We Are Not The Same: The Obligatory Post on “Founder Mode”

[Updated 9/23 to include link to a Brian Chesky interview discussing Founder Mode.]

Founder mode became all the rage last week, following a Brian Chesky speech (whose contents are seemingly not available online) and a Paul Graham blog post about that speech.

Since everyone’s weighing in on founder mode, and a few long-term readers have specifically asked for my take, that will be the subject of this post.

Founder-mode is defined in opposition to manager-mode, the conventional wisdom as taught in business schools, about how to manage an organization. The basic idea is that b-school teaches managers to delegate and empower, lest they be guilty of micromanagement. But, in founder mode, founders dive heroically into details penetrating the gaslighting of their value-destroying C-level execs, which include — and this is an actual quote — “some of the most skillful liars in the world.”

Let me start by saying I have a 270+ degree view on this problem: I advise and sit on boards (so a well meaning advice giver), I’ve been the CEO of two startups, and I’ve also been one of those (presumably duplicitous) C-level execs. But the one thing I’ve not been is a founder. I’ve worked with plenty of them. I’ve been appointed CEO of a company with a founder staying on the team for years alongside me.

Without re-stating the article or the debate about it, let’s just cut directly to my take:

First, we are not the same. It’s an excellent point and one that needs stating. Now, usually I cover it from the other side. And I’ve gotten myself into (at times, deep) trouble by not recognizing these differences. As a professional manager:

  • You have less moral authority to drive change. It’s not your baby after all. You have positional power, but not necessarily moral authority.
  • You are replaceable, some might say disposable. You’ve been hired to do a job and we can hire someone else if and when we need to.
  • You get fewer mulligans. You have more short-term accountability. Hired CEOs should think in quarters. Founders (perhaps unless you’re public) should think in years. Or maybe even eras.
  • You are assumed to be around for an evolutionary phase. If you’re proven in the $20 to $100M size range, maybe we run with you to $200M. But at some scale, unless you’re absolutely crushing it, the board will ask if now’s the right time to hire the next-phase booster CEO.

Second, founders should therefore manage differently from professional managers. Why wouldn’t they? They have more moral authority. They are forever. They are irreplaceable. They get more “lives” as a result. And they have no “sell by” date stamped on their forehead. They are — and I think A16Z had a lot to do with swinging this pendulum back — presumed to be the best person to run the company. Just knowing these differences, how could you ever argue that founders should run a company the same way as a professional manager?

Third, I find most of the arguments against the conventional management wisdom to be strawmen. In business school, I wasn’t taught to never do skip-level meetings or to only meet with the executive staff. I did learn, from both school and work that “listen bottom-up, direct top-down” was a great way of operating. I wasn’t taught to hire great people and get out of their way. I was taught to try and make a distinction between delegation and abdication because you need to empower executives to take on their own challenges, but still hold them accountable for results.

I wasn’t taught that you couldn’t have 60 direct reports, but we did discuss the pros and cons of a large span of control. (And personally, I’ve always hated 1-1s but that started back when I was in technical support and forced to have them with my manager.) I did learn that managers would game me with metrics (i.e., “what gets measured, gets managed” — and not always in a good way). And I did learn to use metrics and surveys to see inside organizations and cut through the layers and find out what customers and employees were thinking.

I take massive exception to the characterization of C-level execs as gaslighters and liars. Yes, they try to paint their organization in the most positive possible way, but the good ones understand the difference between spin and lies. And they answer direct questions with short, direct answers.

Now I don’t doubt what Graham says is true. That many founders get well meaning advice about becoming more hands-off with the business and that can result in founders feeling pushed up and out of their own businesses. And I do believe that people are too quick to accuse bosses of micromanagement — and bosses too quick not to push back.

Aside/example, back when I was a $1B CMO: “Well WTF is my job anyway if not to ensure all our marketing output is of high quality? The marketing quality buck stops here. And who is some PR flack with two years’ experience to accuse me of micromanagement? And, in a true quote: “you say this is a hostile work environment? Well, let me think. Actually, you know what? I want it to be a hostile work environment for people who write like you do.” Yes, I wasn’t about to win any sensitivity awards, but I did have a sense for what my job was, despite the hinderance of being both C-level and an MBA.

But I feel like it’s a giant game of telephone where the signal gets lost across the hops. Think: yes, you need to empower people more and I might have said “get out of their way,” but I never actually meant to not inspect their work or meet with their direct reports. I suppose the real moral here is to have deep conversations with your advisors. So you get beyond the slogans and soundbites into what they really mean. For what it’s worth, I’d argue that Chesky seems to agree, based on this video released subsequent to the Founder Mode brouhaha.

While Silicon Valley is the world’s finest innovation machine and one of the world’s finest wealth creation machines, I don’t think we’re a paragon of managerial practice. Thus, to infer causality between “founder mode” and “great businesses” is a bridge too far. We make great businesses. We have some great managerial ideas (e.g., OKRs, pod organizations, or going back to shortly after the big bang, The HP Way). We’re strong on disruptive strategies and systematic expansion strategies. But to say that great technology businesses were created because of, irrelevant to, or in spite of our management practices, I’m not sure. Don’t be too quick with invoking post hoc, ergo propter hoc when you see an appealing idea in Silicon Valley.

I’ll close by citing one response to Founder Mode that takes a data driven approach to these questions, based on research with 122 founders, 50 personality elements, and 46 different areas of 360-degree feedback. It’s an article worth reading and concludes that the benefits of founder mode are largely a myth.

Much like the myth — that I first learned about in business school — that captains should grab the yoke and fly the plane alone in an emergency. It turns out that cockpit crews get far better performance by maximizing teamwork and communication in emergency situations. Coincidentally, this practice is called CRM (crew resource management).

I understand the attraction of founder mode. It sounds cool. But while it’s more romantic to imagine the founder grabbing the yoke to drive the company, it’s more effective to have a strong team working together to face challenges.

You’ve Been Asked To Be a Startup Advisor: Now What?

“You’re fired,” said the general counsel (GC) of the public, multi-billion-dollar software company and I wasn’t just happy, I was ecstatic.

I’d known this company for a long time.  I’d helped their VCs with diligence.  I’d worked with them in the early days as an advisor, and received a stock option as compensation.  So when I contacted the company to sell the shares (from the option I’d exercised long ago), I was surprised to find a folder called “Grant 2.” They’d given me a second grant that I’d actually forgotten about.  OMG, this was my lucky day.

I told the stock administrator that I wanted to exercise the second option grant. 

“You can’t,” she said.  “It’s been canceled.”

“Why?” I said, watching a G-Wagon disappear before my eyes.

“Because you discontinued your service to the company.”

“No, I didn’t.  You just stopped calling.  That’s the nature of advisory work.  You call and I answer.”

This launched a multi-week argument about if and when I’d stopped providing services and many questions about why I’d not been notified of any termination — so I’d have at least known the 90-day option exercise window had started.  The dispute eventually escalated to the GC who, in firing me, started my 90-day clock, admitting the option was still valid.

Why do I tell you this story?  First, because it’s hilarious.  The GC could easily just have said he’d honor the option, but instead chose to communicate that good news by firing me.  Second, because this is what happens when you use paperwork written for employees to engage with advisors

In this post, I’ll share what I’ve learned over the past fifteen years advising startups to give you a better idea of what to do when someone asks you to advise their startup.  See my disclaimers, remember that this is not legal or financial advice and that you should hire professionals to get advice specific to your situation.

When asked to be an advisor of an early-stage company, I think you should do four things:

  • Decide if you want to advise the company
  • Discuss and set clear expectations on both sides
  • Agree on compensation, which is typically but not always, stock
  • Put a good, quick legal agreement in place

Decide If You Want to Advise the Company

This may seem like an obvious first step, but sometimes the answer really should be no. There are lots of good reasons to advise a company.  For example, you can:

  • Build your network with the company’s team and investors
  • Learn by seeing more business situations
  • Sow seeds for potential downstream relationships (e.g., employee or board)
  • Pay it forward

But there are also some good reasons not to advise a company, including:

  • Bad chemistry.  Life’s too short.  Avoid deals where the investors are trying to impose you as an advisor to a reluctant executive.
  • Poor fit.  You want to be asked about problems you’ve seen dozens of times.  You’ll give better answers and it will take less of your time.
  • When they have a one-shot problem.  Advising is a long-term, relationship game.  If a company just needs help with one thing (e.g., positioning, re-organization), everyone could be better off if you do a cash consulting deal or just offer some input for free.
  • Restrictive terms in the advisor agreement, such as non-solicitation, no-hire, or non-compete agreements.  Once you’re advising company A, you may discover that you wish you were advising company B.  While switching horses may or may not be prohibited under the agreement, it’s always bad form and bad for your reputation.  This is now the top reason I decline advisory deals. There is an opportunity cost associated with advising that many overlook. 

Discuss and Agree on Clear Expectations

I don’t think this needs to be contractual — or even necessarily written down since most agreements feature bilateral termination for convenience anyway — but I do think it’s important to have a detailed conversation about expectations. 

These are all great topics to include in that conversation:

  • The specific areas where the company wants help.  For me, that might be SaaS metrics, marketing, board presentations, and CEO mentoring.
  • The form of the help.  Some people want you to build their financial model; I just want to provide feedback to your finance head who can then iterate and improve it themself.
  • Interaction frequency.  For me, that’s typically measured in times per month.
  • In-office attendance.  Some of my friends like to show up once/week and have watercooler encounters to really get to know the company and its scuttlebutt.  Me, not so much.
  • Periodic vs. ad hoc meetings.  I like to meet because there’s something to discuss, not because it’s Tuesday.  But different people see this differently and compensation structure impacts this as well.
  • Time commitment.  Some people like to agree on hours/month, I don’t.  When you buy experience, you’re paying for fast answers, so hours is the wrong metric.  Value is measured by how quickly I can solve a problem, not how slowly.

Agree on Compensation

Because I’m talking about early-stage (e.g., seed, pre-seed) advisory, the typical company doesn’t have much cash and wants to pay advisors in stock, typically measured in the tenths of a percent. 

Let’s do some sample math which will rely on a bunch of assumptions:

  • Shares granted:  0.2%
  • Anticipated dilution before exit:  50%
  • Shares after dilution:  0.1%
  • Assumed exit price:  $500M
  • Value:  $500K
  • Probability:  5%
  • Expected value:  $25K 
  • Hours invested over 7 years at 2 hours/month:  168 hours
  • Expected value, hourly rate:  $149

You might see the $500K here and think “amazing money,” and you’d be right — in the unlikely case this actually happens. In a more realistic $500M exit scenario, those shares might be worth $250K due to debt and preferences.  In a dire scenario, e.g., with multiple liquidation preferences and a large amount of capital raised, they might be worth $0. 

(Note that this example assumes no debt, no participating preferred shares, and an exit value that clears the preference stack by enough that all investors take their pro rata ownership instead of their preferences.)

So, to go back to the point – the majority of these deals pay $0 to the advisor. When you average out the occasional big hit across the rest you might end up making $150/hour.  And the cashflow is lumpy. It’s a fun hobby, but it’s no way to make a living.

So, when evaluating an advisory opportunity, do the math and run some scenarios.  Then think about the commitment you’re willing to make. And, more than anything, do the work because it’s fun and you grow by doing it — not because you’re banking on any big hit.

If you consider any compensation whatsoever as upside, you’ll always be happy — and maybe sometimes when you get lucky — very happy.

Put a Good, Quick Legal Agreement in Place

The problem here is that neither side is interested in spending money on a good advisor agreement. The cash-starved startup, running on the founder’s savings, doesn’t want to. Nor does the would-be advisor, who’s well aware their most likely outcome is $0. Who wants to spend a few thousand in legal fees on that?

So you end up running on a stock-option agreement written for employees that you repurpose for advisors (which was the case with my company in the opening story). Or a consulting agreement. Or a simple letter. Or nothing at all.

None of that sounds very good to me.

What do I do in this situation? I start with the FAST advisory agreement.  I like it because:

  • It’s standard. To my knowledge a lot of people use it.
  • It’s neutral, not having been created by either the company or the advisor.
  • It covers many of the obvious basics (e.g., non-disclosure, independent contractor relationship, non-conflict).
  • And, if you want to use their matrix, it even includes compensation.

I’m not a lawyer (and you should ask your own), but the FAST agreement strikes me as doing a reasonable job of providing a stage-appropriate agreement for advising an early-stage company. Per the Founder Institute who’s created it:

The FAST Agreement is used by tens of thousands of entrepreneurs and advisors per year to establish productive working relationships, trading advice and support for a standardized amount of equity. […]

With just a signature and a checkbox on the FAST Agreement, entrepreneurs and advisors can agree in minutes on how to work together, on what to accomplish, and on the right amount of equity compensation.

The only catch is that while I like the compensation matrix and the idea of using stage vs. expertise to determine compensation, I don’t like the specific definitions in Schedule A because, among other reasons, they include fixed time commitments that I think are too high.  So I either negotiate them out or rewrite that schedule.

I hope this post will help you in thinking about your next steps when and if someone asks you to advise their startup.

The Four Key Questions About Every Angel Investment Opportunity

Excluding VC funds, I’ve directly invested in a few dozen startups. While the jury’s still out on my performance, I can share a few things that I’ve learned along the way:

  • This isn’t easy. Though I’d never thought I’d say this: it’s given me some empathy for early-stage venture capitalists. Be prepared for ten-year-plus exit horizons and to lose every penny you put in.
  • I mock VCs (a little) less. It’s easy to mock VCs for being too fashion-driven, too pedigree-oriented, and too herd-like in their behavior. But when I’m actually in their shoes evaluating seed-stage opportunities, I see myself adopting some of these very same behaviors. (Think: “it’s an AI data play, the founders dropped out of Stanford PhDs, and DCVC is leading the round? I’m in!!”)
  • Access is everything. You can’t invest in a deal that you never see. This leads me to believe that you should only consider angel investing if you have access to amazing group of people who you think will do great things in the future (e.g., by having worked together at a startup seemingly destined to spawn many more).
  • I can see the power law at work. While I have confidence that my returns will be quite good in the end (and marking them to market today is largely meaningless), I can already see that they will be concentrated in a few superstar investments.

I learned one of my more impactful lessons at an A16Z event a few years back. After the presentation, I went up to one of the partners and we spoke:

DK: Hey, I was looking at XYZ Co the other day thought you might be interested in taking a look at them.

A16Z partner: Yes, we know them. I recently had a few team members do a full run-down on that space — there are about a dozen companies in it — and we decided that while we like the space, they weren’t the team we wanted to bet on.

And a light bulb went off. When I find an seed-stage deal, I evaluate the founder, the story, the product, and then make a decision. When professionals find a seed-stage deal, they put a team of three MBAs on finding and evaluating every startup in the emerging space.

That’s a big difference. I never know if they’re the best team in the space. I can only know if I think they’re impressive.

This observation backed me into what I now use as my four-question framework for evaluating angel opportunities:

  • Why this idea? Do people need this? Will they pay for it? How big can it be? Is this really a company or just a feature?
  • Why now? Is this idea too far ahead of its time? Or, is this company too late?
  • Why this company? Do they have a technological head start? Do they have uncommon expertise that is difficult or impossible to replicate?
  • Why this leadership team? Why is this particular group of smart people (hint: they’re all smart) going to win? What is special about the founders that makes me believe they will beat everyone else and/or change the race as need be?

I know many such frameworks exist. I’m not making any uniqueness claim on this approach. I am saying, however, that this is my current framework when wearing my angel investor hat. And I think it’s really useful for founders to switch perspectives from time to time, so they can get a better sense for what the people on the other side of the table are thinking.

And, in the end, they’re thinking like investors. The more you can too, the better you’ll do when fundraising.

Slides from a Balderton Launched Go-To-Market Workshop

Just a quick post to share the slides I used today in a nearly 90-minute discussion with founders participating in the most recent cohort of the Balderton Launched incubator program.

Because this is focused on incubation-stage startups, we walked mostly about $0 to $1M (or $2M) issues, both how to win deals as founder (largely covered through Q&A) and how, once you’re winning them, to transition from founder-led sales to sales-led sales. I’d say there are four key parts of that process, overall.

  • Throw spaghetti at the wall and see what works
  • Identify key clusters on the wall — particularly those with smart, well-informed prospects who bought from you (anyway). We can’t scale luck or chance.
  • Hire your head of sales 6-12 months before you want to build a sales team. And then lash yourselves together so you experience all GTM leaning together. Then free them to go build a sales team and teach them what they have learned.
  • When it comes to hiring, we don’t want people learning how to the job (e.g., managing a small sales team in the prior bullet). We do want them learning how to do the job here. Beware the difference.

The slides are embedded below and downloadable as a PDF here.

Does Your Startup Need a Patent Strategy?

Yes.

And, by the way, I’m not joking with that answer. I’m not saying you need 17 patents. I’m not saying you need any patents at all — but you probably do. I am saying that despite the frenetic life of running a startup, you need to step back from time to time — maybe once a year or maybe on a cycle before your product releases — take a minute to learn (or remind yourself of) the basics of patents, and then sit down with your technical leaders and your intellectual property (IP) counsel to have a chat.

That is, you may not need to file any patents right now, but you do need to understand patents and devise your company’s strategy for them.


Waiting is not a great option for two reasons:

  • If you don’t have patents when you need them, it will be too late
  • You can lose important rights to your inventions if you fail to patent them before certain milestones

To help you with this process, my Balderton colleagues Dan Teodosiu, Andrew Wigfall, and I recently published a Balderton Perspective entitled: Why Your Startup Needs a Patent Strategy.

The three of us work as EIRs at Balderton, where our role is to advise portfolio companies on operational matters. Dan’s a product/technology guy, Andrew’s a lawyer, and I’m a marketer and former CEO. So we’re kind of the perfect trio to write such an article and provide a holistic view of the subject.

The piece discusses the following topics:

  • Why to file patents
  • A quick introduction to patents
  • What a patent strategy is and why you need one
  • How to define your patent strategy

I encourage all founders and technology or product leaders to read it and then get cracking on your company’s patent strategy.