Category Archives: Startups

Does Your Marketing Pass the Duck Test?

“If a bird walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.” — James Whitcomb Riley

Many marketers are in such a hurry to talk about topical issues that they forget the duck test: if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then most people will conclude it’s a duck. Philosophers teach that such abductive (or should we say, abducktive) reasoning can lead to incorrect conclusions — and it can.

But here in marketing, we draw a different conclusion from the duck test. It’s how most peoples’ minds work so we shouldn’t fight against it. There are two common ways that marketers fail the duck test and we’ll cover both of them — and what to do instead — in this post.

Deny Thy Father and Refuse Thy Name
Many marketers are eager to pretend that their product is the latest in-vogue thing (e.g., AI), and can get so busy dressing it up in the latest tech fashion, that they generate more confusion than sales opportunities.

It’s like a replay of the clichéd movie scene:
Man: Who are you?
Woman: Who do you want me to be, baby?

When someone asks your company the equivalent of “who are you?” [1], you need to answer the question and that answer needs to be clear.

Remember, the enemy for most startups isn’t the competition. It’s confusion. The easiest thing for a prospect to do is nothing. If we talk and I leave confused, then I’ll just write off the wasted half-hour and go on with my day.

Consider an answer like this [2] [3], to the question “what is MarkLogic?”

I mean great question. We ask ourselves that all the time. It’s actually hard to answer because there’s nothing else like it. Answering that is like trying to explain the difference between a Cessna and a 747 to someone who’s never seen an airplane. Our marketing people call it an XML Server, but that’s not a great description.

What is it really? Literally, it’s what you get when you lock two search engine PhDs in a garage for two years and tell them to build a database. You know, it looks like a database from the outside, but when you pop open the hood — surprise — you find that it’s built from search engine parts. Search engine style indexing. And it’s schema-free like a search engine so it can handle unstructured, semi-structured, and, of course, structured data as well. Let’s get into those exciting distinctions in a minute.

This thing — whatever you want to call it — it’s the Vegomatic of a data: it slices and dices and chops in every conceivable way. In the end, I think what makes it hard to understand is that it’s basically a hybrid: half search engine, half content application platform, and all database.

Is that clear?

As mud. What’s wrong with that answer?

  • It’s confusing
  • It’s long
  • It’s navel-gazing (let’s talk about me)
  • It’s bleeding on the customer (sharing internal troubles)

It’s a horrible, horrible answer.

Now before you stop reading, perhaps thinking that this is one specific, dated case study, let me say that I could easily write such a parody for about a quarter of the few score of startups I work with today. This is not some ancient example from another world. This is a current problem for many startups, but I’m not going to parody any of them here [4]. Might you suffer from this problem? Go listen to some Gong or Chorus recordings, particularly high funnel (e.g., SDR) and/or discovery calls, and see if anything resonates.

Now, let’s contrast the previous answer with this one:

It’s an XML database system, meaning it’s a database that uses XML documents as its native data modeling element. Now, what did you want to do with it again?

What’s nice about this answer?

  • It’s short
  • It’s clear
  • It’s correct
  • It leaves an opportunity for follow-up questions [5]

But the really nice part of this answer is that it puts focus back on the customer. The direct cost of all the previous blather is confusion. The opportunity cost of all that blather is you waste precious time you could have spent listening to the customer, learning more about their problem, and trying to decide if you can solve it.

So why didn’t some of our sellers want to give the second answer? They didn’t want to say the X word. XML was cool for a while, but that quickly passed and XML databases were always distinctly uncool. So, some sellers would rather spend five minutes tap dancing around the question rather than directly answering it.

What followed was almost always a difficult conversation [6]. But the flaw in tap-dancing was simple: the customer is going to figure it out anyway [7]. Customers are smart. If it:

  • Stores data like a database
  • Builds indexes like a database
  • And has a query language like a database

Then — quack, quack — it’s a database.

That’s the first way marketers fail the duck test. They’re afraid to say what the product is for fear of scaring people off. But there’s another way to fail the duck test.

Confusing Products and Solutions
The second way to fail the duck test is to rotate so hard to solutions that you basically refuse to say what the product is. You end up dodging the question entirely.

Customer: So, what is it?
Vendor: You can use it to build things, like a deck.
Customer: That’s great, but what is it?
Vendor: You can use it to assemble things, too, like a bed.
Customer: Sure, but what is it?
Vendor: And you can use it for disassembling things too.
Customer: Wait, it’s a drill isn’t it?

Here we have the prospect playing twenty questions to figure out what the product is. Yes, we all know that customers buy solutions to problems [8] and Theodore Levitt’s classic example of customers buying 1/4″ holes, not 1/4″ bits.

But don’t take that in a fundamentalist way. If the customer asks, “what is it?” the answer is not, “a thing that makes holes” but, “a power drill with a 1/4-inch bit.” If they ask why ours is better, we say that our bits are titanium and don’t break. “Feature” need not be a four-letter word to remember that the purpose of the drill is to make a hole and, transitively, that the purpose of the hole is to build a new deck with the ultimate benefit of quality family time.

The point is: knowing what solutions (or use-cases) we want to target does not eliminate the requirement to have strong product messaging. Particularly in unexciting categories, we will need to lead with use-cases, not product superiority, category formation, or market leadership. But, inevitably, even when you lead with use-cases, you will get the question: what is it?

And a short, clear answer – as we discussed above – not only gets the customer what they want, but it lets us have more time for listening and discovery. I see many companies where they rotate so hard to use-case marketing that their product messaging is so weak it actually interferes with discussions of the use-case.

For example, say the product is a data streaming platform (DSP) and the use-case is industrial monitoring for manufacturing facilities. Let’s assume that data streaming platforms are not a hot category, so there aren’t a lot of people out shopping for them. That means we’re not going to target DSP shoppers with a product-oriented superiority message, instead, we are going to target people who have a problem with industrial monitoring.

But when one of those people asks what it is, we’re not going to say, “a thingy that helps you do industrial monitoring.” Instead, we’re going to say, “it’s a data streaming platform, many of our customers use it for industrial monitoring, and here’s why it’s such a great fit for that use-case.”

That is, we map to the use-case. We don’t redefine the product around the use-case. We don’t try to use the use-case to avoid talking about the product. Doing so only confuses people because eventually they figure out it’s not an industrial monitoring application, but a data streaming platform that can be used for industrial monitoring. Unless we are clear that it’s a platform being used for a use-case, then we fail the duck test.

In the end, you will get the right answer if you always remember three things:

  • Customers are smart
  • Time spent in hazy product explanations confuses customers and robs time from discovery
  • If it walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck — then, for marketing purposes at least — it’s a duck.

# # #

Notes

[1] That is, “what is it?”

[2] I swear this is only partially dramatized, and only because I’ve assembled all the fragments into one single response.

[3] This is circa 2008. Presumably much has changed in the intervening 15 years.

[4] I obviously don’t use more recent examples as a matter of both confidentiality and discretion.

[5] An obvious one might be, “so if it’s a database, does it speak SQL?” (To which the answer was “no, it speaks XQuery,” which could lead to another loop of hopefully tight question/answer follow-ups.)

[6] Because, simply put, nobody wanted to buy an XML database. Gartner had declared the category stillborn around 2002 with a note entitled XML DBMS, The Market That Never Was. The way we sold nearly $200M worth of them (cumulatively) during my tenure was not to sell the product (that nobody wanted) but to sell the problems it could solve.

[7] And when they do, they’re not going to be happy that you seemingly tried to deceive them.

[8] Or hire them to do jobs for them, if you prefer the Jobs To Be Done framework.

How to Detect if Your Startup Has a Faux Focus

I’ve realized that one of things I do for (or should I say, to) early-stage startups is detect whether they have a real or a faux focus (pronounced fo-focus) — the latter being a focus that appears to be real at first, but is in fact fake.

Focus is like baseball, hot dogs, apple pie, and Chevrolet. Needed. Timeless. And everyone’s in favor.

But, alas, when you drill in, the conversation often goes something like this:

At this point, I’m thinking three things:

As it turns out, a quick nod to the chasm gods is a lot easier than embracing them. In the rest of this post, I’ll share some tools I use to detect real vs. faux focus and that you can use to sharpen focus in general.

  • An ideal customer customer profile (ICP) with concentric circles. Sometimes it’s too binary to have ICP and non-ICP customers, with the result that everything gets equal treatment. Instead, treat your ICP like a bulls eye. Ring zero is credit unions of size X with use-case 1. Ring one is banks of size X with use-case 1. Ring two is insurance companies of size X with use-case 1. Ring three is financial institutions of size X with use-case 2. Ring four is everyone else. I find this increases focus, especially when the inner rings are variations on a core.
  • Define the idea of strategic vs. opportunistic revenue. Look, I’ve run startups. Cash is king. You want to give me money, I’ll take it. As long as there are no strings attached. Startups get in trouble when they draw-and-quarter themselves by selling roadmap (i.e., non-existing) features to a diverse set of customers. That’s why you should define strategic revenue (e.g., in the first three ICP rings) vs. opportunistic revenue and then religiously enforce this rule: if it’s oportunistic revenue you have to sell what’s on the truck. Don’t even bother asking for roadmap commitments. Maybe give those sellers lower quotas in return. But don’t let them ruin your future by selling your scarcest resource, R&D capacity, for non-strategic purposes.
  • Segmented metrics. Let’s say you’re strong in SMB and your growth strategy is a big up-market push into MM. All of your reported metrics quickly become a variably weighted blend of two different businesses. You’ll find yourself in board meetings saying things like, “well the average sales price isn’t that meaningful because it’s a blend of SMB deals at $10K and MM deals at $40K.” For that matter, neither are average sales cycle, close rate, win rate, loss-to, and other metrics. So, segment these metrics: present SMB, MM, and total (aka, “blended”) figures. The same goes for industries and use-cases. Sometimes you’re doing great on the new strategy but the core business is collapsing faster than you thought. Sometimes, the core business is going gangbusters and you’ve made no progress on the new strategy. Without segmented metrics, you can’t easily tell.
  • Not-on-list lists. Planning is an additive process at most startups. “Let’s do this and this and this. Forget anything? OK, let’s add that, too!” To sharpen your focus, add a subtractive element. When you discuss something and decide not to do it, capture that in a not-on-list list. Think: here’s the list of things we decided to do, and here’s a list of things we considered and decided not to do. It will both help your current focus and shorten subsequent debate (think of the asked and answered objection in court).
  • Split business units. If you’re constantly arguing it’s actually two different businesses that happen to share a go-to-market (GTM) team, then consider splitting the GTM team. Back in the day at MarkLogic, we had two unlikely bedfellows as businesses: intelligence and media (aka spies and publishers). It helped that our staff literally couldn’t attend meetings in the other segment (e.g., security clearances). So we split our business in two: media and federal. We didn’t have SCs, we had media SCs. We didn’t have consultants, we had federal consultants. We didn’t have a CRO, we had a VP of media and a VP of federal. While this is a pretty extreme approach, in certain situations — particularly when the businesses are pretty far apart — it might make sense. We had two different distribution businesses atop a shared product foundation.

I hope this post has given you a few ideas on how to test your own focus, how to sharpen it, and how to report on it.

Video of Balderton Webinar on Efficient Growth via Entering New Markets

Just a quick follow-up post to share the video from the recent Balderton event I did on opening new markets as the key to durable, efficient growth. I previously shared the slides here. Now, thanks to the marketing team at Balderton, I’ve been able to embed a video below.

Thanks to Balderton for hosting, to my colleague Claudia Rowe for emceeing, and to everyone for attending this event.

Slides from Balderton Webinar on Entering New Markets, The Key to Efficient Growth

Just a quick post to share the slides from the webinar I did with Balderton Capital this morning entitled Opening New Markets, The Key to Efficient Growth in 2024 and Beyond.

Thanks to everyone who attended and/or submitted questions at the event. And thanks to the Balderton team for hosting it.

The slides are embedded below as a slideshow. You can download a PDF version here. A video of the presentation at the event is available in the immediately following post on Kellblog.

See You Wednesday for a Webinar on Efficient Growth Through New Market Expansion

Just a quick post to highlight a Balderton Capital webinar I’m doing this week on Wednesday, March 20th at 8:00 AM Pacific, 3:00 PM UK, and 4:00 PM CET.

The registration link is here. Since I’ve heard of a few problems with it, let me know if you get stuck: ping me on LinkedIn, Twitter, or leave a blog comment here.

Since 2024 is the year of efficient growth, I have already talked a lot about how to improve efficiency through driving expansion ARR, doubling down on campaigns and segments that work, relentlessly optimizing the go-to-market (GTM) machine, and experimenting with new AI GTM tools [1] that can increase sales and marketing productivity.

After quickly reviewing that material, we’ll switch gears to talk about growth, which almost invariably means not just tuning and optimization, but doing new things. We’ll discuss what I call the strategic expansion hypercube [2], which covers the five (arguably six) dimensions of growth:

  • Product
  • Use-case
  • Industry
  • Geography
  • Channel
  • And arguably, customer [3]

I’ll make some important general observations about the best ways to traverse this strategic epansion cube, providing some real-life examples of where startups fell into quicksand along the way. I’ll then discuss each growth dimension in more detail before wrapping up and doing a brief Q&A session at the end.

I hope to see you there. As always, I’ll be B2B-focused, fast paced, and hopefully fun. Register here.

I’ll post the slides after the event and a recording if Balderton makes one available.

# # #

Notes

[1] See prediction number five.

[2] A fancy name for an N-dimensional matrix. This terminology is actually fairly common in finance orgs because most financial planning solutions are multidimensional in nature and built atop hypercubes as the data abstraction and/or underlying database model.

[3] In one sense, it’s a somewhat less interesting dimension because it has only two members, new and existing. In another, it’s critical and captured in age-old strategy tools like the Ansoff Matrix.