Keeping Up With The Conversation

The older, grumpier, and less patient I get, the more I realize that keeping up with the conversation is probably the key skill for career success and executive development. I wonder why it’s taken me so long to realize this because, like the discovery of the non-existence of Santa Claus, once seen, it appears obvious. But it sure as heck wasn’t obvious to me during the last 20 years of my management career.

Let’s make this concrete. To assess whether someone keeps up, I increasingly ask myself one question: do I want to talk to person X about problem Y?

There are three primary reasons why I wouldn’t want to talk to person X about problem Y:

  • Person X doesn’t understand problem Y. It’s not interesting to talk to him/her* because all I do is educate him on the problem. It is not a stimulating two-way exchange of ideas.
  • Person X doesn’t say anything interesting about problem Y. Person X understands the problem, but doesn’t have anything new or interesting to say about solving it. Boring.
  • Person X doesn’t follow through. Person X says interesting things about problem Y, but never follows through on agreements made during the discussion. Big talker. Or, to use the Texas equivalent: big hat, no cattle.

I reflect on the now-immortal words of a Business Objects board member who I (and several other execs) watched argue with a United flight attendant many years ago on a flight from Paris: “I don’t want to talk to you any more.” At which point the pilot came out not in an escalation of authority, but more to provide an appropriate-level contact with whom to resume the conversation.

(This became a running joke as we subsequently imagined ourselves being fired in a similar dialog. “What went wrong with the marketing campaign?” “Well, we had some trouble with the mailing lists.” “The mailing lists?” “Yes, you know sometimes it’s hard to find good –” “I don’t want to talk to you any more.” “But, but, but …”)

I like the want part of the equation because it provides an emotional element in the decision process. Yes, I’m supposed to talk to person X about problem Y because it’s in his domain as defined by the current organization. Yes, I know that. But do I want to talk to him?

Wherever I find a supposed-to/want-to gap, there’s a potential need for an organization change.

It might be that person X is wrong for the company. Or it might be that person X is a bad fit with his role or certain parts of it. But when things are working well, I should not only want — but be eager — to talk to person X about problem Y.

Now I’m sure I’ve condemned myself to weeks of “Hi Dave, do you like talking to me about X” questioning from Mark Logic staff. But I think it’s probably worth it to have shared this reductionist nugget.

According to this theory, the secret to career success is then: getting your bosses to want to talk to you about the organization’s top problems. That means two things: you need to figure out the top problems and you need to figure out how to make them want to talk with you about them.


* Henceforth, take all him references as him/her and his references as his/her.

Judge Does Not Decide on Dimissing ZL Technologies Complaint Against Gartner

(Revised: confirmed that the source, MS&L, is ZL’s PR firm.)

While I don’t have official verification of this, I did learn the following this afternoon, regarding the lawsuit filed against Gartner by ZL Technologies over its treatment in their magic quadrants about which I posted earlier this week and which is also covered here, here, and here.

“In today’s hearing on Gartner’s motion to dismiss ZL’s complaint, the court did not come to a decision.”

Precisely because I couldn’t find any reference to this online (yet), I figured it was breaking news and should share it via the blog. I learned this information via an email from David Schraeder of MS&L, the PR firm representing ZL Technologies.

Given my limited understanding of the law, a non-decision is a decision. That is, by not deciding to throw out the case, I take to mean that the case is on and will proceed. More information will undoubtedly come out later, but I wanted to share this while it was hot.

It’s not every day I can break a story on the Mark Logic CEO blog!

Gartner Sued Over Magic Quadrant for Alleged Damages of $132M plus Punitives of $1.3B

I found this story today, entitled Gartner’s Magic Quadrant Goes to Court, about ZL Technologies who, citing damages of $132M, has decided to sue Gartner over its Magic Quadrants. From ZL’s web page on the suit:

ZL Technologies, a San Jose-based IT company specializing in … enterprise software solutions for e-mail and file archiving, is challenging Gartner Group and the legitimacy of Gartner’s “Magic Quadrant.” In a complaint … ZL claims that Gartner’s use of their proprietary “Magic Quadrant” is misleading and favors large vendors with large sales and marketing budgets over smaller innovators such as ZL that have developed higher performing products.

The complaint alleges: defamation; trade libel; false advertising; unfair competition; and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

“Sour grapes” spring to mind as an immediate reaction. In fact, ZL concedes that they’ve been ranked in the “niche” segment of every email archiving quadrant since 2005. (Ouch!) But they nevertheless argue that bigger stakes are in play and that this is not only about ZL, but Gartner itself, technological innovation, and very nearly preservation of the American way of life. Excerpt, edited for brevity:

Regardless of how the court may decide the First Amendment arguments, ZL hopes to achieve the following …

  • Fair Disclosure on Conflicts of Interest. Gartner generates its revenues from payments made by the same vendors whose products it evaluates. …
  • Fair Disclosure on Evaluation Scores. The tech industry would benefit if Gartner were required to disclose more data in its evaluation process and disclose component scores so vendors know exactly where they are lacking and by how much and take corrective action. …
  • Better Oversight. Gartner currently has an employee act as ombudsman to handle disagreements. The conflict of interest is self-evident in the way ZL’s concerns were summarily dismissed with little supporting evidence. ZL believes that Gartner’s immense heft and power in the marketplace necessitate careful checks and balances against abuse of power. ZL believes that if IT innovation is to remain a driver for the US economy, there must be assurances that ratings agencies such as Gartner do not subvert the competitive forces which drive innovation.

I remember a long time ago CA boycotted all Gartner research after some research-related dispute. It certain did nothing to help them: picking a fight with the movie critics always seems a risky strategy for a producer.

But it is hard to argue that Magic Quadrants are good for competition. They are inherently subjective in their assessments, they two-dimensionalize an N-dimensional problem, they encourage mental laziness on the part of customers, and –- heck –- some of us work in sectors that don’t even have a magic quadrant. What’s worse, ZL? Getting a poor ranking on an existing quadrant, or selling in a software category that Gartner doesn’t even recognize?

Since I think it’s fun to read court filings (when I have the time), let’s dig down a little deeper. The court documents are here, and I’ll embed them along the way as well. Here’s the initial complaint.

One of the many arguments made in the complaint is that Gartner doesn’t do “a single minute of independent testing of the products it purports to evaluate.” When I was younger in my career, I used to buy that argument. As I gotten older, I now realize (think: Wisdom of Crowds) that it is indeed possible to get a pretty good picture of
a product’s strengths and weaknesses simply by talking to lots of people who use it.

And that’s what Gartner does. Yes, there are no guys in lab coats doing Consumer Reports style testing. But, sometimes the guys in the lab coats measure the wrong things anyway. So while Gartner does not, to my knowledge, do hands-on testing, they neither claim to do so nor, in my estimation, is such testing strictly necessary to develop an informed opinion.

That said, a pathological case of that research model is when a vendor has very small market share. If research is done primarily through talking and there’s no one to talk to, then you’re not going to get on the map very easily.

On the other hand, I love their brass tacks description of the reality behind being labeled a “niche player”:

These MQ placements were, and are, derogatory because they are understood by technology purchasers as a warning, by Gartner, that ZL and ZL products are not good choices for enterprise email archive applications.

Yep.

Also of interest was this statement by Gartner’s ombudsman:

My sense is that there has been a relationship issue for many years with [archiving analyst] Carolyn DiCenzio and at this point it’s come down to level of trust and respect.”

I suppose there’s some logical consistency at least — if you’re going to declare war on the #1 analyst firm, well, why not make it personal as well. :-)

Let’s move on. Here’s Gartner’s response, a motion to dismiss, which is much tougher reading and more techno-legal:

Clearly, Gartner’s response is based on opinion and freedom of speech. Excerpt:

Whether plaintiff’s opinions about its product are correct, comprehensible or sincere has no legal significance; what matters is that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it attacks opinions expressed by Gartner, Inc. These opinions are constitutionally protected, in part to discourage lawsuits like this one, which are aimed at chilling the free expression of ideas and opinions.

While Gartner marketing may not love that response (imagine: “could we please defend the research as well as our right to have opinions?”) it’s not a terribly surprising one.

If nothing else, you can being to see why lawsuits cost so much money. Bear in mind the legal meters are probably running at $600/hour and they’re still debating whether the case should be immediately thrown out: it’s like dropping $20K standing on the starting line fighting about the start time for the race.

Here is ZL’s opposition to Gartner’s motion for dismissal, another 32-pages:

If you didn’t jump into the document above, let me pull out the first zinging paragraph (bolding mine):

This is a commercial case about a dominant industry player’s baseless defamation of an independent startup whose growth prospects have been crushed by the defendant’s unfair business practices. Defendant Gartner, Inc. (“Gartner”), which advises businesses on information technology decisions, exercises hegemonic control over the purchases made by a wide swath of the international corporate and governmental market. The technology Gartner says to buy is bought; what Gartner says not to buy languishes unsold, leaving its developers scrambling for the leftover market share Gartner does not dictate. The problem arises when Gartner exercises its market power recklessly, maliciously or—because of its tremendous influence—negligently. When that occurs, as it has here, innovation and competition are stifled, to the detriment of small companies who lack the resources to challenge Gartner, and to the consuming public at large.

Wow, someone turned up the rhetoric meter! At this point things are quickly getting over my legal head. There arguments seem to be largely about what is fact vs. opinion. Since I’m unable to comment on the legal issue, I’ll move on.

Finally, for the strong of legal stomach, here is Gartner’s reply to the opposition t
o the motion to dismiss. (Say that ten times fast.)

Here’s a nice summary of the counter-argument:

Try as it might, ZL cannot create a dispute where there is none. ZL alleges at great length in its Complaint (and recapitulates in its Opposition) that it has a strong product and satisfied customers. The Magic Quadrant reports do not say otherwise; the real point of contention here is not the quality of ZL’s product, but instead the subjective analytical model Gartner used to assess ZL’s market position and prospects. ZL does not contest Gartner’s basic assessments of ZL—that it has a good product but needs to expand its sales and marketing—but ZL challenges its placement on the Magic Quadrant Report because Gartner uses a “misguided analytical model” that gives “undue weight to sales and marketing.”

I have no idea how this will end. Will it be quickly thrown out of court? Will it a long drawn-out case? I don’t know. I would say that Gartner’s quadrants wield enormous power and that vendors go to great lengths to maxmize their position on them. And I’d say that you can’t judge a vendor by the quality of its technology alone. While Ingres arguably had the best database technology in the 1980s, Oracle’s sales and marketing prowess caused it to win the market and any analyst who — focused solely on the technology — would have recommended Ingres at that time would have done his customers a disservice.

I don’t know how the movie here ends, but I at least expect it to be interesting.

Dear CIO: Stop Writing Big Checks for Commodity (Database) Software

Dear CIO,

What’s wrong this picture?

  • At 50%+, Oracle’s operating margins have never been higher
  • The differentiation of Oracle’s database technology, however, has never been lower and the number of both core and specialized alternatives has never been greater.

So what’s going on? You, kind Sir or Madam, are being milked. What’s worse is that you, in an example of collective behavioral dysfunction, have inadvertently played a role in setting up the milking. What happened?

  • Like all smart CIOs you followed a bit of herd mentality when it came to core technology. Pity the poor fools who, back in the day, bet big on Ingres or Sybase. You played it safe and went with Oracle, IBM, or if your requirements weren’t too heavy, Microsoft.
  • The problem is, of course, that everyone executed the same strategy you did. Hence, the market created a system of increasing returns where the strong vendors got stronger and the weak ones died. The result: the RDBMS market is an (order of magnitude) $10B/year market, structured as an oligopoly with 3 players. Most other software markets worked out the same way.
  • You were focused on standardization. You realized that through a combination of decentralized IT decision making and growth-by-acquisition your organization had become a kitchen sink of enterprise software. You had everything. In order to reduce the administrative, training, and license acquisition costs, you fought tooth and nail with your divisions to standardize the environment. You said, “Heck, it’s all the same stuff in the end, folks, so let’s make Oracle our DBMS standard, Business Objects our BI standard, Documentum our ECM standard, and SAP our ERP standard.”
  • And you won. Mostly. There’s still some Cognos in finance. And marketing didn’t totally give up on Interwoven. But, for the most part, you won. You reduced the entropy of your IT environment and drove cost savings for your organization.

The problem is you’ve won the battle but lost the war. Why? Because if, as you say, the “stuff really is all the same” you shouldn’t standardize on the most expensive product. You should standardize on the cheapest.

  • Do you really need to be paying those big fees to Oracle for enterprise licenses? Wouldn’t MySQL do?
  • Are you really using all the functionality of that $1M/year Documentum ECM system? Wouldn’t SharePoint or Alfresco do?
  • For BI, do you need all the bells and whistles of BusinessObjects? Wouldn’t Pentaho or Qlikview do a fine job, at a fraction of the cost?

But these alternatives are obvious. Heck, even “the establishment” (i.e, Gartner) says it’s safe to tread in the open source water. So the question is, what’s holding you back?

  • Switching costs. It’s hard to move off Oracle or Documentum and you don’t want to pay the nut to do so.
  • Organizational inertia. Your whippersnapper DBAs who were in their 30s in the 1980s are now in their 50s. They’re thinking that change devalues their knowledge and experience; some just want to cruise into retirement. But that’s their personal agenda, not your enterprise one.
  • Accounting: you made it free for your divisions to keep using Documentum, Oracle, or BusinessObjects because you bought an enterprise license. While this appeared to “save” you money on a per-license basis, and it helped support your standardization initiative, it squashed innovation in your divisions, reinforced the organization inertia, and has a lot of people using the wrong tool for the job, resulting in projects that either take more or more expensive hardware than necessary (Oracle is good at this), that take too long to develop, or that simply fail.

So, what do I recommend doing about all this? I suggest that you adopt these policies, which –- for full disclosure, are at least partially in the self-interest of this blog’s author:

  • Stop writing big checks for commodity software. Every time a big check comes along, ask yourself: is this software differentiated or commoditized? Be willing to pay a premium for differentiated software, and price shop commodity software. Call a group of your smartest staff together periodically to help you make the commodity versus differentiated call.

  • When you see a big check coming for commodity software, make a migration plan. My hunch is that most of the time, you can create a nice 3-year ROI in the transition from premium to cheaper software. (This reminds me of the time I visited an investment bank’s CIO asking about their Documentum strategy. The answer: “our Documentum strategy is to get off Documentum,” because we’re paying too much and using too little.)

  • Stop doing enterprise agreements that create poor economic incentives within your organization. Don’t pay $XM at the enterprise level, spread that as a “tax” across your divisions, and then make use of certain software “free.” It distorts project reality, creates false incentives, squashes innovation, and generates lots of hidden costs. If you want to negotiate a master agreement and discount rate, that’s fine. Shoot for centralized discounts without central planning.
  • Don’t worry that the prior policies will create mayhem. While I understand that you don’t want arbitrary taste differences increasing the entropy of your enterprise software portfolio, recognize that with the first policy you’ve solved that problem already. If you deem a category (e.g., core RDBMS, enterprise search) commoditized, then you are going to force people to pick on cost. You’ll get standardization on the commodity categories –- just on the least expensive alternatives. The only entropy you’ll need to manage will be on the differentiated software which, having dispatched the commodity majority, you’ll have time to explore, study, and exploit.

Why I am taking the time to write this note to you? Back in the 1980s I was a foot soldier in the relational database revolution, and today I’m the CEO of one specialized DBMS company and on the board of another.

  • Mark Logic makes an XML server which can save great amounts of time and money in creating applications against unstructured information, replacing the combination of an RDBMS, an enterprise search engine, and an application server. Not only can Mark Logic manage 100s of TB of XML, the system eliminates the object / relational/ hierarchical impedance mismatch between Java, SQL, and XML that hampers developer productivity. Mark Logic was recently named the fourth fastest-growing IT company in Silicon Valley.
  • Aster Data makes a specialized data warehouse DBMS that runs on low-cost commodity hardware with a shared nothing architecture and leverages in-database MapReduce technology for parallelism and high scalability.

And during the past 25 years or so I’ve watched the market evolve. While I fully understand the policies and market forces that have led
us to where we are, I feel like we’ve come full circle. Vendor power is now concentrated in the big three. Vendor margins top 50%. Big vendors don’t innovate; they consolidate. Inertia has set in customer organizations. And there’s a major platform shift in progress; last time it was mainframe to minicomputer, this time it’s cloud.

Things feel a lot to me the way they did in 1985, just past dawn of the relational revolution. So in one way I’m writing to point out the oft-overlooked obvious: stop paying premium prices for commodity items. And in another way I’m saying, take the money you save in so doing and invest it in innovation technologies that:

  • Drive competitive advantage (which will matter again as we come out of the Great Recession)
  • Enable the Internet-scale applications you’ll need to face the coming information deluge
  • Reform the application development stack in ways that make sense for the coming generation of information applications, not that made sense for the last generation of data-centric ones.

Thank you for reading my note. If you have any questions or comments, please give me a ping at dave-dot-kellogg-at-marklogic-com or comment on this post.

Sincerely,

Dave Kellogg

DHT, Listen To Your Heart, and Flanking Strategy

In 1988, Listen To Your Heart was the third single issued in the USA by the Swedish pop duo Roxette. In this post, I’ll use the song as fun example of flanking marketing strategy. First, the original song/video.

(Sorry, but EMI disallows embedding, so you’ll have to press the above link to hear it.)

Then, in 2005 the Belgian dance group DHT released several trance cover versions (i.e., remakes) of the song. Here is one such example, the “hardcore remix”:

Now it starts to get interesting. Based on the success of the trance cover versions, later that year DHT then releases an acoustic version of the song, which goes on to receive substantial airplay. Here it is:

Now, not being an music expert, I can’t say anything for sure, but what are the odds that DHT would have done anywhere near as well by entering the market with a directly competitive Listen To Your Heart? My guess: quite low. Heck, even Alvin and the Chipmunks have remade this song.

In my estimation, the magic — the reason it all worked — was they entered the market on a non-competitive flank (club music) and then, once established, bridged from there into making a what I consider a better-than-original acoustic version of the song.

But “better” isn’t the point. Simply having a better version on the initial attack would have gotten them nowhere. But building a strong position in the trance genre (flanking) and then bridging made all the difference.