Kellblog covers topics related to starting, managing, leading, and scaling enterprise software startups. My favorite topics include strategy, marketing, sales, SaaS metrics, and management. I also provide commentary on Silicon Valley, venture capital, and the business of software.
A few months ago I signed up to be an advisor to Kelda, and I thought I’d do a quick post to talk about the company and why I decided to sign up.
What is Kelda?
Kelda provides developer sandboxes in a customer’s cloud within their Kubernetes cluster. Why does this matter?
The world is moving to cloud computing at a rapid place.
Cloud computing is moving away from virtual machines as the unit of abstraction and towards containers, microservices, and serverless architectures.
The exact technologies that make microservices powerful in production environments have made the development experience worse.
In short, nobody was thinking much about developers when they started migrating to these new architectures.
Think for a minute about being a developer building a microservices-based application. Then think about testing it. Your code has dependencies on scores or hundreds of microservices which in turn have dependencies on other microservices. Any or all of these microservices are themselves changing over time. How you are you supposed to find a stable test-bed on which to test your code?
Unlike production environments, run by DevOps teams with a sophisticated CI/CD platform, development environments are often primitive by comparison. Tools for collecting dependencies are not robust. Developers often have to test on their own laptops, running all the required microservices locally, which elongates test cycles because of slow performance. Moreover, debugging is potentially complicated by non-deterministic interactions among microservices.
Kelda solves all that by effectively spinning up a private, stable, server-based Kubernetes cluster where developers can test their code. If that sounds pretty practical, well it is. If that sounds pedestrian, remember that one of VMware’s top early use-case was … stable test environments for QA teams across different version of operating systems, middleware, and databases. Pragmatic solutions often generalize way beyond their initial landing point.
There are always many reasons behind such a decision, so in no particular order:
The awesome founder, Ethan Jackson, who put his Berkeley computer science PhD on the back burner in order create the company. I like that this isn’t his first corporate rodeo (he worked at Nicira –> VMware) for 5 years. I also like the burn-the-ships level of commitment.
The practical logic behind the product idea. Remember the famous William Gibson quote: “the future is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed.” When you’re working at the cutting edge, the next step looks kind of obvious. So while this looks very high-tech to me, it looks pretty obvious to Ethan and, in my humble opinion, a lot of people have been very successful doing the next pretty-obvious thing (e.g., from PeopleSoft building apps atop Oracle to NetSuite taking financials to the cloud to Palo Alto Networks doing application-based firewalls).
The trends driving the company. Kelda is dead center of the movement to containers and microservices-based architectures in the cloud. The technology elite can use all these technologies today. Kelda makes them more accessible to the typical corporate development shop.
Jim and I worked together at Ingres back in the — well “pre-Chernobyl” as Jim likes to put it. When we met, he was a pre-sales engineer and I was a technical support rep. We’ve each spent over 25 years in enterprise software, in mixed roles that involve both technology and sales & marketing (S&M). Jim went on to write a great book, Making the Technical Sale. I went on to create Kellblog. He’s spent most of his recent career in private equity (PE) land; I’ve spent most of mine in venture capital (VC) land.
With a little more time on my hands these days, I had the chance to re-connect with Jim so when I was in Chicago recently we sat down at ParkerGale’s “intergalactic headquarters” for a pretty broad-ranging conversation about a recent blog post I wrote (Things to Avoid in Selecting an Executive Job at a Startup) along with a lot of banter about the differences between PE-land and VC-land.
Unlike most podcasts, which tend to be either lectures or interviews, this was a real conversation and a fun one. While I’m not sure I like the misparsing potential of their chosen title, Things To Avoid in Selecting an Executive Job with Dave Kellogg, I’ll assume the best. Topics we covered during the fifty-minute conversation:
I’ve increasingly spoken to startup employees who find themselves in a difficult trap. Let’s demonstrate it via an example:
Say you joined a startup in September 2009 as an early employee and immediately received a stock-option grant of 400,000 shares with a strike price of $0.10 when you joined. The company, while having experienced some ups and downs over the years, has done very well. At its last 409a valuation, the common stock was valued at $10/share . You feel great; after all, you’re a paper millionaire, with an option worth about $4M .
What could possibly be the problem in this seemingly great situation? Well, sometime in the next 45 days that stock-option is going to vaporize and become worthless.
More scarily, what needs to happen for that option to become worthless? Absolutely nothing. Nobody has to say or do anything. No notices need to be sent. Sometime in the next 45 days that option will silently cease to exist . If the company gets acquired two years later at $20/share and you’re expecting an $8M payout you’re going to be rudely surprised to find you get nothing.
The Silent Killer
What happened? What is this silent killer of stock option value? Expiration. The option expired ten years after its grant date.
The vast majority of Silicon Valley stock option plans feature options that expire after ten years. In this example, your option was granted in September 2009 which means that by October 1, 2019 that option will be expired. And the really scary part is that nobody needs to tell you it’s about to happen.
While some companies are undoubtedly more proactive than others in both helping employees avoid getting into this situation and warning them as it approaches, in the end, it’s up to you to make sure you don’t get caught in this trap. Technically, the company doesn’t need to say or do anything. And – to be clear — because it’s a relatively new phenomenon in Silicon Valley the company may not even have noticed it’s happening and, even if it does, it may remain silent because it doesn’t really have any good remediation options. It’s a tough situation on both sides because there are no easy wands that anyone can wave to fix this.
If you think you should stop reading here because you’re only at year two of your vesting, don’t. If you resign (and/or get fired) from your job your stock options will typically expire in just 90 days, so you’ll be facing these same issues — just on a greatly shortened timeframe.
Who Is The Evil Genius Who Set This Up?
None. There is no evil genius. It’s simply an unwelcome artifact of Silicon Valley history. In olden days it took about 4 years for a startup to hit a liquidity event  . That’s why stock options vest over 4 years. It’s also why they expire after 10 years. All options need to have an expiration date and back in the day, 10 years approximated infinity .
As employees, we benefit from the artifact of 4-year-vesting. However, if we’re not paying attention, we can get crushed by the artifact of 10-year expiration.
What Can I Do About It?
First, this is a tough situation and you may have few or no good options.
Second, I’m not a financial advisor ; you’ll need to see your financial and/or tax advisors to figure this out. In this post, I’ll walk through what I see as some of your options – which will itself demonstrate the problem.
Third, short timeframes are not your friend. If you see this problem coming I recommend you start thinking hard about it at least 12 months in advance; when you’re down to 30 days left your available choices may be extremely limited.
Here are some of your available options for handling this situation.
1. Exercise the stock-option before it expires. You’ll need to find $40K to pay the company for the exercise, but that’s not the hard part. Because the fair market value (FMV) of the stock is $10/share you’re going to face a tax bill of somewhere between $1.1M and $1.9M on the exercise, even if you hold the stock (i.e., you don’t sell it) . This is, in fact, the problem statement.
2. Exercise the option before it expires and sell enough to a third-party to pay the tax bill. This means, if you’re selling in the private market (e.g., EquityZen, Sharespost) at the FMV of $10, that you exercise 400K shares and then sell about 150K of them to cover your tax bill  [10A]. That leaves you holding 250K shares of stock. This, however, requires (a) the existence of such a market and/or your ability to independently find a buyer, (b) the stock to be not restricted from you selling it without company approval (or the company granting such approval), and (c) you paying I’d guess $10K or more in legal and/or other transaction fees to make it happen .
3. Exercise the option with the support of a specialist fund (e.g,. ESOfund) that cuts rather exotic deals to solve this and related problems [10A]. For example, one of these (typically very boutique) funds might say: “I’ll give you the cash both for the exercise and to pay your tax bill, if you give me the shares. When we eventually sell them, I’ll keep 100% of proceeds until I get my money back, 50% until I get 3x my money back, and 25% after that .” These funds are hard to find and the deals can be very hard to understand. Legal bills can rack up quickly. And you’ll need to be a major shareholder; no one wants to do a lot of complex work for 2K shares.
4. Use a company liquidity program, if offered, to avoid getting into the situation. Some companies periodically offer employees the right to sell shares in order to demonstrate to everyone that liquidity is possible. Don’t be so busy doing your job that you forget to consider these programs. While you may think the valuations offered are too low, if there is no secondary market for the stock and/or the company restricts selling the stock after its purchase, you may have no choice but to use such a program. It’s a far better deal than letting the options expire worthless.
5. Live in Belgium. I believe Belgium has a great law whereby you pay a modest tax at the time you receive a stock option grant and then no tax on either exercise or sale . I’m telling you this not to encourage you to start learning to enjoy moules frites and making immediate plans to move to Brussels (it’s probably too late) — but to remind my international readers that I’m writing from a US point of view and that stock option taxation, in particular, varies a lot from country to country. If you happen to live in Belgium and the law hasn’t changed, it’s a particularly good place to get stock-options in early-stage startups. But the main point is to be sure you understand the law of your country before making any plans or decisions when it comes to stock options (or any other tax matter).
6. Avoid the problem in the first place via an early-exercise with section 83b election. Some companies will allow you to exercise your options before they vest by effectively reversing the stock option – you pay the exercise price, the company gives you the shares, and the company retains a right to buy back the shares from you (at the exercise price) which declines by 1/48th per month over four years. In addition, if you file a section 83b election within 30 days (and the grant was not in-the-money) then you pay no tax at exercise time and incur tax liability only when you eventually sell the shares, which if it’s more than a year away, results in long-term capital gains tax treatment . Wow, this sounds awesome – and it is.
What’s the downside? (a) Ideally, you need to do this up-front so it’s not necessarily a good solution if you’re in year three, (b) you need enough money to pay the exercise price which typically works well at early-stage startups (400K shares at $0.01/share = $4K) and a lot less well at later stage ones (100K shares at $5/share = $500K), (c) if the company gets in trouble  your common stock could well end up worthless and you won’t get your money back – you are effectively destroying the option-value of your option by exercising it, (d) if you don’t file your section 83b in a timely manner and/or lose your records of having filed it you could end up in a very bad position tax-wise .
7. Mitigate the problem via regular exercises along the way (laddered). While I don’t think this is a great strategy, it’s simple to understand, and mixes preserving option value while periodically exercising (and incurring taxes) along the way – so it’s going to be expensive to execute; but nevertheless way less expensive than a forced exercise in year 10. The two nice things about this strategy are (a) you shouldn’t need company approval to execute it and (b) you can stop along the way and still own some of your options — it only gets very expensive in years 3 and 4. Here’s a spreadsheet to show it (including some comments not in the image below) which you can download here.
Of course, you may find other strategies, proactive companies may offer programs with other strategies, you might be able to execute a derivative of one of these strategies (e.g., number 3 with a rich uncle), and you can combine the above strategies (e.g., laddering plus early-exercise) as you see and your financial and tax advisors see fit.
In this post, I’ve alerted you to the ten-year stock option expiration trap and given you a few ideas on how to avoid it. Moreover, remember that if you resign (or get terminated) that this distant ten-year expiration problem becomes a 90-day problem. Finally, I’ll point you to my favorite book on this subject (which covers both stock-options and RSUs), Consider Your Options 2019, and which has a nice website as well.
Remember to always talk to your financial and tax advisors before making key decisions about equity-based compensation.
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 Most private startups get an annual 409a valuation once a year to establish the fair market value (FMV) of their common stock so they can appropriately set the strike price on newly granted stock options, without being accused of granting in-the-money options (as some companies were accused of doing during the dot-com bubble). 409a valuations are always lower than “headline valuations” that companies often announce as part of financing rounds, because headline valuations take the price of a newly issued preferred share and multiply it by the entire share pool (common and preferred). 409a valuations first value the business overall, then subtract any debt, and then subtract the value of “preference stack” in arriving at a value for common stock in aggregate, and then per-share. Because (a) of how they are calculated, (b) various valuation methodologies produce ranges, and (c) there is a general desire to preserve a low common stock price for as long as possible, 409a valuations not only differ from headline valuations (which are arguably calculated incorrectly) but they tend to produce a low-side estimate for the value of the common.
 And maybe a lot more than that because many private, hot-company stocks sometimes trade well above the 409a value in secondary markets. In fact, in many cases it trades a little or no discount to the price of the last preferred round, and in some cases above it which, unless a lot of time has passed since the last round, strikes me as kind of crazy.
 That is, in the 45 days after August 15, 2019 – the day I wrote the post.
 For example, Business Objects was founded in 1990 and went public in 1994.
 If Silicon Valley were reinvented today, options would probably vest over 12 years, because that’s about how long it takes to get to an IPO. However, that’s unlikely to happen as the ten years is the maximum duration under law for an ISO option. This isn’t a VC-change kind of thing; it’s a write your Congressional Representative sort of thing.
 The definition of a (call) stock option is the right to buy N shares at price P by date D. Expiration dates are inherent to options.
 Math is approximate. On the low side, I’m assuming it’s an ISO option and the tax is all AMT at 28% and you’re in a tax-free state. On the high side, I’m assuming it’s an NQ option, and a combined marginal rate of 49%. See your tax professional for your situation. The main point here: it can be a huge number.
 Bear in mind, per earlier comments, the FMV tends to run on the low side and particularly for red-hot companies, prices in the secondary market can be well above the FMV, e.g., in this case, let’s say $20. While this will help you on the sale side (you’ll need to sell half as many shares), it could bite you on the tax calculation because you’ll simultaneously be arguing that the stock is worth $10 for tax calculation purposes while actually selling it for $20. See your tax professional. Good luck.
 I’ve seen and/or heard of cases where companies charge a $5K administrative fee for people selling shares in this manner. Some companies like it and make it easy. Some don’t and make it anywhere from hard to impossible.
[10A] There is zero endorsement of any vendor or fund mentioned here. I provide examples simply to make things concrete in terms of classification.
 This is a somewhat flawed representation of such deals, but you get the idea. The fund effectively becomes your partner in owning the stock. These can be expensive deals, but for the stock-optionee some value is better than none, which is what they will have once the option expires.
 This works particularly well for early-stage startups because I believe you pay a tax of either 9% or 18% of the aggregate value (shares x strike price) of the option at grant time, and the shares are worth next to nothing. (It works less well if you get a grant of 100K shares valued at $100/share.)
 You must, must, must see your tax advisor on this. You have only 30 days to file an election and if you don’t, you lose the benefits of this approach and can put yourself in a very bad situation.
 And trouble doesn’t have to mean bankruptcy. It simply means any situation where the sale price of the company is less than the sum of debt to be repaid plus the preference stack. In these situations, the common stock becomes worthless. Note to the wise: while it’s often the case, you cannot assume the preference stack is simply the amount VCs have invested in preferred stock. In some cases, you have multiple liquidation preferences where VCs (or PEs) get 1.5x to 2.0x their investment back before the common gets anything.
 See . I won’t go into the details of what happens because it’s complicated, but if you are going to go the section 83b route, you need to file within 30 days and keep very good records that you did. You remember when people went bankrupt on AMT taxes due to buying-and-holding ISO options in Bubble 1.0? You could end up rekt in a similar way if you get this wrong.
I can’t tell you the number of times, as we were tearing down our booth after having had an epic show, that we overheard the guy next door calling back to corporate saying that the show was a “total waste of time” and that the company shouldn’t do it again next year. Of course, he didn’t say that he:
Staffed the booth only during scheduled breaks and went into the hallway to take calls at other times.
Sat inside the booth, safely protected from conference attendees by a desk.
Spent most of his time looking down at his phone, even during the breaks when attendees were out and about.
Didn’t use his pass to attend a single session.
Measured the show solely by qualified leads for his territory, discounting company visibility and leads for other territories to zero.
Does this actually happen, you think? Absolutely.
All the time. (And it makes you think twice when you’re on the other end of that phone call – was the show bad or did we execute it poorly?)
I’m a huge believer in live events and an even bigger believer that you get back what you put into them. The difference between a great show and a bad show is often, in a word, execution. In this post, I’ll offer up 10 tips to ensure you get the best out of the conferences you attend.
Ten Ways to Get the Most out of Conferences and Tradeshows
1. Send the right people. Send folks who can answer questions at the audience’s level or one level above. Send folks who are impressive. Send folks who are either naturally extroverts or who can “game face” it for the duration of the show. Send folks who want to be there either because they’re true believers who want to evangelize the product or because they believe in karma . Send senior people (e.g., founders, C-level)  so they can both continue to refine the message and interact with potential customers discussing it.
2. Speak. Build your baseline credibility in the space by blogging and speaking at lesser conferences. Then, do your homework on the target event and what the organizers are looking for, and submit a great speaking proposal. Then push for it to be accepted. Once it’s accepted, study the audience hard and then give the speech of your life to ensure you get invited back next year. There’s nothing like being on the program (or possibly even a keynote) to build credibility for you and your company. And the best part is that speaking a conference is, unlike most everything else, free.
3. If you can afford a booth/stand, get one. Don’t get fancy here. Get the cheapest one and then push hard for good placement . While I included a picture of Slack’s Dreamforce booth, which is very fancy for most early-stage startup situations, imagine what Slack could have spent if they wanted to. For Slack, at Dreamforce, that’s a pretty barebones booth. (And that’s good — you’re going to get leads and engage with people in your market, not win a design competition.)
4. Stand in front of your booth, not in it. Expand like an alfresco restaurant onto the sidewalk in spring. This effectively doubles your booth space.
5. Think guerilla marketing. What can make the biggest impact at the lowest cost? I love stickers for this because a clever sticker can get attention and end up on the outside of someone’s laptop generating ongoing visibility. At Host Analytics, we had great success with many stickers, including this one, which finance people (our audience) simply loved .
While I love guerilla marketing, remember my definition: things that get maximum impact at minimum cost. Staging fake protests or flying airplanes with banners over the show may impress others in the industry, but they’re both expensive and I don’t think they impress customers who are primarily interested not in vendor politics, but in solving business problems.
6. Work the speakers. Don’t just work the booth (during and outside of scheduled breaks), go to sessions. Ask questions that highlight your issues (but not specifically your company). Talk to speakers after their sessions to tee-up a subsequent follow-up call. Talk to consultant speakers to try and build partnerships and/or fish to referrals. Perhaps try to convince the speakers to include parts of your message into their speech .
7. Avoid “Free Beer Here” Stunts. If you give away free beer in your booth you’ll get a huge list of leads from the show. However, this is dumb marketing because you not only buy free beer for lots of unqualified people but worse yet generate a giant haystack of leads that you need to dig through to find the qualified ones — so you end up paying twice for your mistake. While it’s tempting to want to leave the show with the most card swipes, always remember you’re there to generate visibility, have great conversations, and leave with the most qualified leads — not, not, not the longest list of names.
8. Host a Birds of a Feather (BoF). Many conferences use BoFs (or equivalents) as a way for people with common interests to meet informally. Set up via either an online or old-fashioned cork message board, anyone can organize a BoF by posting a note that says “Attention: All People Interested in Deploying Kubernetes at Large Scale — Let’s Meet in Room 27 at 3PM.” If your conference doesn’t have BoFs either ask the organizers to start them, or call a BoF anyway if they have any general messaging facility.
9. Everybody works. If you’re big enough to have an events person or contractor, make sure you define their role properly. They don’t just set up the booth and go back to their room all day. Everybody works. If your events person self-limits him/herself by saying “I don’t do content,” then I’d suggest finding another events person.
10. No whining. Whenever two anglers pass along a river and one says “how’s the fishing?” the universal response is “good.” Not so good that they’re going to ask where you’ve been fishing, and not so bad that they’re going to ask what you’ve been using. Just good. Be the same way with conferences. If asked, how it’s going, say “good.” Ban all discussion and/or whining about the conference until after the conference. If it’s not going well, whining about isn’t going to help. If it is going well, you should be out executing, not talking about how great the conference is. From curtain-up until curtain-down all you should care about is execution. Once the curtain’s down, then you can debrief — and do so more intelligently having complete information.
 In the sense that, “if I spend time developing leads that might land in other reps’ territories today, that what goes around comes around tomorrow.”
 In order to avoid title intimidation or questions about “why is your CEO working the booth” you can have a technical cofounder say “I’m one of the architects of the system” or your CEO say “I’m on the leadership team.”
 Build a relationship with the organizers. Do favors for them and help them if they need you. Politely ask if anyone has moved, upgraded, or canceled their space.
 Again note where execution matters — if the Host Analytics logo were much larger on the sticker, I doubt it would have been so successful. It’s the sticker’s payload, so the logo has to be there. Too small and it’s illegible, but too big and no one puts the sticker on their laptop because it feels like a vendor ad and not a clever sticker.
 Not in the sense of a free ad, but as genuine content. Imagine you work at Splunk back in the day and a speaker just gave a talk on using log files for debugging. Wouldn’t it be great if you could convince her next time to say, “and while there is clearly a lot of value in using log files for debugging, I should mention there is also a potential goldmine of information in log files for general analytics that basically no one is exploiting, and that certain startups, like Splunk, are starting to explore that new and exciting use case.”
Harry’s interview was broad-ranging, covering a number of topics including:
Financing lessons I’ve learned during prior bubble periods and, perhaps more importantly, bubble bursts.
The three basic types of exits available today: strategic acquirer, old-school private equity (PE) squeeze play, and new-school PE growth and/or platform play.
A process view of exiting a company via a PE-led sales process, including discussion of the confidential information memorandum (CIM), indications of interest (IOIs), management meetings, overlaying strategic acquirers into the process, and the somewhat non-obvious final selection criteria.
The Soundcloud version, available via any browser is here. The iTunes version is here. Regardless of whether you are interested in the topics featured in this episode, I highly recommend Harry’s podcast and listen to it myself during my walking and/or driving time.
It’s been a few years since I wrote about this survey, which I post about less to communicate recent highlights and more to generate awareness of its existence. The Fenwick & West Venture Capital Survey is must-read material for any entrepreneur or startup CEO because it not only makes you aware of trends in financing, but also provides an excellent overview of venture capital terminology as well as answering the important question of “what’s normal” in today’s venture funding environment (also known as “what’s market.”)
So if you’re not yet subscribed to it, you can sign up here.
3Q18 F&W Venture Capital Survey Highlights
215 VC financing rounds were closed by companies with headquarters in Silicon Valley
Up rounds beat down rounds 78% to 9%
The average price increase (from the prior round) was 71%
24% of rounds had a senior liquidation preference
8% of rounds had multiple liquidation preferences
11% of rounds has participation
6% of rounds had cumulative dividends
98% of rounds had weighted-average anti-dilution provisions
2% of rounds had pay-to-play provisions
6% of rounds had redemption rights
In summary, terms remained pretty friendly and valuations high. Below is Fenwick’s venture capital barometer which focuses on price changes from the prior financing round. It’s a little tricky to interpret because the amount of time between rounds varies by company, but it does show in any given quarter what the price difference is, on average, across all the financings closed in that quarter. In 3Q18, it was 71%, slightly down from the prior quarters, but well above the average of 57%.
Some books are almost too honest. Some books give you too much information (TMI). Some books can be hard to read at times. Lost and Founder is all three. But it’s one of the best books I’ve seen when it comes to giving the reader a realistic look at the inside of Silicon Valley startups.
In an industry obsessed with the 1 in 10,000 decacorns and the stories of high-flying startups and their larger-than-life founders, Lost and Founder takes a real look at what it’s like to found, fund, work at, and build a quite successful but not media- and Sand-Hill-Road-worshiped startup.
Rand Fishkin, the founder of Moz, tells the story of his company from its founding as a mother/son website consultancy in 2001 until his handing over the reins, in the midst of battling depression, to a new CEO in February 2014. But you don’t read Lost and Founder to learn about Moz. You read it to learn about Rand and the lessons he learned along the way.
In 2001, I started working with my mom, Gillian, designing websites for small businesses in the shadow of Microsoft’s suburban Seattle-area campus. […] The dot-com bust and my sorely lacking business acumen meant we struggled for years, but eventually, after trial and error, missteps and heartache, tragedy and triumph, I found myself CEO of a burgeoning software company, complete with investors, employees, customers, and write-ups in TechCrunch.
By 2017, my company, Moz, was a $45 million/ year venture-backed B2B software provider, creating products for professionals who help their clients or teams with search engine optimization (SEO). In layman’s terms, we make software for marketers. They use our tools to help websites rank well in Google’s search engine, and as Google became one of the world’s richest, most influential companies, our software rose to high demand.
Moz is neither an overnight, billion-dollar success story nor a tragic tale of failure. The technology and business press tend to cover companies on one side or the other of this pendulum, but it’s my belief that, for the majority of entrepreneurs and teams, there’s a great deal to be learned from the highs and lows of a more middle-of-the-road startup life cycle.
Fishkin’s style is transparent and humble. While the book tells a personal tale, it is laden with important lessons. In particular, I love his views on:
Pivots (chapter 4). While it’s a hip word, the reality is that pivoting — while sometimes required and which sometimes results in an amazing second efforts — means that you have failed at your primary strategy. While I’m a big believer in emergent strategy, few people discuss pivots as honestly as Fishkin.
Fund-raising (chapters 6 and 7). He does a great job explaining venture capital from the VC perspective which then makes his conclusions both logical and clear. His advice here is invaluable. Every founder who’s unfamiliar with VC 101 should read this section.
Making money (chapter 8) and the economics of founding or working at a startup.
His somewhat contrarian thoughts on the Minimum Viable Product (MVP) concept (chapter 12). I think in brand new markets MVPs are fine — if you’ve never seen a car then you’re not going to look for windows, leather seats, or cup-holders. But in more established markets, Fishkin has a point — the Exceptional Viable Product (EVP) is probably a better concept.
His very honest thoughts on when to sell a startup (chapter 13) which reveal the inherent interest conflicts between founders, VCs, and employees.
His cheat codes for next itme (Afterword).
Finally, in a Silicon Valley where failure is supposedly a red badge of courage, but one only worn after your next big success, Fishkin has an unique take on vulnerability (chapter 15) and his battles with depression, detailed in this long, painful blog post which he wrote the night before this story from the book about a Foundry CEO summit:
Near the start of the session, Brad asked all the CEOs in the room to raise their hand if they had experienced severe anxiety, depression, or other emotional or mental disorders during their tenure as CEO. Every hand in the room went up, save two. At that moment, a sense of relief washed over me, so powerful I almost cried in my chair. I thought I was alone, a frail, former CEO who’d lost his job because he couldn’t handle the stress and pressure and caved in to depression. But those hands in the air made me realize I was far from alone— I was, in fact, part of an overwhelming majority, at least among this group. That mental transition from loneliness and shame to a peer among equals forever changed the way I thought about depression and the stigma around mental disorders.
Overall, in a world of business books that are often pretty much the same, Lost and Founder is both quite different and worth reading. TMI? At times, yes. TLDR? No way.
I’m Dave Kellogg, consultant, independent director, advisor, and blogger focused on enterprise software startups.
I bring a unique perspective to startup challenges having 10 years’ experience at each of the CEO, CMO, and independent director levels across 10+ companies ranging in size from zero to over $1B in revenues.
From 2012 to 2018, I was CEO of cloud enterprise performance management vendor Host Analytics, where we quintupled ARR while halving customer acquisition costs in a competitive market, ultimately selling the company in a private equity transaction.
Previously, I was SVP/GM of Service Cloud at Salesforce and CEO at NoSQL database provider MarkLogic, which we grew from zero to $80M in run-rate revenues during my tenure. Before that, I was CMO at Business Objects for nearly a decade as we grew from $30M to over $1B. I started my career in technical and product marketing positions at Ingres and Versant.
I love disruption, startups, and Silicon Valley and have had the pleasure of working in varied capacities with companies including Cyral, FloQast, GainSight, Kelda, MongoDB, Plannuh, Recorded Future, and Tableau. I currently sit on the boards of Alation (data catalogs), Nuxeo (content management) and Profisee (master data management). I previously sat on the boards of agtech leader Granular (acquired by DuPont for $300M) and big data leader Aster Data (acquired by Teradata for $325M).
I periodically speak to strategy and entrepreneurship classes at the Haas School of Business (UC Berkeley) and Hautes Études Commerciales de Paris (HEC).