don’t need additional expense constraints, you might well compromise growth with a premature focus on the Rule of 40, which could shoot off your corporate foot in terms of your eventual valuation.

If “when should we be Rule of 40 compliant” is the wrong question, then what’s the right one?

What should my company’s Rule of 40 glideslope be?

That is, over the next several years what is your eventual Rule of 40 score target and how do you want to evolve to it?  The big advantage of this question is that the answer isn’t “a year” and it doesn’t assume Rule of 40 compliance.  But it does get you to start thinking about and tracking your Rule of 40 score.

I built a little model to help do some what-if analysis around this question.  You can download it here.

r40-1

In our example, we’ve got a 5 year-old, $30M ARR SaaS company planning the next five years of its evolution, hopefully with an IPO in year 8 or 9.  The driver cells (orange) define how fast you want to grow and what you want your Rule of 40 glideslope to be.  Everything else is calculated.  At the bottom we have an overall efficiency analysis:  in each year how much more are we spending than the previous year, how much more revenue do we expect to get, and what’s the ratio between the two (i.e., which works like kind of an incremental revenue CAC).  As we improve the Rule of 40 score you can see that we need to improve efficiency by spending less for each incremental dollar of revenue.  You can use this as a sanity check on your results as we’ll see in a minute.

Let me demonstrate why I predict that 9 out 10 ten CFOs will love this modeling approach.  Let’s look at every CFO’s nightmare scenario.  Think:  “we can’t really control revenues but we can control expenses so my wake up in the middle of the night sweating outcome is that we build expenses per the plan and miss the revenues.”

r40-2

In the above (CFO nightmare) scenario, we hold expenses constant with the original plan and come in considerably lighter on revenue.  The drives us miles off our desired Rule of 40 glideslope (see red cells).  We end up needing to fund $42.4M more in operating losses than the original plan, all to generate a company that’s $30.5M smaller in revenue and generating much larger losses.  It’s no wonder why CFOs worry about this.  They should.

What would the CFO really like?  A Rule-of-40-driven autopilot.

As in, let’s agree to a Rule of 40 glideslope and then if revenues come up short, we have all pre-agreed to adjust expenses to fall in line with the new, reduced revenues and the desired Rule of 40 score.

r40-3

That’s what the third block shows above.  We hold to the reduced revenues of the middle scenario but reduce expenses to hold to the planned Rule of 40 glideslope.  Here’s the bad news:  in this scenario (and probably most real-life ones resembling it) you can’t actually do it — the required revenue-gathering efficiency more than doubles (see red cells).  You were spending $1.38 to get an incremental $1 of revenue and, to hold to the glideslope, you need to instantly jump to spending only $0.49.  That’s not going to happen.  While it’s probably impossible to hold to the original {-10%, 0%, 5%} glideslope, if you at least try (and, e.g., don’t build expenses fully to plan when other indicators don’t support it), then you will certainly do a lot better than the {-10%, -32%, -42%} glideslope in the second scenario.

In this post, we’ve talked about the Rule of 40 and why startups should think about it as a glideslope rather than a short- or mid-term destination.  We’ve provided you with a downloadable model where you can play with your Rule of 40 glideslope.  And we’ve shown why CFOs will inherently be drawn to the Rule of 40 as a long-term planning constraint, because in many ways it will help your company act like a self-righting ship.

# # #

Notes

[1] The 75th percentile spends $1.92.  And 25% spend more than that.  Per KeyBanc.

[2] Rule of 40 compliant means a company has an rule of 40 score >= 40%.  See next note.

[3] Rule of 40 score is generally defined as revenue growth rate + free cashflow (FCF) margin.  Sometimes operating margin or EBITDA margin is used instead because FCF margin can be somewhat harder to find.

[4] I’m trying to find data a good data set of Rule of 40 scores at IPO time but thus far haven’t found one.  Anecdotally, I can say that lots of successful high-growth SaaS IPOs (e.g., MongoDB, Anaplan, and Blackline) were not Rule of 40 compliant at IPO time — nor were they well after, e.g., as of Oct 2018 per JMP’s quarterly software review.  It seems that if growth is sufficiently there, that the profitability constraint can be somewhat deferred in the mind of the market.

SaaStr 2019 Presentation Preview: Five Questions SaaS CEO Wrestle With

I’m super excited for the upcoming SaaStr Annual 2019 conference in San Jose from February 5th through the 7th at the San Jose Convention Center.  I hope to see you there — particularly for my session from 10:00 AM to 10:30 AM on Tuesday, February 5th.  Last year they ended up repeating my session but that won’t be possible this year as I’m flying to Europe for a board meeting later in the week — so if you want to see it live, please come by at 10:00 AM on Tuesday!

saastr 2019

I’d quibble with the subtitle, “Lessons from Host Analytics,” because it’s actually more, “Lessons From a Lifetime of Doing This Stuff,” and examples will certainly include but also span well beyond Host Analytics.  In fact, I think one thing that’s reasonably unique about my background is that I have 10+ years’ tenure in two different, key roles within an enterprise software company:

  • CEO of two startups, combined for over ten years (MarkLogic, Host Analytics).
  • CMO of two startups, combined for over ten years (BusinessObjects, Versant).

I’ve also been an independent director on the board of 4 enterprise software startups, two of which have already had outstanding exits.  And I just sold a SaaS startup in an interesting process during which I learned a ton.  So we’ve got a lot of experience to draw upon.

SaaS startup CEO is hard job.  It’s a lonely job, something people don’t typically understand until they do it.  It’s an odd job — for what might be the first time in your career you have no boss, per se, just a committee.  You’re responsible for the life and death of the company.  Scores or hundreds of people depend on you to make payroll.  You need to raise capital, likely in the tens of millions of dollars — but these days increasingly in the hundreds — to build your business.

You’re driving your company into an uncertain future and, if you’re good, you’re trying to define that future your way in the mind of the market.  You’re trying to build an executive team that not only will get the job done today, but that can also scale with you for the next few years.  You’re trying to systematize the realization of a vision, breaking it down into the right parts in the right order to ensure market victory.  And, while you’re trying to do all that, you need to keep a board happy that may have interests divergent from your own and those of the company.  Finally, it’s an accelerating treadmill of a job – the better you do, the more is expected of you.

Wait!  Why do we do this again?  Because it’s also a fantastic job.  You get to:

  • Define and realize a vision for a market space.
  • Evangelize new and better ways of doing things.
  • Compete to win key customers, channels, and partners.
  • Work alongside incredibly talented and accomplished people.
  • Serve the most leading and progressive customers in the market.
  • Manage a growing organization, building ideally not just a company but a culture that reflects your core values.
  • Leverage that growth internationally, exploring and learning about the planet and the business cultures across it.

Basically, you get to play strategic N-dimensional wizard chess against some of the finest minds in the business.  Let’s face it.  It’s cool.  Despite the weight that comes with the job, any SaaS startup CEO should feel privileged every day about the job that they “get to” do.

But there are certain nagging questions that hound any SaaS startup CEO.  Questions that never quite get answered and put to bed.  Ones that need to asked and re-asked.  Those are the 5 questions we’ll discuss in my talk.  And here they are:

  1. When do I next raise money?
  2. Do I have the right team?
  3. How can I better manage the board?
  4. To what extent should I worry about competitors?
  5. Are we focused enough?

Each one is a question that can cost you the company, the market, or your job.  They’re all hard.  In my estimation, number 4 is the trickiest and most subtle.  There’s even a bonus question 6 – “are we winning?” — that is perhaps the most important of them all.

I look forward to speaking with you and hope you can attend the session.  If you have any advance questions to stimulate my thinking while preparing for the session, please do send them along via email, DM, or comment.

You don’t need to be a CEO to benefit from this session.  There are lots of lessons for everyone involving in creating and running a startup.  (If nothing else, you might get some insight to how your CEO might think about you and your team.)

I hope to see you there.

An Update on the SaaS Rule of 40

Thanks to the folks at Piper Jaffray and their recently published 2018 Software Market Review, we can take a look at a recent chart that plots public software company enterprise value (EV) vs. Rule of 40 (R40) score = free cash-flow margin + revenue growth rate.

As a reminder, the Rule of 40 is an industry rule of thumb that says a high-growth SaaS company can burn as much cash as it likes in order to drive growth — as long as its growth rate is 40 percentage points higher than its free cashflow margin.  It’s an attempt at devising a simple rule to help software companies with the complex question of how to balance growth and profitability.

One past study showed that while Rule of 40 compliant software companies made up a little more than half of all public software companies that they captured more than 80% of all public market cap.

Let’s take a look at Piper’s chart which plots R40 score on the X axis and enterprise value (EV) divided by revenue on the Y axis.  It also plots a presumably least squares fit line through the data points.

newer rule of 40

Source: PJC Analysis and SAP Capital IQ as of 12/31/2018

Of note:

  • Less than half of all companies in this set are Rule of 40 compliant; the median R40 score was 31.7%.
  • The median multiple for companies in the set was 6.6x.
  • The slope of the line is 12, meaning that for each 10 percentage points of R40 score improvement, a company’s revenue multiple increases by 1.2x.
  • R^2 is 0.42 which, if I recall correctly, means that the R40 score explains 42% of the variability of the data.  So, while there’s lots it doesn’t explain, it’s still a useful indicator.

A few nerdier things of note:

  • Remember that the line is only valid in the data range presented; since no companies had a negative R40 score, it would be invalid extrapolation to simply continue the line down and to the left.
  • Early-stage startup executives often misapply these charts forgetting the selection bias within them. Every company on the chart did well enough at some point in terms of size and growth to become a public SaaS company.  Just because LivePerson (LPSN) has a 4x multiple with an R40 score of 10% doesn’t mean your $20M startup with the sames score is also worth 4x.   LPSN is a much bigger company (roughly $250M) and and already cleared many hurdles to get there.

The big question around the Rule of 40 is:  when should companies start to target it?   A superstar like Elastic had 76% growth and 8% FCF margin so a R40 score of 84% at its spectacular IPO.  However, Avalara had 26% growth and -28% FCF margin for an R40 score of -2% and its IPO went fine.  Ditto Anaplan.

I’ll be doing some work in the next few months to try and get better data on R40 trajectory into an IPO.  My instinct at this point is that many companies target R40 compliance too early, sacrifice growth in the process, and hurt their valuations because they fail to deliver high growth and don’t get the assumed customer acquisition cost efficiencies built in the financial models, which end up, as one friend called them, spreadsheet-induced hallucinations.

The Next Chapter

This morning we announced that Vector Capital has closed the acquisition of Host Analytics.  As part of that transaction I have stepped down from my position of CEO at Host Analytics.  To borrow a line from The Lone Ranger, “my work is done here.”  I’ll consult a bit to help with the transition and will remain a friend of and investor in the company.

A Word of Thanks
Before talking about what’s next, let me again thank the folks who made it possible for us to quintuple Host during my tenure all while cutting customer acquisition costs in half, driving a significant increase in dollar retention rates, and making a dramatic increase in net promoter score (NPS).  Thanks to:

  • Our employees, who drove major productivity improvements in virtually all areas and were always committed to our core values of customer success, trust, and teamwork.
  • Our customers, who placed their faith in us, who entrusted us with their overall success and the secure handling of their enormously important data and who, in many cases, helped us develop the business through references and testimonials.
  • Our partners, who worked alongside us to develop the market and make customers successful – and often the most challenging ones at that.
  • Our board of directors, who consistently worked positively and constructively with the team, regardless of whether we were sailing in fair or foul weather.

We Laid the Groundwork for a Bright Future
When Vector’s very talented PR guy did his edits on the closing press release, he decided to conclude it with the following quote:

Mr. Kellogg added, “Host Analytics is a terrific company and it has been an honor lead this dynamic organization.  I firmly believe the company’s best days are ahead.”

When I first read it I thought, “what an odd thing for a departing CEO to say!”  But before jumping to change it, I thought for a bit.  In reality, I do believe it’s true.  Why do Host’s best days lie ahead?  Two reasons.

First, we did an enormous amount of groundwork during my tenure at Host.  The biggest slug of that was on product and specifically on non-functional requirements.  As a fan of Greek mythology, the technical debt I inherited felt like the fifth labor of Hercules, cleaning the Augean stables.  But, like Hercules, we got it done, and in so doing shored up the internals of a functionally excellent product and transformed our Hyderabad operation into a world-class product development center.  The rest of the groundwork was in areas like focusing the organization on the right metrics, building an amazing demand generation machine, creating our Customers for Life organization, running a world-class analyst relations program, creating a culture based on learning and development, and building a team of strong players, all curious about and focused on solving problems for customers.

Second, the market has moved in Host’s direction.  Since I have an affinity for numbers, I’ll explain the market with one single number:  three.  Anaplan’s average sales price is three times Host’s.  Host’s is three times Adaptive’s.  Despite considerable vendor marketing, posturing, positioning, haze, and confusion to the contrary, there are three clear segments in today’s EPM market.

  • Anaplan is expensive, up-market, and focused primarily on operational planning.
  • Adaptive is cheap, down-market, and focused primarily on financial planning.
  • Host is reasonably priced, mid-market, focused primarily on financial planning, with some operational modeling capabilities.

Host serves the vast middle where people don’t want (1) to pay $250K/year in subscription and build a $500K/year center of excellence to support the system or (2) to pay $25K/year only to be nickeled and dimed on downstream services and end up with a tool they outgrow in a few years.

Now, some people don’t like mid-layer strategies and would argue that Host risks getting caught in a squeeze between the other two competitors.  That never bothered me – I can name a dozen other successful SaaS vendors who grew off a mid-market base, including within the finance department where NetSuite created a hugely successful business that eventually sold for $9.3B.

But all that’s about the past.  What’s making things even better going forward?  Two things.

  • Host has significantly improved access to capital under Vector, including the ability to better fund both organic and inorganic growth. Funding?  Check.
  • If Workday is to succeed with its goals in acquiring Adaptive, all rhetoric notwithstanding, Adaptive will have to become a vendor able to deliver high-end, financial-focused EPM for Workday customers.  I believe Workday will succeed at that.  But you can’t be all things to all people; or, to paraphrase SNL, you can’t be a dessert topping and a floor wax.  Similarly, Adaptive can’t be what it will become and what it once was at the same time – the gap is too wide.  As Adaptive undergoes its Workday transformation, the market will switch from three to two layers, leaving both a fertile opening for Host in mid-market and a dramatically reduced risk of any squeeze play.  Relatively uncontested market space?  Check.

Don’t underestimate these developments.  Both these changes are huge.  I have a lot of respect for Vector in seeing them.  They say that Michelangelo could see the statue within the block of marble and unleash it.  I think Vector has clearly seen the potential within Host and will unleash it in the years to come.

What’s Next?
I don’t have any specific plans at this time.  I’m happily working on two fantastic boards already – data catalog pioneer Alation and next-generation content services platform Nuxeo.   I’ll finally have time to write literally scores of blog posts currently stalled on my to-do list.  Over the next few quarters I expect to meet a lot of interesting people, do some consulting, do some angel investing, and perhaps join another board or two.  I’ll surely do another CEO gig at some point.  But I’m not in a rush.

So, if you want to have a coffee at Coupa, a beer at the Old Pro, or – dare I date myself – breakfast at Buck’s, let me know.