Category Archives: SaaS

Lessons from Playing with a Simple Quota Attainment Model

Quota attainment can get confusing quickly. It’s simple concept, but:

  • Do you mean percent of reps at 100% of their quota or above some lower bar? Board members bark rules like, “we should shoot for 80% of our reps at 100% of quota,” almost hearing the unspoken words, “because that’s what we did back in the day at GreatCo.” How much of that is nostalgia I’m not sure, but here in the real world, I almost never see 80% at 100% [1]. In fact, getting to 80% at 80% is actually quite an achievement. 
  • Do you mean on a quarterly or annual basis? The telltale of a dilettante is when asked they reply: ”uh, well, we need 80% at 100% on a quarterly basis.” In my enterprise B2B world, that literally never happens. Getting to 80% at 100% on an annual basis is nearly impossible. On a quarterly basis, it’s absolutely impossible. See this post, and the spreadsheet at the end of it, to demonstrate this point quite tangibly [2].
  • Do you mean productivity or quota? Quota is the target we assign to reps. Productivity is what we expect them to actually sell. Many people build a quota model and then subtract a cushion to get productivity. I prefer to build a productivity model [3] and then uplift to quota. Note that both the thickness and layer-by-layer allocation of that cushion is an important sales culture issue. But, back to our main point: when you say 80% or 100%, my question is: of what? [4]
  • Do you mean rep-by-rep achievement or overall realization of assigned quota? Most people mean rep-by-rep. But it’s also quite interesting to view realization as professional services teams do. If we model a consultant to bill 2,000 hours per year at a list price of $200/hour, they should bill $400,000 per year. If, due to beach time, discounts, and rework, they end up billing $300,000, we would say their realization is 75%. We realized only 75% of their theoretical billings. By analogy, we can say that if we assign $10M in street-level quota [5] and sell $7.5M that we realized 75% of our assigned quota.

In short, there’s enough potential for confusion here that I recommend three things:

  • Track percent of reps below 50%, above 80%, and above 100% of quota [6]. 
  • Track realization of overall, street-level quota.
  • Make the conversation concrete by building and playing with a simple quota attainment model [7].

I have embedded such a model below, and you can download it here.

Let’s quickly have some fun looking at the scenarios I created:

  • Scenario 1 realizes 100% of assigned quota and does that with three stars and one superstar. 20% of reps are less than 50% of quota [8]. Fun, but rarely happens.
  • Scenario 2 is what I view as realistic for a high-performing company. We made plan. We’ve got 80% of reps at 80%. Only 20% are below 50%. 30% at 100%, which might be a tad light for most sales managers. (That’s why I started making it green at 40%.)
  • Scenario 3 explores highly uneven achievement. We’re still making plan, but half of total sales are coming from one rep. 50% are below 50%. I lived a less dramatic version of this scenario and it’s unpleasant. The board will ignore that you’re making plan and complain endlessly about the unhealthy distribution of achievement [9].
  • Scenario 4 will never happen in real life but it shows you what happens when everyone is at 80%. The good news is you’re 80% at 80% and 0% below 50%. The bad news is you’re 0% at 100%. Some people wish for this, but I’m not sure they actually understand what they’re wishing for.
  • Scenario 5 is a more realistic version of scenario 3. Again we make plan and this time we get 30% at 100%. But save for one person at 90%, everyone else is in various degrees of trouble. 50% are below 50%. Half the salesforce is thinking of quitting.
  • Scenario 6 is an utter disaster, sadly not uncommon in early-stage startups where quotas are mis-set. Either we have hired 10 bad reps or we are setting quotas too high. Change the quota to $600K and watch everything change [10]. 
  • Scenario 7 demonstrates that you can’t actually have 80% at 100% without overperforming. Only rep 7 is over quota (and by only $200K) and the other $600K comes from the contributions of the stragglers. 

If you find yourself in conversations about attainment and things start to get confusing, I’d whip out a model like this and start playing with scenarios. You can download this sheet here.

# # #

Notes

[1] Nomenclature: X% at Y% means X% of reps at or above Y% of their quota.

[2] The title is about “proving a repeatable sales process” because a common use of attainment statistics is to prove sales model repeatability.

[3] When done my way (i.e., based on productivity) every number in the model (except the one row with quota) is a realistic take on what we expect to sell. The alternative is to have every number uplifted by 20-30% and then need to do constant mental discounts. That’s too much work that’s too easily forgotten. Start your model on Earth.

[4] Some companies run two layers of cushion: quota to productivity (to account for the fact that 100% of quota is rarely realized) and then productivity to plan (to add extra cushion to increase the odds of hitting plan).

[5] The sum of the quotas for each of the reps, forgetting management layers and cushions, which can complicate things endlessly.

[6] “At” here means “at or above.” I wanted to make many sentences less wordy.

[7] People aren’t great at statistics and distributions and often screw up even simple mental math. For example, if you have a 20% cushion between quota and productivity and you say we need 80% of reps at 100% of plan, then you are also saying that the plan is to beat plan. While that might sound like a great locker room speech, it’s bad analytics. If 80% are at 100%, you hit plan. Any over-performance (and there always is) by the hundred-plus percenters takes you above plan, and any contributions from the 20% of reps below quota take you beyond that.

[8] My intent at picking 50% is both that it’s an unacceptable performance and, while you should model it out for your company, they are likely unprofitable to carry, depending on cost of sales and marketing support resources. Reps at 80% aren’t achieving plan but they are usually squarely profitable.

[9] And they’re not wrong to do so, but well, you did make plan.

[10] Orange cells are drivers/input cells that you can type in. One only hopes their OTE is $150K so it’s inline with a 4x+ quota/OTE ratio and that they don’t require heavy support resources. Then, resetting the quotas might just be the solution.

Does Your Startup Need a Sales Playbook or Just a Few Plays?

When a company is transitioning from founder-led sales (FLS) to sales-led sales (SLS), you hear the word “playbook” a lot. For early-stage companies, this rubs me the wrong way because when I hear playbook, it conjures up an image of:

  • A large sales enablement team
  • A hefty three-ring binder full of paper (or its digital equivalent)
  • A lot of templates (which perhaps commit the cardinal sin of the template leading the content)
  • A formal onboarding program that teaches playbook contents
  • And perhaps a formal sales process (e.g., MEDDIC) or methodology

That’s all great when you’re $100M+ in ARR and you’re trying to institutionalize a model that you know works — from repeated experience with scores of reps over many quarters. But for an early-stage company with less than a dozen reps and that’s still highly dependent on the founder(s) to sell software, it’s overkill.

So when these companies say they need a playbook my retort is, “no you don’t — you don’t need a playbook; you just need a handful of plays.”

What is a Playbook?

While the term gets bandied about, few seem to define it. Many companies will tell you how to make a sales playbook. For example, Pipedrive does so in a not-so-mere 4,500 words. But if the how-to-make-one guide is nine, single-spaced pages, then how big are the playbooks themselves? Usually, big. Per Pipedrive:

A sales playbook is a document that outlines your sales processes, procedures, and best practices. By following the strategies in a playbook, sales reps can increase their productivity, improve their win rates and drive revenue growth for the company. Sales playbooks typically include […] target customer profiles, stages of the sales process, how to handle customer objections, sales methodologies, sales tools and technologies, key performance indicators (KPIs), and strategic objectives.

Pipedrive’s how-to guide is a fine piece of work. It’s just way too heavy for early-stage startups. These startups can’t make large playbooks, nor should they. They don’t have the resources to build them, but far more importantly, they don’t know what to say — they simply don’t have enough experience to know what works across a wide range of buyers and situations. Sure, you can pay an intern to fill in templates, but you don’t have quality content.

That said, what’s my definition of a playbook?

A playbook is a collection of plays.

What is a Play?

My definition begs the question: what, then, is a play? So let’s define that, too.

A play is a series of steps to make in a given situation to help you win a deal.

The keywords are:

  • Steps: the things that the sales team needs to do. While different team members may do different things at different times, the quarterback of the deal is always the seller.
  • Situation: the situation for which the play is designed. For example, you might have play for leaving a deal that you don’t think is qualified (the Polite Walk Away) or for saving a deal you know you’re losing (the Hail Mary).
  • Win: the purpose of the play is to win the deal. As James Mason said of lawyers in The Verdict, “you’re not paid to do your best, you’re paid to win.” The same is true is in sales. The purpose of the play is to win.

An Example Play

Because I find the notion of play still somewhat amorphous, I’ll provide a concrete example.

Situation. You sell BI tools. You are competing against a hot competitor with a slick user interface that’s generally preferred by end-users to your own. One feature, in particular, gets audible wows when demoed. Your product and engineering team has recently released a similar but inferior version of that feature to help. Because the competitor knows they will win in end-user demos, they encourage selection committees to “let the users decide” by having a large end-user demo near the conclusion of the selection process. Your competitor calls their play the “End Run” because they’re running around the IT group charged with the selection to the end-users.

Steps. You take the following steps in this situation.

  • Build or re-use the slickest available demo of the product that you can find.
  • Request an end-user demo session for your company, too, justified by basic process fairness.
  • Demonstrate the “wow” feature several times. Know that you are likely to still lose with the end-users, but that’s not the point. You are trying to minimize the perceived gap and convince the end-users that — even if they don’t see your solution as “best” — that it’s certainly “good enough” to get the job done.
  • Call a meeting with the IT team to discuss security and administration. Convince them of the importance of security and the cost of administration. Show that your product, rightfully, is superior in both these areas.
  • Get IT to reframe the end-user vote as “input” (versus “selection”) and that they should ask the end-users two questions: which is your preferred solution and can both solutions do the job?
  • Win the deal when IT selects your product based on security and adminstration with the end-users’ consent that your solution is good enough to do the job.

That is a play. It’s not complicated. It’s easily taught. You can and should build tools to support its execution — e.g., the wow demo and a security and adminstration white paper.

Plays Are Applied Marketing

Are plays marketing or sales? While plays are always executed by sales, I think of building plays as applied marketing. We start with what we know about the customer and market. We add what we know about the competition — both in terms of product strengths/weaknesses and common sales tactics. Then we apply that knowledge into making a play (i.e., a series of steps) to beat them.

What Plays Do You Need?

I tihnk most startups need 3 or 4 plays, each of which can be described in less than a page (if not a single paragraph):

  • Replicate success. This is your primary play. If you have a few big insurance companies using your product for use-case X, then you need a play for replicating that. Who to call. What to ask. What to say. How to tell the story of your existing references. How to overcome objections. How to close.
  • Replace BigCo. If you have newer, better, faster, cheaper technology than an established (now “legacy”) vendor, you need a play for how to replace them. Who to call. What to ask. What to say. How to qualify. How to win. When to give up.
  • Beat archrival startup. If you have a head-to-head startup rival, you’ll need a play for how to beat them. This is usually a mix of product differentiators tied to use-cases combined with vision/roadmap to address objections along with strong messaging on safety, company/investor quality, and early market leadership.
  • Polite walk alway. As an early-stage startup you should walk away from plenty of deals, so you should get good at it. The deals you qualify out today are next year’s opportunities so treat them well and get good at slow nurture.

Come To My Sesssion at SaaStock Dublin: What Founders Need To Know About Product Marketing

I decided to take a quick break from SaaS metrics after doing a matched set of conference presentations in the past two months (strategic at SaaStr Annual and tactical at SaaS Metrics Palooza) — and that’s not to mention starting the SaaS Talk podcast with my “metrics brother” Ray Rike.

So I thought I’d take a moment, switch gears, and go back to my roots by talking not just about marketing, but product marketing at the upcoming SaaStock conference in Dublin. I thought I could add the most value by educating people on this often-misunderstood function that is always important, but can be particularly critical in the early days of building a SaaS company.

My session, entitled What Founders Need To Know About Product Marketing, will be on Tuesday, October 17th on the Scale Stage at 2:20pm. In the session, we’ll discuss four key questions:

  • What is product marketing?
  • How do you know if someone is good at product marketing?
  • To whom should product marketing report?
  • How can you support product marketing?

If you’re a founder, any C-level executive, product leader or manager, or heck, even a product marketer yourself, I hope you’ll be able to attend this session. Either way, I’ll post my slides shortly after the presentation and SaaStock usually makes a video generally available a bit after the show.

See you there.

Slides from SaaS Metrics Palooza 2023: How To Present SaaS Metrics Like a Pro

Last month I spoke at SaaStr Annual 2023 on The Strategic Use and Abuse of SaaS Metrics (video here). When I wrote that presentation I found myself with something of a content blivit on my hands. I had a bunch of strategic things I wanted to say, but darn it, I had a lot of tactical things I wanted to say as well.

While the strategic use of metrics is key, poor tactical presentation of metrics can lead to anything from obsfucation to disaster. Never forget Edwin Tufte’s reminder that tactical presentation mistakes can lead to quite strategic problems, demonstrated via his analysis of a Powerpoint deck that was used in a discussion of the Columbia re-entry decision.

So, instead of trying to jam everything into a single deck, I decided to write two different presentations:

While there is a touch of overlap between the two presentations (e.g., piecemealing), they are designed to be consumed together and reinforce each other, so please take a look at them both.

I have discovered a new mantra in building these decks. Because so many SaaS metrics problems are ultimately driven by a lack of trust, and because templates can do so much to build both trust and alignment, I am now in the habit of repeating:

Templates build trust. Templates build trust. Templates build trust.

I also have a new theme song (and walk-on music) for mistake number seven, excessive use of smoothing. Don’t be a Smooth (metrics) Operator.

I’ve embedded the slides of the SaaS Metrics Palooza presentation below. You can download a PDF of them as well. You can find a video of the presentation at the SaaS Metrics Palooza Website (registration required, but free.)

Thanks to those who attended the presentation and thanks to BenchmarkIt and my SaaS Talk podcast partner, metrics brother Ray Rike, for inviting me.

Video of my SaaStr 2023 Presentation: The Strategic Use and Abuse of SaaS Metrics

At some point the folks at SaaStr will release the official video of my SaaStr Annual 2023 presentation, but for now they have posted the livestream from the room, done with some nice edits that cut back and forth between the stage and the slides. It even includes the Q&A at the end.

So, since it’s certainly “good enough” in the current format, I am posting a link to the video and embedding it below. Note that if you somehow end up at the start, you want to advance to 03:42 where the presentation actually begins. The slides are available on Kellblog here.

Thanks to Jason Lemkin and the SaaStr team for having me and thanks to everyone who attended. Enjoy! It’s a fun one.