Category Archives: sales model

New ARR and CAC in Price-Ramped vs. Auto-Expanding Deals

In this post we’re going to look at the management accounting side of multi-year SaaS deals that grow in value over time.  I’ve been asked about this a few times lately, less because people value my accounting knowledge [1] but rather because people are curious about the CAC impact of such deals and how to compensate sales on them.

Say you sign a three-year deal with a customer that ramps in payment structure:  year 1 costs $1M, year 2 costs $2M, and year 3 costs $3M.  Let’s say in this example the customer is getting the exact same value in all 3 years (e.g., the right for 1,000 people to use a SaaS service) – so the payment structure is purely financial in nature and not related to customer value.

Equal Value:  The Price-Ramped Deal
The question on my mind is how do I look at this from a new ARR bookings, ending ARR, CAC, and sales compensation perspective?

GAAP rules define precisely how to take this from a GAAP revenue perspective – and with the adoption of ASC 606 even those rules are changing.  Let’s take an example from this KPMG data sheet on ASC 606 and SaaS.

(Price-Ramped) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Payment structure $1M $2M $3M
GAAP revenue $1M $2M $3M
GAAP unbilled deferred revenue $5M $3M $0M
ASC 606 revenue $2M $2M $2M
ASC 606 unbilled accounts receivable $1M $1M $0M
ASC 606 revenue backlog $4M $2M $0M

When I look at this is I see:

  • GAAP is being conservative and saying “no cash, no revenue.” For an early stage startup with no history of actually making these deals come true, that is not a bad position.  I like the concept of GAAP unbilled deferred revenue, but I don’t actually know anyone who tracks it, let alone discloses it.  Folks might release backlog in some sort of unbilled total contract value (TCV) metric which I suspect is similar [2].
  • ASC 606 is being aggressive and mathematical – “hey, if it’s a 3-year, $6M deal, then that’s $2M/year, let’s just smooth it all out [3]”. While “unbilled A/R” strikes me as (another) oxymoron I see why they need it and I do like the idea of ASC 606 revenue backlog [4].  I think the ASC 606 approach makes a lot of sense for more mature companies, which have a history of making these deals work [5].

Now, from an internal, management accounting perspective, what do you want to do with this deal in terms of new ARR bookings, ending ARR balance, CAC ratio, and sales comp?  We could say:

  • It’s $2M in new ARR today
  • Ergo calculate this quarter’s CAC with it counted as $2M
  • Add $2M in ending ARR
  • Pay the salesrep on a $2M ARR deal – and let our intelligently designed compensation plan protect us in terms of the delayed cash collections [6] [6A]

And I’d be OK with that treatment.  Moreover, it jibes with my definition of ARR which is:

End-of-quarter ARR / 4 = next-quarter subscription revenue, if nothing changes [7]

That’s because ASC 606 also flattens out the uneven cash flows into a flat revenue stream.

Now, personally, I don’t want to be financing my customers when I’m at a high-burn startup, so I’m going to try and avoid deals like this.  But if I have to do one, and we’re a mature enough business to be quite sure that years 2 and 3 are really coming, then I’m OK to treat it this way.  If I’m not sure we’ll get paid in years 2 and 3 – say it’s for a brand-new product that has never been used at this scale – then I might revert to the more GAAP-oriented, 1-2-3 approach, effectively treating the deal not as a price ramp, but as an auto-expander.

Increasing Value:  The Auto-Expanding Deal
Let’s say we have a different use-case.  We sell a SaaS platform and year 1 will be exclusively focused on developing a custom SaaS app, we will roll it to 500 users day 1 of year 2, and we will roll it to 500 more users on day 1 of year 3.  Further assume that the customer gets the same value from each of these phases and each phase continues until the end of the contract [8].  Also assume the customer expects that going forward, they will be paying $3M/year plus annual inflation adjustments.

Oy veh.  Now it’s much harder.  The ramped shape of the curve is not about financing at all.  It’s about the value received by the customer and the ramped shape of the payments perfectly reflects the ramped shape of the value received.  Moreover, not all application development projects succeed and if they fall behind on building the customized application they will likely delay the planned roll-outs and try to delay the payments along with them.  Moreover, since we’re an early-stage startup we don’t have enough history to know if they’ll succeed at all.

This needs to be seen as an auto-expanding deal:  $1M of new-business ARR in year 1, $1M of pre-sold upsell ARR in year 2, and another $1M of pre-sold upsell ARR in year 3.

When you celebrate it at the company kickoff you can say the customer has made a $6M commitment (total contract value, or TCV [9]) to the company and when you tier your customers for customer support/success purposes you might do so by TCV as opposed to ARR [10].  When you talk to investors you can say that $1M of next year’s and $1M of the subsequent year’s upsell is already under contract, ergo increasing your confidence in your three-year plan.  Or you could roll it all together into a statement about backlog or RPO [11].  That part’s relatively easy.

The hard part is figuring out sales compensation and CAC.  While your rep will surely argue this is a $2M ARR deal (if not a $3M ARR deal) and that he/she should be paid accordingly, hopefully you have an ARR-driven (and not a total bookings-driven) compensation plan and we’ve already established that we can’t see this as $2M or $3M ARR deal.  Not yet, at least.

This deal is a layer cake:  it’s a three-year $1M ARR deal [12] that has a one-year-delayed, two-year $1M ARR deal layered atop it, and a two-year-delayed, one-year $1M ARR deal atop that.  And that, in my opinion, is how you should pay it out [13].  Think:  “hey, if you wanted to get paid on a three-year $3M ARR deal, then you should have brought me one of those [14].”

Finally, what to do about the CAC?  One might argue that the full cost of sale for the eventual $3M in ARR was born up-front.  Another might argue that, no, plenty of account management will be required to ensure we actually get the pre-sold upsell.  The easiest and most consistent thing to do is to treat the ARR as we mentioned (1+1+1) and calculate the CAC, as you normally would, using the ARR that we put in the pool.

If you do a lot of these deals, then you would see a high new-business CAC ratio that is easily explained by stellar net-dollar expansion rates (173% if these were all you did).  Think:  “yes, we spend a lot up-front to get a customer, but after we hook them, they triple by year three.”

Personally, I think any investor would quickly understand (and fall in love with) those numbers.  If you disagree, then you could always calculate some supplemental CAC ratio designed to better amortize the cost of sale across the total ARR [14].  Since you can’t have your cake and eat it too, this will make the initial CAC look better but your upsell CAC and net-dollar expansion rates worse.

As always, I think the right answer is to stick with the fundamental metrics and let them tell the story, rather than invent new metrics or worse yet, new definitions for standard metrics, which can sow the seeds of complexity and potential distrust.

# # #

Notes

For more information on ASC 606 adoption, I suggest this podcast and this web page which outlines the five core principles.

[1] I am not an accountant.  I’m a former CEO and strategic marketer who’s pretty good at finance.

[2] And which I like better as “unbilled deferred revenue” is somewhat oxymoronical to me.  (Deferred revenue is revenue that you’ve billed, but you have not yet earned.)

[3] I know in some cases, e.g., prepaid, flat multi-year deals, ASC 606 can actually decide there is a material financing event and kind of separate that from the core deal.  While pure in spirit, it strikes me as complex and the last time I looked closely at it, it actually inflated revenue as opposed to deflating it.

[4] Which I define as all the future revenue over time if every contract played out until its end.

[5] Ergo, you have high empirical confidence that you are going to get all the revenue in the contract over time.

[6] Good comp plans pay only a portion of large commissions on receipt of the order and defer the balance until the collection of cash.  If you call this a $2M ARR deal, you do the comp math as if it’s $2M, but pay out the cash as dictated by the terms in your comp plan.  (That is, make it equivalent to a $2M ARR deal with crazy-delayed payment terms.)  You also retire $2M of quota, in terms of triggering accelerators and qualifying for club.

[6A] This then begs the question of how to comp the $1M in pre-sold upsell in Year 3.  As with any of the cases of pre-sold upsell in this post, my inclination is to pay the rep on it when we get the cash but not on the terms/rates of the Year 1 comp plan, but to “build it in” into their comp plan in year 3, either directly into the structure (which I don’t like because I want reps primarily focused on new ARR) or as a bonus on top of a normal OTE.  You get a reward for pre-sold upsell, but you need to stay here to get it and you don’t year 1 comp plan rates.

[7] That is, if all your contracts are signed on the last day of the quarter, and you don’t sign any new ones, or churn any existing ones until the last day of the quarter, and no one does a mid-quarter expansion, and you don’t have to worry about any effects due to delayed start dates, then the ARR balance on the last day of the quarter / 4 = next quarter’s subscription revenue.

[8] Development is not “over” and that value released – assume they continue to fully exploit all the development environments as they continue to build out their app.

[9] Note that TCV can be seen as an “evil” metric in SaaS and rightfully so when you try to pretend that TCV is ARR (e.g., calling a three-year $100K deal “a $300K deal,” kind of implying the $300K is ARR when it’s not).  In this usage, where you’re trying to express total commitment made to the company to emphasize the importance of the customer, I think it’s fine to talk about TCV – particularly because it also indirectly highlights the built-in upsell yet to come.

[10] Or perhaps some intelligent mix thereof.  In this case, I’d want to weight towards TCV because if they are not successful in year 1, then I fail to collect 5/6th of the deal.  While I’d never tell an investor this was a $6M ARR deal (because it’s not true), I’d happily tell my Customer Success team that this a $6M TCV customer who we better take care of.  (And yes, you should probably give equal care to a $2M ARR customer who buys on one-year contracts – in reality, either way, they’d both end up “Tier 1” and that should be all that matters.)

[11] Or you could of the ASC 606 revenue backlog and/or Remaining Performance Obligation (RPO) – and frankly, I’d have trouble distinguishing between the two at this point.  I think RPO includes deferred revenue whereas ASC 606 revenue backlog doesn’t.

[12] In the event your compensation plan offers a kicker for multi-year contracts.

[13] And while you should factor in the pre-committed upsell in setting the reps targets in years 2 and 3, you shouldn’t go so far as to give them a normal upsell target with the committed upsell atop it.  There is surely middle ground to be had.  My inclination is to give the rep a “normal” comp plan and build in collecting the $1M as a bonus on top — but, not of course at regular new ARR rates.  The alternative is to build (all or some of) it into the quota which will possibly demotivate the rep by raising targets and reducing rates, especially if you just pile $1M on top of a $1M quota.

[14] This ain’t one – e.g., it has $6M of TCV as opposed to $9M.

Hiring Profiles: Step 0 of a Successful Onboarding Program

Happily, in the past several years startups are increasingly recognizing the value of strong sales enablement and sales productivity teams.  So it’s no surprise that I hear a lot about high-growth companies building onboarding programs to enable successfully scaling their sales organizations and sustain their growth.  What’s disappointing, however, is how little I hear about the hiring profiles of the people that we want to put into these programs.

Everyone loves to talk about onboarding, but everybody hates to talk about hiring profiles.  It doesn’t make sense.  It’s like talking about a machine — how it works and what it produces — without ever talking about what you feed into it.  Obviously, when you step back and think about it, the success of any onboarding program is going to be a function of both the program and people you feed into it.  So we are we so eager to talk about the former and so unwilling to talk about the latter?

Talking about the program is fairly easy.  It’s a constructive exercise in building something that many folks have built before — so it’s about content structuring, best practice sharing, and the like.  Talking about hiring profiles — i.e., the kind of people we want to feed into it — is harder because:

  • It’s constraining.  “Well, an ideal new hire might look like X, but we’re not always going to find that.  If that one profile was all I could hire, I could never build the sales team fast enough.”
  • It’s a matter of opinion.  “Success around here comes in many shapes and sizes.  There is not just one profile.”
  • It’s unscientific.  “I can just tell who has the sales gene and who doesn’t.  That’s the hardest thing to hire for.  And I just know when they have it.”
  • It’s controversial.  “Turns out none of my six first-line sales managers really agree on what it takes — e.g., we have an endless debate on whether domain-knowledge actually hurts or helps.”
  • It’s early days.  “Frankly, we just don’t know what the key success criteria are, and we’re working off a pretty small sample.”
  • You have conflicting data.  “Most of the ex-Oracle veterans we’ve hired have been fish out of water, but two of them did really well.”
  • There are invariably outliers.  “Look at Joe, we’d never hire him today — he looks nothing like the proposed profile — but he’s one of our top people.”

That’s why most sales managers would probably prefer discussing revenue recognition rules to hiring profiles.  “I’ll just hire great sales athletes and the rest will take care of itself.”  But will it?

In fact, the nonsensicality of the fairly typical approach to building a startup sales force becomes most clear when viewed through the onboarding lens.

Imagine you’re the VP of sales enablement:

“Wait a minute. I suppose it’s OK if you want to let every sales manager hire to their own criteria because we’re small and don’t really know for sure what the formula is.  But how am I supposed to build a training program that has a mix of people with completely different backgrounds:

  • Some have <5 years, some have 5-10 years, and some have 15+ years of enterprise sales experience?
  • Some know the domain cold and have sold in the category for years whereas others have never sold in our category before?
  • Some have experience selling platforms (which we do) but some have only sold applications?
  • Some are transactional closers, some are relationship builders, and some are challenger-type solution sellers?”

I understand that your company may have different sales roles (e.g., inside sales, enterprise sales) [1] and that you will have different hiring profiles per role.  But you if you want to scale your sales force — and a big part of scaling is onboarding — then you’re going to need to recruit cohorts that are sufficiently homogeneous that you can actually build an effective training program.   I’d argue there are many other great reasons to define and enforce hiring profiles [2], but the clearest and simplest one is:  if you’re going to hire a completely heterogeneous group of sales folks, how in the heck are you going to train them?

# # #

Notes

[1] Though I’d argue that many startups over-diversify these roles too early.  Concretely put, if you have less than 25 quota-carrying reps, you should have no more than two roles.

[2] Which can include conscious, deliberate experiments outside them.

 

 

Book Review: Enablement Mastery by Elay Cohen

I had the pleasure of working with Elay Cohen during my circa year at Salesforce.com and I reviewed SalesHood, his first book, over four years ago.  We were early and happy customers of the SalesHood application at Host Analytics.  I’m basically a big fan of Elay’s and what he does.  With the average enterprise SaaS startup spending somewhere between 40% to 80%+ of revenue on sales, doesn’t it make sense to carve off some portion of that money into a Sales Enablement team, to make sure the rest is well spent?  It sure does to me.

I was pleased to hear that Elay had written a second book, Enablement Mastery, and even more pleased to be invited to the book launch in San Francisco several weeks back.  Here’s a photo of Cloudwords CEO Michael Meinhardt and me at the event.

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I have to say I simply love salesops and sales productivity people.  They’re uniformly smart, positive, results-oriented, and — unlikely many salespeople — process-oriented.  A big part of the value of working with SalesHood, for a savvy customer, is to tap into the network of amazing sales enablement professionals Elay has built and whose stories are profiled in Enablement Mastery.

I read the book after the event and liked it.  I would call it a holistic primer on sales enablement which, since it’s a relatively new and somewhat misunderstood discipline, is greatly in need in the market.

Elay’s a great story-teller so the book is littered with stories and examples, from his own considerable experience building the impressive Salesforce.com sales productivity team, to the many stories of his friends and colleagues profiled in the book.

Some of the more interesting questions Elay examines in Enablement Mastery include:

  • Why sales enablement?
  • Where to plug it organizationally?  (With pros and cons of several choices.)
  • What to do in your first 90 days in a new sales enablement role?
  • What to look for when hiring sales enablement professionals?
  • How to get organizational (and ideally strong CEO) buy-in to the sales enablement program?
  • How sales enablement can work best with marketing?  (Hint:  there is often tension here.)
  • What is a holistic process map for the sales enablement function?
  • How to measure the sales enablement function?  (And it better be more than instructor ratings on the bootcamp.)
  • How to enable front-line managers to be accountable for their role enabling and developing their teams?  (Elay wrote a whole chapter on this topic.)
  • How to conduct a quarterly business review (QBR)?
  • How managers can use basic Selling through Curiosity principles to coach using curiosity as well?
  • How to build an on-boarding plan and program?
  • What core deliverables need to be produced by the marketing and sales productivity teams?

Elay, never one to forget to celebrate achievement and facilitate peer-level knowledge sharing, also offers tips on how to runs sales kickoffs and quota clubs.

Overall, I’d highly recommend Enablement Mastery as a quick read that provides a great, practical overview of an important subject.  If you’re going to scale your startup and your sales force, sales enablement is going to be an important part of the equation.

The Three Types of Customer Success Manager

Since we’re now officially in 2019 planning season, I’ve been thinking about — among other things — our Customer Success model for next year and talking with friends in my network about that.  Since Customer Success is (sadly, perhaps) still a relatively new discipline in enterprise software companies, I’d say the whole field is evolving quickly, so it’s important to keep up with the changes.

In this post, I won’t approach things from a Customer Success Model perspective and how Customer Success interfaces to Sales (e.g., hunter/farmer, hunter-in-zoo, farmer-with-shotgun, account manager) [1].  Instead, I’m going to look bottom-up at the three basic types of customer success manager (CSM).  While they may share a common job title, CSMs are often cut from very different cloth.  Regardless of which model you implement, I believe you’ll be working with individuals who fall into one of three basic types to staff it.

  • Product-oriented
  • Process-oriented
  • Sales-oriented

In order to characterize the three types clearly and concretely, I’m going to use a template — first, I’ll show how each type introduces themselves to a customer, then I’ll present fragments of typical conversations they like to have with customers.

Note here that I’m talking about people, not roles.  In defining Customer Success Models you map people to roles and roles to duties [3].  In this post I’m really writing about the nature of the CSMs themselves because — all other complexity aside — I think the people pretty naturally drift to one of three types.

The art of setting up the right Customer Success Model is to clearly map out the sales and CSM roles (who does what), define the appropriate frequencies (how often do they do it), and then put the right people in the right roles — both to maximize job satisfaction as well as performance [4] [5].

The Product-Oriented CSM
Introduction: “Hi, I’m Jane, and my job is to ensure you get best use of our products. I’ll be here to keep an eye on your implementation process and to answer any technical questions that go beyond normal technical support. I’ll also perform periodic, proactive ‘health checks’ to ensure that you are using the system properly and making best use of new features.  I’m an expert in our products and previously worked at a consulting shop helping people implement it.  I’m here if you need me.”

Conversations they like to have:

  • “How’s that report working that I helped you build?”
  • “Yes, there are two ways of solving that problem in the product, let me help you pick the right one.”
  • “So you’re having some issues with performance, let me get in a take a look.”

The Process-Oriented CSM
Introduction: “Hi, I’m Joe, and my job is to make sure you are happy with our service and renewing your contract every year.  I’ll drive the renewal process (which, you should note, starts about 4-6 months before the subscription end date), monitor your adoption of the service, ask you to complete our ongoing customer satisfaction surveys, inform you about local user community events, and proactively call you about once a month to check-in.  Should we hit a rough patch, I’ll also serve as your escalation manager and pull together the right resources across the company to get you successfully through it.  I’m a very organized person — I was a project manager in my prior job — and I can manage 10,000 things at once, so don’t hesitate to call — I’m here if you need me.”

Conversations they like to have:

  • “Have you guys budgeted for next year’s renewal — and by the way don’t forget to leave room for the annual price increase?”
  • “I see you hired a new CFO, do you think that’s going to have an impact on our renewal process and can we setup a time to meet her?”
  • “We’re having a training class on new features in the November release and wanted to make sure you knew about it.”
  • “You’ve got two tickets stuck in technical support?  Let me swing over there and find out what’s going on.”

The Sales-Oriented CSM
Introduction: “Hi, I’m Kelly, and my job is to make sure your company gets maximum benefit from, and makes maximum use of, our software.  I’ll be managing your account from here forward, taking care of the renewal, and working to find other areas of your company that can benefit from our solutions [6].  Of course, I know you won’t be expanding usage if you’re not successful, so a big part of my job is to keep you happy as well — towards that end I’ll be keeping an eye on your implementation and your ongoing satisfaction surveys, and setting up periodic health checks with our ace technical team.  For routine technical or services questions, you should call those departments, but if you find yourself getting stuck do not hesitate to call me.  And, well, not to get ahead of myself, but I was wondering if you could introduce me to the CFO of the XYZ division, because I’d love to see if we could get in there and help them experience the same benefits that you’re going to be getting.  In my prior job, I worked as as sales development rep (SDR) and was promoted into this position 2 years ago.’

Conversations they like to have:

  • “Do you see any reason why you wouldn’t be renewing the subscription in February?”
  • “I’d love to come in next week and demonstrate our new Modeling product; I think it could help you with the inventory problem your CFO told me about.”
  • “I see you hired a new finance VP; can the three of us get together next week to discuss her goals for the team and our history working with you as a supplier?

Conclusion
I’ve exaggerated the types to make them clear.  What kind of CSM are you?  What other types have you seen? I’d love to hear.

In the end, it’s all about getting the right Sales and Customer Success Models working side by side, with the duties clearly mapped, and with the right people in the right roles.  I think the best way to do that is a mix of top-down planning and bottom-up assessment.  How do we want to break up these duties?  And who do we have on our team.

# # #

Notes

[1] The way to define your Customer Success model is to define which duties (e.g., adoption, upsell, renewal) are mapped to which Customer Success and Sales roles in your company.  I won’t dive into Customer Success models in this post (because I can think of 3-5 pretty quickly) and each of those models will have a different duty mapping; so the post would get long fast.  Instead, I’m focusing on people because in many ways it’s simpler — I think CSMs come with different, built-in orientations and its important that you put the right CSM into the right role.

[2] I *love* characterizing jobs in this way.  It’s so much more concrete than long job descriptions or formal mission statements.  Think:  if a customer asks you what your job is, what do you say?

[3] As well as map duties to frequencies — e.g., a tier-one CSM may perform monthly outreach calls and setup quarterly health checks, whereas a tier-three CSM may perform quarterly outreach calls and setup annual health checks.

[4] You can make a product-oriented CSM responsible for renewals, but they probably won’t like it.  You could even make them responsible for upsell — but you won’t get much.

[5] To keep things simple here, I’m omitting the Customer Success Architect (CSA) role from the discussion.  Many companies, particularly as they grow, break product-oriented CSMs out of the CSM team, and move them into more of an advanced technical support and consulting role (CSA).  While I think this is generally a good idea, once broken out, they are no longer technically CSMs and out of scope for this post.

[6] One of my favorite quotes from a sales VP I know:  “I always put ‘sales’ on my business card — and not account executive or such — because I don’t want anyone to be surprised when I ask for money.”  This introduction preserves that spirit.