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A Tale of Two Companies: The Professional Services Paradox

Quick:  which company do you like better?

Yes, assume they’re similar size, growing at similar rates, and both at scale. Pick A or B.  Thelonious can’t help because there’s no third option.

C’mon.  You know you want to pick A.

It seems clear that Company A is superior.  And not just by a little — look at the gross margins.  Think of the impact on CAC Payback Period.

Here’s the trick, though.  Company B is company A with one, single difference:  $100M additional services revenue.  Here’s a deeper look showing both dollars and percentages.

Company B has $100M more in total revenue, $2M more in gross profit, and $2M more in operating profit.  Every other figure (not derived from those differences) is the same.  For example:

What’s jamming our radar here?  What’s making them look so different?  Percent of sales analysis.  Normally our friend, but here it’s working against us.

While Company B looks less efficient at gross margin level, it looks more efficient at an opex level because we’re dividing by $600M, not $500M.  That 13% less efficient gross margin is exactly offset by 13% more efficient total opex.  But we didn’t really notice that.  Why?  Because we were stuck on gross margin. Think:  Company A’s clearly the better business – look at those gross margins – so it’s fine to spend a bit more to build it.

Through a purely financial lens, I might still like Company A better than Company B.  Yes, B has $2M extra in operating income, but it’s having to take on the hassle of managing a $100M larger services business.  Is it worth all that for an extra $2M in operating profit?  Maybe not.

This is how investors tend to think.  With 2% margins, it’s a crappy services business anyway, so why not let someone else do it?  Heck, they can probably do it more profitably than us, anyway.  I sometimes call this the Mikey likes it argument, referring to the ancient TV commercial where two brothers force their little brother to try a new cereal.  Think:  we don’t want to do our services ourselves, but I’m sure we can find partners who will just love doing them.  Maybe Mikey will like it, just like the commercial.

This argument overlooks a few key points:

The biggest problem — one I think of as the services paradox — is when vendors want to transition to selling solutions, not just software.  This strategic upleveling is a common request from sales teams and boards alike.  It’s an important part of category creation and/or 3+1 repositioning strategies.

Here’s the catch — while  boards generally love to hear that you’re selling solutions, they don’t want to hear that you’re building a services business to actually deliver those solutions.  They want you to sell solutions, but deliver software.  In the absence of real, committed partners, that message is going to ring hollow with customers.

But partners are generally unwilling to make strategic come-bets on your category creation strategy.  Once you’ve created a massive market, they’ll be happy to come along and suck up services.  But taking strategic risk to do that?  Building a services practice on the come?  No thanks.  Services firms are unapologetic opportunists.

That means there are times when only you can deliver the services needed to execute a transformation strategy.  Qualtrics had to do this as part of their strategic transformation from survey software to customer experience management (CXM) to experience management (XM) platform.  And they provided plenty of services along the way, running in that uncomfortable 25% of revenues range (and perhaps higher in the earlier days, but I don’t have the numbers).

So, all that considered, which company do I like better?  I need to know the answer to two more questions.  Are they executing a strategic transformation from software to solutions?  Are they upleveling their message and creating a new, broader category (i.e., Playing Bigger)?

Peace out.

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