Category Archives: Entrepreneurship

Kellblog Predictions for 2024

Well, it’s that time of year again, time for my annual predictions post, now in its tenth incarnation.  As per my custom, let’s review my 2023 predictions before presenting those for 2024.  Please remember that I do these for fun and fun alone.  See my FAQ for my terms, disclosures, disclaimers, et cetera.

2023 Predictions Review

1. The great pendulum of Silicon Valley swings back.  Hit.  I think Silicon Valley is driven by a master pendulum that in turn drives numerous sub-pendulums — and they all swung back in 2023.  Valuations came down, structure regrettably came back, cashflow trumped growth, founder friendliness decreased, diligence generally flopped back from FOMO to FOFU, and companies again started to treat employees as, well, people they are paying to do work

2. The barbarians at the gate are back.  Partial hit.  They’re there, but not quite buying with the frenzy I’d anticipated.  The problem with buyer’s markets is that sellers can often wait — and it seems many have.  PE software acquisitions were at roughly pre-pandemic levels in the first three quarters of 2023, though still well below 2021 and 2022 highs. Notable deals on the year include Silver Lake buying Qualtrics ($12.5B) and SoftwareAG ($2.4B), Thoma Bravo buying Coupa ($8B), Clear Lake and Insight buying Alteryx ($4.4B), Vista buying Duck Creek ($2.6B), Francisco Partners buying Sumo Logic ($1.7B), and Symphony buying Momentive ($1.5B).  Expect more of this activity in 2024.


3. Retain is the new add.  Hit.  Customer retention came into sharp focus in 2023 and with it a new, balanced view relying on both NRR and GRR as key retention metrics.  As I said last year, “while this bodes well for the customer success (CS) discipline, it does not automatically bode well for the customer success department.” Some found themselves blown up (aka Slootmanned), often in hasty lose/lose transactions leaving customers dissatisfied with reduced attention levels and sales unhappy with additional work without additional resource or pay.  Blowing up customer success to save money is myopic.  Re-organizing it, or simply re-chartering it, with a more business-aligned mission is the key to success.  New technology (e.g., Hook) will help.  Jason Lemkin predicts a slow reboot of the customer success function in 2024. 

4. The Crux becomes the strategy book of the year.  Partial hit.  Two things went wrong here.  First, I was manifesting this prediction – I wanted it to be the strategy book of the year.  Second, I was late to the party.  I bought my copy in December, 2022 so to me it was a brand-new book, but it had been released seven months earlier and had already won recognition from the FT, Forbes, and The Globe & Mail.  Sales-wise, I don’t have access to great stats, but I can see its best ranking on Amazon is in Business Systems and Planning where it currently ranks 121st.  It should be in the top ten with Good to Great, Blue Ocean Strategy, Thinking in Bets, The Art of War, and its older sibling Good Strategy, Bad Strategy.  Popularity be damned, I think The Crux is a great book, better than its predecessor which does a great job tearing apart the garbage that passes for strategy, but a worse job of saying what to do about it.

5. The professionals take over for Musk.  Hit.  I almost downgraded this to a partial hit because “take over” may not properly describe what has happened with Linda Yaccarino.  But she is nevertheless the CEO, if perhaps in name only.  (And yes, I’m still reluctant to call Twitter X.)  The question today is not how long Musk lasts, but how long Yaccarino lasts.  Having withstood so much already, I think it’s unlikely that she’s gone in 2024, but I won’t waste a prediction on it this year.

6. The bloom comes off the consumption pricing rose.  Hit.  I’ve always felt the famous Warren Buffet quote applies to consumption-based pricing:  “when the tide goes out you can see who’s swimming naked.”  I’m scoring this a hit not because I think usage-based pricing (UBP) – as it’s also known — is bad, but because I felt it was overhyped and often pushed too hard on companies by investors chasing stratospheric (or Snowflake-spheric) net revenue retention rates (NRR).  In reality, UBP has both pros and cons and is better applied to some products than others.  While UBP companies were hit harder, as this slightly confusing slide from Iconiq demonstrates [1], they nevertheless grew faster than their subscription counterparts in 2023.  Consumption models are here to stay, but hopefully the industry can take a more balanced, rational view on them.


7. The rise of unified ops.  Partial hit.  I think organizations increasingly realize that stovepiped ops functions generate inconsistency, conflict, and excess cost.  Though here again, I was manifesting because I believe in unifying all go-to-market ops – e.g., salesops, servicesops, successops, and marketingops — into a single ops function.  Some companies call that unified function revops, others use revops to mean only the unification of sales and successops.  The big rock is to bring marketing into the unified team.  While it’s impossible to know the revops job description from the name alone, a phrase search for “sales operations” versus “revenue operations” on LinkedIn jobs reveals 3x more listings for salesops than revops.  We still have a long way to go, but I’m confident slowly and steadily these functions will integrate over time.  Every time a unified revops team is created an angel gets its wings

8. Data notebooks as the data app platform.  Hit.  This prediction is in large part a proxy for “Hex will prosper,” because I’m a big believer in their vision to create a collaborative analytics platform [2].  In a difficult fundraising environment they raised $28M from not just anyone but Sequoia, using my all-time favorite fundraising strategy —  not looking for money.   As of the round, they’d grown the business 4x over the prior year.  Per LinkedIn, headcount is up 240% over the past two years.  They continue to rapidly innovate on product.  They support a wide variety of use-cases that go well beyond data apps.  They’ve also expanded the personas they support.  And, for the marketers out there, they’re the first data-oriented company since Splunk to have a distinctive voice in their marketing (e.g., the Hex 3.0 launch subtitle, “one arbitrary version number for Hex, one giant leap for data people.”)  If you want to understand why I’m so excited about this company (and see concrete examples of what some of these data buzzwords mean), watch their latest product launch video.

9. Meetings somehow survive.  Hit.  I’m so glad the idiocy of companies are for builders, not managers was brief.  Yes, companies need to focus on continuous productivity improvement.  Yes, companies need to remain vigilant against unproductive meetings, particularly standing ones.  And yes, we can always do better.  But to suggest discarding the collaboration baby with the unproductive bathwater was always absurd.  If you want better meetings, read Death By Meeting.  But meetings were, and are, here to stay.

10. Silicon Valley thrives again in 2024.  TBD.  In a desire to end last year’s list on a positive note, I realize that I inadvertently included a 2024 prediction in my 2023 list.  Thus, the score on this prediction remains to be decided.  Despite a rough 2023, or more aptly, in part because of it, I remain optimistic that the Silicon Valley business environment will improve in 2024. 

Kellblog Predictions for 2024

1. Election Dejection. No matter your political leanings, the 2024 presidential election will be divisive, distracting, and quite probably depressing.  It will test our institutions, challenge supreme court legitimacy, and drown voters in higher-calling rhetoric about saving the country or saving democracy, as the case may be.  There will likely be a constitutional crisis or two along the way, for good measure.

To stay in my wheelhouse of Silicon Valley, communications, and to a lesser extent, media, I think three things will happen:

  • The media will make a dog’s breakfast of coverage.  Alternative facts.  Improper framing.  Narrative fallacy.  Bothsideism and false equivalence.  And many others.  Worst of all, due to a lazy preoccupation with oddsmaking, the media will abdicate a key duty in its coverage, wasting the coming months endlessly handicapping the outcome.  Instead of this horse-race journalism, the media should do what NYU professor Jay Rosen advises:  focus on not the odds, but the stakes in its coverage.
  • The election will test the once-veiled political neutrality of Silicon Valley.  For years, Silicon Valley was a place of quiet liberalism among workers and veiled libertarianism among overlords.  The attitude towards Washington was leave us alone and let us work [3].  In the past two decades, that’s changed with lobbying dollars up about 10x, more VCs and celebrity CEOs openly expressing political views, and the rise of podcasts with strong political leanings.  A16Z’s American Dynamism initiative has strong political overtones and is surprisingly nationalistic for an international firm [4].  Politics are coming out of the closet in Silicon Valley, for better or worse.
  • There will be a lot of infantile rhetoric.  The rise of social media dropped the level of our discourse, with many politicians only too happy to follow suit.  Today’s vile norms (e.g., name-calling) were unacceptable only 10 or 20 years ago.  This debasement will continue during the 2024 election cycle.  I refer readers to Graham’s hierarchy of disagreement as a framework for characterizing the quality of debate and to encourage everyone to climb, not descend, this ladder.

The ray of good news is that while the election will almost certainly be a mess, most Americans are exhausted by today’s politics and polarization.  Eventually, this should percolate into votes and candidates, and ultimately result in a government focused on consensus and compromise [5].  One hopes so, at least.

2. A Slow Bounceback in Startup Land. There’s blood in the Silicon Valley water.  3,200 startups failed in 2023.  Unicorns are turning into zombies.  The predicted mass extinction event appears to be upon us.  Those who can raise money face dilutive downrounds.  Even among healthier unicorns, there’s a large backlog of over-valued private companies trying to grow into a contemporary valuation before running out of cash.


On the financing side, VC funding was down to pre-pandemic levels.  OpenView surprised the industry with an abrupt shutdown in new investing.  Some predict that 25% of VC partners will exit the business in the next few years.  Silicon Valley Bank failed


So, what will happen in startup land in 2024?

  • We will start to turn the corner.  ARR growth stalled.  Valuation multiples were hammered.  But green shoots are emerging.  I think the worst of it is over, particularly for those companies that responded quickly to the downturn by increasing focus, reducing burn, and increasing runway.
  • This will happen more quickly on the startup side.  Net new ARR growth rates are already rebounding.  David Sacks is calling an end to the software recession of 2022 and 2023.  Gartner predicts software spend will grow 14% in 2024.  Things will recover, but they won’t snap back
  • And it will happen more slowly on the venture side.  Everything happens more slowly on the venture side [6].  While public markets can turn on a dime, venture funds are decade-long, illiquid, limited partnerships where prices are reset more quarterly than daily [7].  This creates a damping effect whereby dramatic change needs time to percolate through the system [8]. 

3. The Year of Efficient Growth. If 2023 ended up the year of hunkering down, then 2024 will be the year of efficient growth.  For the first time, an overall productivity measure, ARR/FTE, has crawled its way into the top 5 SaaS metrics [9].  See chart below for how it varies with scale [10].


The rule of 40 (R40) is back with a vengeance.  R40-compliant companies currently command a 61% EV/R multiple premium over their non-compliant counterparts [11].  In a two-factor regression, the relative importance of growth to profitability in predicting EV/R multiples is currently around 2.0 [12] – so growth and profit both matter, but growth still matters more. Because of that, and because Bessemer believes that the relative impact should change as a function of scale, they have introduced a new metric, the rule of X, which is a variably growth-weighted rule of 40 [13].  Don’t read the article with the understanding that there will be no math.  There’s plenty of it.

The ultimate sales pitch for the rule of X is its superior explanatory power of the EV/R multiple, as depicted in the chart below [14]. 


While I have several concerns about this proposed metric [15], the point is that Bessemer, a thought leader in SaaS metrics who to my knowledge defined and/or were early evangelists of CAC, CPP, and CCS, is spending time and energy on a growth/profit balance metric.  That’s the point.  GAAC is dead.  Long live balanced growth and profit. 

In 2024, expect emphasis on the usual go-to-market (GTM) efficiency metrics like CAC, CPP, and LTV/CAC, continued emphasis on both net and gross retention rates (NRR and GRR), new emphasis on overall productivity (ARR/FTE) and balanced growth measures (R40), and of course strong attention to cash burn efficiency (burn multiple).

4. AI Climbs the Hype Cycle. In 2023, artificial intelligence peaked on Gartner’s hype cycle. It garnered significant attention, particularly in sectors like healthcare, finance, and entertainment, promising personalized solutions and immersive experiences. However, amid this excitement, there was a growing awareness of AI’s challenges, including ethics and regulations. This marked a crucial juncture for AI, transitioning from hype to practical use, demanding responsible implementation.

Perhaps you noticed the change in voice — the prior paragraph was written by ChatGPT.  While I think I’m still winning my John Henry battle with generative AI, I know my lead won’t last forever.  Writers fighting ChatGPT are like mathematicians fighting calculators. 

Last year was an amazing year for AI, one that both inspired and frightened us.  While 40% of humans don’t pass the Turing test, ChatGPT can now pass as human about 40% of the time.  Marc Andreessen, in his role as public intellectual, declared that AI will save the world (presumably after software has finished eating it).  Some see Andreessen’s manifesto as visionary, others as self-serving, but it’s well worth reading as is this Stratechery interview. For extra fun, watch the techies debate on Hacker News. 

Should we lean into AI as the e/acc movement believes, or should we pull back to avoid turning humanity into collateral damage from an AI all-consumed with making paperclips

If you don’t have time for Marc’s philosophy, I recommend Ben Evans’ wonderful, more down-to-earth deck on AI.  It hits all the key issues with a nice balance of insights, examples, and just enough Meeker-style trends data [16].

In 2024, I think AI will continue to blow our socks off as we climb to peak hype.  Vendors will propose a wide variety of use-cases, some of which will stick while others will not.  Some features will become companies and some products will become features [17].  What’s a technology consumer to do?  Allocate time to experiment with a broad range of AI features and products.  I expect many AI solutions to go from magical advantage to table stakes almost overnight. 

In 2024, AI will continue to pose interesting questions in four areas:

  • Philosophical.  The semantics of predicting vs. reasoning.  See this amazing interview with Jensen Huang and Ilya Sutskever, in particular the part where Ilya presents his detective novel analogy.  Goosebumps. 
  • Practical.  Are you getting quality answers that you can trust or generating botshit?  Do generated answers include hallucinations, as a hapless lawyer discovered, or math challenges, as highlighted by Stephen Wolfram? 
  • LegalCopyright and fair use questions reminiscent of Internet 1.0.  Will OpenAI have their Napster moment?  Read the New York Times complaint.  While not yet at the forefront of debate, my friend Anshu Sharma often highlights important privacy concerns as well.
  • Pricing.  Much as SaaS moved the industry from perpetual to subscription (and then consumption) pricing, will AI move the industry to value- or results-based pricing? [18]

5. AI-Driven GTM Efficiency. We are experiencing a Cambrian explosion of enterprise AI tools.  Here’s a part of Sequoia’s map to them.  And these are just the leaders.


In marketing, you can find tools for anything including media relations, image editing, presentations, storytelling, personalization, SEO, content, copywriting, leadgen, intent, engagement, automation, cross-channel messaging, nurture, outbound, social, advertising, and even analytics [19]. 

In sales, you can find maps like this:


These things are everywhere.  And we’ve not even discussed customer success, customer support (e.g., chatbots), or professional services.

My prediction is that this Cambrian explosion will continue into 2024 and by the end of the year things will start to sort out.  What does that mean?

  • If you’re a vendor, you’re playing musical chairs and you should go all-out to ensure you have a seat when the music stops (i.e., the market starts to organize)
  • If you’re a customer, you should allocate real time to play with and explore these tools.  Don’t be too busy fighting battles with swords to talk to the machine gun salesperson.
  • If you’re a GTM executive, you should understand that your investors expect real productivity gains from these tools.

In terms of gains, this slide from Battery argues that an AI-enabled sales team with 75 people can support the same number of sellers (and drive the same quota) as a traditional 110-person team.  Are you ready for this board conversation?  You should be.


6. Beyond Search. The traditional search business is in trouble.  For decades, information retrieval people have pleaded for “answers, not links.” While Google has made progress over the years at providing answers (e.g., featured snippets, PAA) [20], generative AI clearly delivers the answers that many have sought for so long.

Search today is in roughly the same mess that it was in the pre-PageRank days of Yahoo and AltaVista.  Bombed out.  Gamed out.  Loaded with clickbait.  Over advertised.  It’s just increasingly hard to find what you’re looking for.  And that’s before the coming, widespread creation of more AI-generated, SEO-driven content.  More cruft to jam up the system. 

Well, Clayton Christensen to the rescue.  We are watching the cycle of disruptive innovation play out.  As Google continues to cater to its existing customers and is increasingly run by extractors as opposed to innovators, they create the opportunity for disruption.  Now, since Google is a very smart company, they’re not flat-footed in response and are very much trying to disrupt themselves.  But, regardless of which vendors win, I expect generative AI’s answers to largely replace traditional search’s lists-of-links going forward.

This will have a huge impact on SEO.  For example, the question will no longer be “are you above the fold?” but instead, “are you in the answer or not?”  Consider this example, where I asked ChatGPT to make a short-list of conversation intelligence tools to evaluate.


You’re either on that list or you’re not [21].  There is no next page — no consolation prize if you will.  Perhaps that’s not really a change because few people clicked on subsequent pages anyway.  But I think the stakes are going up in an increasingly winner-take-all race — where most of us currently lack the requisite knowledge and skills to even compete.  I’m not talking about how to use ChatGPT for traditional SEO and generate more cruft.  I’m talking about optimizing your content for inclusion in ChatGPT results.  SEO is dead.  Long live ChatGPTO.

For decades, information retrieval expert Stephen Arnold has written a blog called Beyond Search. In 2024, we’re finally going to get there.

7. From RAGs to Riches. Consider this now famous chat with Chevy of Watsonville.

That feeling when your chatbot is overqualified for the job.

General-purpose, large language models (LLMs) can suffer from three weaknesses:

  • Broad scope, in many applications far broader than is necessary or desirable.
  • Inability to inform them with specialized knowledgebases and/or supplemental information after the model has been trained.
  • No sourcing, making hallucination detection more difficult and limiting their use in environments that require sources.

A relatively new technology, introduced in 2020, called retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) solves these problems.  This article provides a great technical overview of RAG.  IBM Research also wrote a great high-level overview, including two nice analogies: 

“It’s the difference between an open-book and a closed-book exam,” Lastras said. “In a RAG system, you are asking the model to respond to a question by browsing through the content in a book, as opposed to trying to remember facts from memory.”

And

“Think of the model as an overeager junior employee that blurts out an answer before checking the facts,” said Lastras. “Experience teaches us to stop and say when we don’t know something. But LLMs need to be explicitly trained to recognize questions they can’t answer.”

From what I understand of RAG, I like it because it’s a practical approach for eliminating problems with LLMs that adds enterprise features like use of existing knowledgebases and references to sources. 

In 2024, I think we’ll be hearing a lot more about RAG.  Salesforce has added it to EinsteinGlean has raised over $150M from Sequoia and others to reinvent enterprise search using RAG.  Cohere has raised over $400M from Index and others to build conversational apps with RAG.  Many more will follow.

8. Outbound Finds Its Proper Place. Debates about outbound heat up faster than honey in a microwave oven.  Particularly when companies (often quite prematurely) think they have picked all the low-hanging inbound fruit, outbound becomes a religious issue, fast.  Here are some of the reasons I’ve heard for this:

  • The great hope.  It must succeed because other methods are topping out or failing (and execution quality couldn’t possibly be the reason).
  • It worked before.  Five years ago at my last company, even if it was in a different situation, with a different strategy, in a different time.
  • I was brought here to make it work.  It’s why the CEO hired me.  I know how to build it.
  • Sales wants control of its own destiny.  Even if it’s inefficient, I don’t want to be so dependent on marketing.
  • I need outbound SDRs to groom into sellers.  They’re my funnel for filling AE headcount.
  • I want a club to beat sellers.  When sellers complain about lack of leads, I need to be able to say:  “So what have you done to help yourself?”

The last point is true only in cases where sellers are required to generate a certain amount of their own pipeline, which, with the exception of account-based marketing (ABM) models, I don’t think they should do.  Remember the quote:  “sellers are like airplanes, they only make money when they’re in the air.”

Recently, I’ve heard more and more CEOs abandon this religious belief in outbound.  That’s good.  Standalone outbound [22] is a low-conversion rate activity.  Stalk someone.  Twist their arm to agree to a meeting.  See if they show up.  (Often, they don’t, so repeat the stalking process.)  Try to convince them they need to buy in your category and then to buy from  you.  See what happens. 

If you were a seller, which would you prefer?

  • The stalked, arm-twisted lead above, or
  • Someone who found us through an organic search, downloaded a white paper, attended a weekly demo session, rated it highly, and asked to speak to a seller

Conversion rates usually reflect this [23].  Partner- and inbound-generated leads often convert at double or triple the rate of outbound.  I expect standalone outbound effectiveness to only get worse because of the AI-driven tools arms race.  Every SDR will be sending AI-generated, personalized email sequences.  And that’s not to mention the new Gmail anti-spam rules that go into effect in February.

What’s the glaring exception here?  ABM, done properly.  When a company targets a small number of accounts, focuses sellers on penetrating them, and aligns both marketing and outbound SDRs as part of the effort.  In effect, the whole company stalks the customer, not just an SDR.  Does this work?  Yes, absolutely.  What’s the catch?  That’s simple:

Is the juice worth the squeeze?

ABM is a lot of work.  You shouldn’t bother trying it to win a $10K or even a $50K deal.  But when you can do $100K to $500K+ deals and have a few strong references in a vertical to which your company has strategically committed, that is when you should do ABM. 

Outbound isn’t Santa Claus.  It’s just a nice old man with whiskers.  In 2024, I think many companies will figure that out.   

9. The Reprise of Repricing. Compressed valuation multiples and reduced growth mean lower stock prices.  That’s no surprise.  However, this creates real problems with equity-based compensation, greatly lowering or entirely eliminating its value.  Let’s look at two common equity-based compensation methods.

  • RSUs which are typically granted in terms of value.  For example, if you’re granted $400K worth of RSUs over 4 years when the stock is $50, you get 8,000 shares over 4 years or 500 shares/quarter.  If the stock falls to $20, you’re now vesting $10K per quarter instead of $25K.  That’s a big compensation hit.
  • Stock options which are the right to buy shares at a fixed price, typically the stock’s value on the day the option is granted.  For example, you are granted 8,000 shares over 4 years when the stock price is $50.  If the stock falls to $20, your option is “underwater,” meaning it’s basically worthless because the market price is well below your strike price [24].  That’s an even bigger compensation hit [25].

Now, let’s imagine that we at GoodCo have a similar competitor across the street called NiceCo, and that NiceCo’s stock has suffered similarly.  I can stay at GoodCo and vest equity compensation at a reduced or zero rate, or I can quit, cross the street to work at NiceCo, and get a new grant.

  • For RSUs, I might get a new grant of 20,000 shares and vest at my original $25K/quarter rate.  And feel like there’s upside because the stock may appreciate from there.
  • For options, I might get a new 20,000 share grant at a strike price of $20/share, a no-brainer compared to my existing grant of far fewer shares at a far higher price [26] [27].

How can GoodCo retain its employees in this situation?  The short answer — barring soft factors like superior management, culture, and perks — is they can’t.  This is a major problem and left unsolved, GoodCo will lose a lot of employees to NiceCo [28].

Enter repricing.  While I won’t get into the details, the basic idea for stock options is that in return for some modest consideration (e.g., a reduction in share count), the company will reset the strike price on the options in the example above from $50 to $20.  While the concept is simple, the rules are different for public and private companies and, unsurprisingly, public companies are more restricted in what they can do.

For RSUs, it’s slightly different.  Technically speaking you don’t need to reprice anything.  The company can simply grant more RSUs to make up the difference in reduced value.  Or, it seems they can run a sort of repricing where they, e.g., redo the initial grant math to produce  a new higher vest rate, but in exchange for a vesting reset. 

After that long introduction, my prediction is simple.  In 2024, repricing will be back.  If your company has a greatly reduced valuation and is not talking about repricing or its equivalents, then you might want to ask them.  I’d advise some patience because these things can take time.  And bear in mind these rules often vary a lot by country.

As always with financial and career matters, make your own decisions, consult your own advisors, and ensure you understand Kellblog terms and disclaimers.  You can also read a book like Consider Your Options for more information. 

10. Peak Podcasting. For years, podcasts have been on the rise, with the pandemic driving a massive peak in podcast creation.  One of the better-kept B2B marketing secrets was that starting a CEO podcast could serve as a structured way to help CEOs, particularly introverted ones, get out there and meet new, important people.  Creating a CEO podcast was the ultimate three-fer, improving:

  • Communications, driving company messages and positioning the founder/CEO as a thought leader.
  • Customer relationships, gaining access to and/or reinforcing relationships with next-level executive contacts as invited guests.
  • Partner relationships, interviewing fellow CEOs, greasing the skids for many kinds of partnerships, potentially including the one that eventually sells the company.

If you like the sound of that and haven’t started one yet, I still think it’s a good idea.  But start fast.  It takes a long time to build an audience and I think in 2024 we will hit peak CEO podcast, for the simple reason that the word is getting out.  My feeling is largely intuition-driven – podcast advertising forecasts still paint quite a rosy picture – but I think the software market will tire of B2B CEO podcasts over the next few years.  If you don’t believe me, ask the podcast police

If you want to create a podcast, make sure everyone understands why you’re doing it, get buy-in for a long-term, high-frequency commitment [29], and start now.  That should keep the podcast police away.

Thank you for reading to the end, and I wish everyone a happy and healthy 2024.

# # #

Notes

[1] The two bars on the right make the point – they compare top-quartile growth rates of UBP and subscription companies.  This slide doesn’t do the world’s best job of making this point, but I’ve seen it in other studies as well.

[2] Note that while I’m an angel investor in Hex, I do not work closely or actively with the company so my conclusions about their progress are based entirely on external observation. 

[3] With the major exceptions of government-funded research projects (e.g., DARPA) and, usually as companies gain in scale, the embrace of government as a customer.

[4] Though I suspect they’d argue it’s a US-focused practice more than a firmwide initiative, but that hasn’t been 100% clear to me in reading about it.

[5] Which I believe was the subtitle of my American Government textbook back in college.

[6] Even OpenView’s “abrupt” shutdown was not an overnight closing of the doors; it was a cessation in new investment.  As the firm noted, it will continue to exist and support existing investments until the existing funds reach their eventual conclusions – which can be years, even for growth investors.

[7] While new investments and valuations can turn on a dime, the rest of the business is focused on the long-term task of building companies and delivering TVPI, DPI, and IRR over a decade or so.

[8] IMHO, this damping is a good thing because it damps out irrationality as well.  You can’t see a bank run on a venture fund, because investors generally don’t have the right to demand their money back. 

[9] Iconiq New Era of Efficient Growth, slide 16.

[10] OpenView 2023 SaaS Benchmarks, slide 41.

[11] Battery State of the OpenCloud, slide 8.

[12] Bessemer State of the Cloud, slides 14-16.  This shows nicely the growth at all costs era (6.0x), the trough after the peak (0.8x) and return to normal (2.0x).  While growth is still twice as important as profit in predicting valuation, the balance still matters.

[13] SEG’s growth-weighted rule of 40 is double the 2x growth-weighted-average of growth and profit (i.e., it’s like a weighted average that isn’t averaged because they don’t take the last step and divide by 2). SEG does this to stay consistent with R40 which is the sum of profit and growth, not the average. In the rule of X, the relative weight (i.e., the “multiplier”) varies – over time and across stage.  This makes the metric more complex, less comparable across stage and time, and produces a wider ranges of outcomes. For example, a company whose (growth, profit) is (100%, 50%) scores 150 on R40 and scores 950 on RX when the multipler is 9x, 130 when the multiplier is 0.8x, and 280 when the multiplier is 2.3x.

[14] Frankly, this argument strikes me as circular.  If you’re getting the weight multipler from a regression of the current market, it seems obvious that you’d expect a higher R^2 compared to any fixed weighting of growth and profit, including the default weight of one in the rule of 40.

[15] My concerns:  bad name (if rule of 40 abbreviates to R40, this abbreviates to RX), hard to interpret scores, incomparability across stages and time, and seeming circular logic (see prior note).  Their ultimate point is correct:  growth matters more and blind adherence to an unweighted rule of 40 may take you to the wrong place.  But this metric needs some more work.

[16] Meeker was legendary for drowning the audience in nevertheless interesting data in her annual tech trends reports.  As my dearly departed father might have said, “there’s enough here to gag a maggot.”

[17] Ben Evans covers these ideas, starting on slide 39 of his deck.

[18] The argument in favor is that AI will create a lot of value, vendors want to capture that value, and vendors are certain enough that they’re willing to take the downside risk to get the upside.  The argument against is that value creates an upper bound on pricing, but the lower bound is determined by the price of alternatives.  At Host Analytics, I could replace a Hyperion system that cost $500K/year with a SaaS app that cost $50K.  That’s a lot of value to tap.  But if Adaptive Insights were willing to do the same deal at $25K, then the price of alternatives, not value, became the focus of the conversation and differentiation the focus of the sales cycle.

[19] Please note that none of these references are endorsements, I don’t know many of the companies, and I’m sure many would be unhappy with my chosen one-word label.  The point is to show the breadth and depth of the market.

[20] Front-running content producers in the process – e.g., featured snippets provide answers that leverage content producers’ content while eliminating and/or reducing traffic to their sites.

[21] This example also shows the problems with ChatGPT’s cut-off date, e.g., it doesn’t seem to know that Chorus is now part of Zoominfo.

[22] By standalone outbound, I mean outbound not done as part of a bigger ABM program.

[23] Unless they’ve been gamed to over-credit outbound as is sometimes the case when a company has “outbound fever.”

[24] Technically, even an underwater option has value because of its time value and the chance the stock price may rise above the strike price at some point in the future during the life of the option.  In my example, it needs to go up by 150% before the option has any intrinsic value. 

[25] Though these days an increasing number of tech workers are jaded with stock options, may value them at zero, and see them as pure upside – e.g., lottery tickets on top of their cash compensation.   In that case, there is no “hit” per se to compensation, because they were expecting zero value anyway.

[26] If the company derives option grants from value, they’d say:  we’ll grant you $400K worth of value, so at $20/share, that’s 20,000 shares.  Even if they don’t work this way and simply offer to match the number of shares, the job-switcher is still offered a far better deal — 8,000 shares at a $20 strike price, as opposed to $50.

[27] Note that other factors come into play here, including the fact that grant sizes tend to decrease over time.  For example, if you’ve been at GoodCo for four years with an initial grant of 8,000 shares, the going rate for your job might have dropped to 2,000 shares.  Thus, crossing the street to NiceCo might result in a grant at a lower strike price, but with a much smaller number of shares.  I think this is somewhat less true of RSUs (because they feel more a part of annual compensation as opposed to gravy on top), but I’d need to think more to be sure.

[28] That said, in this example, they can presumably hire NiceCo employees in the same situation.  That aside, neither company benefits from the mass rotation of employees.

[29] Because that’s what it takes to climb the charts.  And some advertising spend doesn’t hurt either.

An Epitaph for Intrapreneurship

About twenty years ago, before I ran two startups as CEO and served as product-line general manager, I went through an intrapreneurship phase, where I was convinced that big companies should try to act like startups.  It was a fairly popular concept at the time.

Heck, we even decided to try the idea at Business Objects, launching a new analytical applications division called Ithena, with a mission to build CRM analytical applications on top of our platform.  We made a lot of mistakes with Ithena, which was the beginning of the end of my infatuation with the concept:

  • We staffed it with the wrong people.  Instead of hiring experts in CRM, we staffed it largely with experts in BI platforms.  Applications businesses are first and foremost about domain expertise.
  • They built the wrong thing.  Lacking CRM knowledge, they invested in building platform extensions that would be useful if one day you wanted to build a CRM analytical app.  From a procrastination viewpoint, it felt like a middle school dance.  Later, in Ithena’s wreckage, I found one of the prouder moments of my marketing career  — when I simply repositioned the product to what it was (versus what we wanted it to be), sales took off.
  • We blew the model.  They were both too close and too far.  They were in the same building, staffed largely with former parent-company employees, and they kept stock options in both the parent the spin-out.  It didn’t end up a new, different company.  It ended up a cool kids area within the existing one.
  • We created channel conflict with ourselves.  Exacerbated by the the thinness of the app, customers had trouble telling the app from the platform.  We’d have platform salesreps saying “just build the app yourself” and apps salesreps saying that you couldn’t.
  • They didn’t act like entrepreneurs.  They ran the place like big-company, process-oriented people, not scrappy entrepreneurs fighting for food to get through the week.  Favorite example:  they had hired a full-time director of salesops before they had any customers.  Great from an MBO achievement perspective (“check”).  But a full-time employee without any orders to book or sales to analyze?  Say what you will, but that would never happen at a startup.

As somebody who started out pretty enthralled with intrapreneurship, I ended up pretty jaded on it.

I was talking to a vendor about these topics the other day, and all these memories came back.  So I did quick bit of Googling to find out what happened to that intrapreneurship wave.  The answer is not much.

Entrepreneurship crushes intrapreneurship in Google Trends.  Just for fun, I added SPACs to see their relatively popularity.

Here’s my brief epitaph for intrapreneurship.  It didn’t work because:

  • Intrapreneurs are basically entrepreneurs without commitment.  And commitment, that burn the ships attitude, is key part of willing a startup into success.
  • The entry barriers to entrepreneurship, particularly in technology, are low.  It’s not that hard (provided you can dodge Silicon Valley’s sexism, ageism, and other undesirable -isms) for someone in love with an idea to quit their job, raise capital, and start a company.
  • The intrapreneurial venture is unable to prioritize its needs over those of the parent.  “As long as you’re living in my house, you’ll do things my way,” might work for parenting (and it doesn’t) but it definitely does not work for startup businesses.
  • With entrepreneurship one “yes” enables an idea, with intrapreneurship, one “no” can kill it.  What’s more, the sheer inertia in moving a decision through the hierarchy could kill an idea or cause a missed opportunity.
  • In terms of the ability to attract talent and raise capital, entrepreneurship beats intrapreneurship hands down.  Particularly today, where the IPO class of 2020 raised a mean of $350M prior to going public.

As one friend put it, it’s easy with intrapreneurship to end up with all the downsides of both models.  Better to be “all in” and redefine the new initiative into your corporate self image, or “all out” and spin it out as an independent entity.

I’m all for general mangers (GMs) acting as mini-CEOs, running products as a portfolio of businesses.  But that job, and it’s a hard one, is simply not the same as what entrepreneurs do in creating new ventures.  It’s not even close.

The intrapreneur is dead, long live the GM.

The Holy Grail of Enterprise Sales: Defining the Repeatable Sales Process

(This is the first in a three-part restructuring and build-out of the prior post.  See note [1] for details.)

The number one question go-to-market question in any enterprise software startup is:  “do you have a repeatable sales process?” or, in more contemporary Silicon Valley patois, “do you have a repeatable sales motion?”

It’s one of the key milestones in startup evolution, which proceed roughly like:

  • Do you have a concept?
  • Do you have a working product?
  • Do you have any customer traction (e.g., $1M in ARR)?
  • Have you established product-market fit?
  • Do you have a repeatable sales process?

Now, when pressed to define “repeatable sales process,” I suspect many of those asking might reply along the same lines as the US Supreme Court in defining pornography:

“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced… but I know it when I see it …”

That is, in my estimation, a lot of people throw the term around without defining it, so in the Kelloggian spirit of rigor, I thought I’d offer my definition:

A repeatable sales process means you have six things:

  1. Standard hiring profile
  2. Standard onboarding program
  3. Standard support ratios
  4. Standard patch
  5. Standard kit
  6. Standard sales methodology

All of which contribute to delivering a desirable, standard result.  Let’s take a deeper look at each:

  1. You hire salesreps with a standard hiring profile, including items such as years of experience, prior target employers or spaces, requisite skills, and personality assessments (e.g., DiSC, Hogan, CCAT).
  2. You give them a standard onboarding program, typically built by a dedicated director of sales productivity, using industry best practices, one to three weeks in length, and accompanied by ongoing clinics.
  3. You have standard support ratios (e.g., each rep gets 1/2 of a sales consultant, 1/3 of an SDR, and 1/6 of a sales manager).  As you grow, your sales model should also use ratios to staff more indirect forms of support such as alliances, salesops, and sales productivity.
  4. You have a standard patch (territory), and a method for creating one, where the rep can be successful.  This is typically a quantitative exercise done by salesops and ideally is accompanied by a patch-warming program [2] such that new reps don’t inherit cold patches.
  5. You have standard kit including tools such as collateral, presentations, demos, templates.  I strongly prefer fewer, better deliverables that reps actually know how to use to the more common deep piles of tools that make marketing feel productive, but that are misunderstood by sales and ineffective.
  6. You have a standard sales methodology that includes how you define and execute the sales process.  These include programs ranging from the boutique (e.g., Selling through Curiosity) to the mainstream (e.g., Force Management) to the classic (e.g., Customer-Centric Selling) and many more.  The purpose of these programs is two-fold:  to standardize language and process across the organization and to remind sales — in a technology feature-driven world — that customers buy products as solutions to problems, i.e., they buy 1/4″ holes, not 1/4″ bits.

And, most important, you can demonstrate that all of the above is delivering some desirable standard result, which will be the topic of the next post.

# # #

Notes

[1] I have a bad habit, which I’ve been slowly overcoming, to accidently put real meat on one topic into an aside of a post on a different one.  My favorite example:  it took me ~15 years to create a post on my marketing credo (marketing exists to make sales easier) despite mentioning it in passing in numerous posts.  After reading the prior post, I realized that I’d buried the definition of a repeatable sales model and the tests for having one into a post that was really about applying CMMI to the sales model.  Ergo, as my penance, as a service to future readers, and to help my SEO, I am decomposing that post into three parts and elaborating on it during the restructuring process.

[2] I think of patch-warming as field marketing for fallow patches.  Much as field marketing works to help existing reps in colder patches, why can’t we apply the same concepts to patches that will soon be occupied?  This is an important, yet often completely overlooked, aspect of reducing rep ramping time.

Book Review of Good Strategy, Bad Strategy by Richard Rumelt

Good Strategy, Bad Strategy by UCLA Anderson professor Richard Rumelt is by far my favorite book on strategy.  In this post I’ll explain why I love this book, provide an overview of Rumelt’s core concepts, and offer a few thoughts on (and dare I say an enhancement to) his strategy framework.

Why I Love This Book
I love this book for two reasons.  First, he skillfully eviscerates all of the garbage that far too often passes for strategy in corporate America.  It’s borderline therapeutic to watch him tear down case after case of junk that is pitched by executives and consultants as strategy.  His four telltales:

  • Fluff.  Corporate doublespeak that,“uses ‘Sunday’ words and apparently esoteric concepts to create the illusion of high-level thinking.”
  • Failure to face the challenge“Bad strategy fails to recognize of define the challenge.  If you can’t define the challenge, you cannot evaluate a strategy.”
  • Mistaking goals for strategy.  Here at the center of the OKR universe, it’s common to find companies with lists of “statements of desire” rather than “plans for overcoming obstacles.” [1]
  • Bad strategic objectives“Strategic objectives are ‘bad’ when they fail to address critical issues or when they are impracticable.”

His dismemberment of bad strategy is so surgical and so deft that it alone is worth the price of the book.

The second thing I love about this book is focus.  As my high school Latin teacher, Mr. Maddaloni, always reminded us:  focus is singular [2].  Most companies — often due to the group consensus process used to create strategy — fail at rising to the challenge of picking and end up with multiple, strategic foci instead of a single, strategic focus [3].

This can reflect avoidance of a dead moose issue threatening the company or simply lead to a laundry list of incoherent and unattainable goals.  Either way, Rumelt’s approach sidesteps this problem by forcing the company to focus on a single issue.

The Core Concepts of Good Strategy, Bad Strategy
Per Rumelt, “good strategy is coherent action backed up by an argument, an effective mixture of thought and action with a basic underlying structure called the kernel.”

Excerpt:

The kernel of a strategy contains three elements:

A diagnosis that defines or explains the nature of the challenge. A good diagnosis simplifies the often overwhelming complexity of reality by identifying certain aspects of the situation as critical.

A guiding policy for dealing with the challenge. This is an overall approach chosen to cope with or overcome the obstacles identified in the diagnosis.

A set of coherent actions that are designed to carry out the guiding policy. These are steps that are coordinated with one another to work together in accomplishing the guiding policy.

This is brilliant in its simplicity and in its recognition that a huge part of strategy is an accurate and insightful simplification of the situation:  determining which elements are essential and boiling it down to a short, simple narrative as to “what’s going on”  and ergo what to do about it.

I use a trick to indirectly make this point when I’m in a strategy meeting.  At some point the discussion inevitably fades into, “argh, this is so complicated, there are so, so many things to consider” and room is lost to a sense of hopelessness.  I’ll then ask one of the participants, “can you tell me the story of the last company you worked at?”

You’ll usually hear something like this in response:

  • “We pushed too far up market without the product to support it.”
  • “We got caught in a squeeze between a high-end enterprise vendor and low-end velocity disrupter.”
  • “We got out-marketed by a company with more capital and a more aggressive team.”

I’ll then say, “why do you suppose it’s so easy for us to tell short, simple stories about our prior employers but nearly impossible to make one about us?  What do you think we’ll say in four years about this company?”  It’s the same idea as Rumelt’s — to force simplification of the story to its core narrative and to focus on one thing in the diagnosis.  We do it naturally when looking at the past.  In the present, we resist it like the plague.

I believe that 80% of strategy is the diagnosis — and sometimes the diagnosis simply can’t get made through a group process, but instead has to be decided by the CEO [4] [5].  The other half, to paraphrase Yogi Berra, is the guiding policy and coherent actions.

Thoughts on the Framework
While I love the fact that Rumelt forces executives to diagnose the single most important challenge facing the company — and avoid creating lists of many such challenges — doing so is quite difficult for both good and bad reasons.

The good reason is that it forces “table stakes” conversations, well, “off the table.”  If it’s a discussion about something that everyone in the industry must do (e.g., build quality product, train and scale sales), then it’s almost definitionally not the single most important challenge facing that company.  That’s good, because while those table stakes operations are undoubtedly hard work, they are not strategic.  Operating executives too often confuse the two.

The bad reason it’s difficult is that you might get it wrong.  And in this framework, where everything is tied to a diagnosis about the company’s single-most important challenge, if you get the diagnosis wrong, the whole strategy collapses along with it.

The hardest part I’ve found is balancing immediate vs. longer-term challenges.  For example, say it’s 2003 and you’re at CRM leader Siebel Systems.

  • Your most immediate challenge is likely your direct competition, PeopleSoft or Oracle who are much larger than you and providing broad suites.
  • Your biggest strategic challenge is your indirect competitor Salesforce.com, who is disrupting the business model with software as a service.

Perhaps one of my friends who worked at Siebel at the time can weigh in with an informed comment, but my guess is that Siebel (who was doing $1.4B in annual revenue) minimized Salesforce (who reported doing a mere $65M in its S-1) and, to the extent they would have used a framework like this, would have picked the wrong challenge and gotten the wrong strategy as a result.

Another potential criticism of this framework is that it tends to orient you to competitive threats in a Silicon Valley that would much rather talk about vision (and making the world a better place) than competition.  In my experience, there are few vendors who have the luxury of being totally vision-driven, those who claim otherwise are often practicing revisionism [6], and there’s nothing in the framework, per se, that says the central challenge has to be competition-related.  It could be about building the product, creating distribution channels, or landing your first ten customers.  The framework doesn’t dictate the nature of the challenge, it simply demands that you pick one.

My last thought on the framework is that it appears to be missing an element [7].  In order to make a guiding policy from a diagnosis it helps to have a set of beliefs (or assumptions) as the bridge in between, because these beliefs are neither an explicit part of the guiding policy nor necessarily documented in the diagnosis.

So my slightly revised format of the template is:

  • Diagnosis:  the single most important challenge faced by the company (whether immediate or strategic)
  • Beliefs:  a short list of key assumptions that bridge from the diagnosis to the guiding policy.
  • Guiding policy:  the overall approach to dealing with the challenge
  • Coherent actions:  a set of actions designed to carry out the guiding policy

Or, in English form, given the diagnosis and this set of beliefs, we have chosen this guiding policy which is to be carried out through this set of coherent actions.

Closing Thoughts
I’d say that while I love this book it might have been better titled Bad Strategy, Good Strategy because it’s stronger at tearing apart the garbage that masquerades as strategy than at helping you build good strategy yourself [8].  That said, if you can learn by example and through emulation of the many good strategy examples Rumelt provides, it should be enough to help you and your company not only avoid falling for garbage instead of strategy, but building a good strategy yourself.

I’ll end with the best news of all:  I wrote Rumelt to ask him a few questions and he told me that he’s working on a new book that should address some of my issues.  I can’t wait to read it.

# # #

Notes
[1] OKRs are great and I love OKRs.  But OKRs are for establishing clarity about goals, their unambiguous measurement, and (typically by omission) their priority.  OKRs should be implied by a strategy, but the existence of OKRs (particularly an overly long or incoherent set) does not imply the existence of strategy.

[2] The plural, of course, being foci.

[3] A common case of this is simply failing to make a strategy at all, instead saying (as I’ve actually heard at strategy meetings), “well we’re going to need two financial goals, two sales goals, two product goals, a marketing goal, a customer goal, an alliances goal, and a people goal, so there you go, that’s 10, so let’s just sit down and start making them.  I know the people goal (“attract, develop, and retain the best talent”) and customer goal (“delight our customers”) already, so there’s only 8 more to go.”

[4] I’m slightly twisting Rumelt’s example of a Condorcet Paradox which was really about strategy formulation, not diagnosis, but to the extent that people often gun jump in offering a diagnosis that leads to their desired strategy it still holds.  Adapting his example, the Services person wants a diagnosis that leads to Solutions, the design head wants a diagnosis that leads to Chips, and the systems person wants a diagnosis that leads to Boxes.  The paradox actually occurs not there, but in how each ranks the relative strategies.

[5] If everyone on the team can agree to it, I’d argue it’s almost definitionally a bad strategy.  In a good strategy choices are made, some areas are resources, others are starved, and some are discontinued.  The Chips person voting for Solutions would be, as the saying goes, like the turkeys voting for Thanksgiving.

[6] In conference talks and podcasts it’s far cooler to talk about being vision-driven than talking about competitive strategies; thus I have found the best companies talk little about the competition externally, but are fiercely competitive internally.

[7] Hat tip to my friend Raj Gossain for figuring this out.

[8] By this I mean that while the book provides examples of good strategy, and a simple framework for expressing it, I find the framework missing an important element (beliefs) and the book doesn’t even attempt to outline a process whereby an executive team can work together to devise a good strategy.

Stopping the Sales & Marketing Double Drowning

I earned my spending money in high school and partially paid for college by working as a lifeguard and water safety instructor. Working at a lovely suburban country club you don’t make a lot of saves. One day, working from the deep-end chair, I noticed two little kids hanging on a lane line. That was against the rules. I blew my whistle and shouted, “off!”

Still young enough to be obedient (i.e., under 11), the two kids let go of the line. The trouble was they couldn’t swim. Each grabbed the other and they sank to the bottom. “Oh my God,” I thought as I dove off the chair to make the save, “I just provoked a double drowning.”

While that was happily the last actual (and yes, averted) double drowning I have witnessed, I’ve seen a lot of metaphorical ones since. They involve adults, not kids. And it’s always the VP of Sales in a deadly embrace with the VP of Marketing. Sure, it may not be an exactly simultaneous death — sometimes they might leave a few months apart — but make no mistake, in the end they’re both gone and they drowned each other.

How To Recognize the Deadly Embrace

I believe the hardest job in software is the VP of Sales in an early-stage startup. Why? Because almost everything is unknown.

  • Is the product salable?
  • How much will people pay for it?
  • What’s a good lead?
  • Who should we call on?
  • What’s the ideal customer profile?
  • What should we say / message?
  • Who else is being evaluated?
  • What are their strengths/weaknesses?
  • What profile of rep should I hire?
  • How much can they be expected to sell?
  • What tools do they need?
  • Which use-cases should we sell to?
  • What “plays” should we run?

You might argue every startup less then $50M in ARR is still figuring out some of this. Yes, you get product-market fit in the single-digit millions (or not at all). But to get a truly repeatable, debugged sales model takes a lot longer.

This painful period presents a great opportunity for sales and marketing to blow each other up. It all begins with sales signing up for (or being coerced into) an unrealistic number. Then, there aren’t enough leads. Or, if there are, the leads are weak. Or the leads don’t become pipeline. Or pipeline doesn’t close.

At each step one side can easily blame the other.

Sales Says Marketing Says
There aren’t enough leads There are, but they’re all stuck with your “generation Z” SDRs
The SDRs are great, I hired them The SQL acceptance rate says they are passing garbage to sales.
The SQLs aren’t bad, there just aren’t enough of them Your reps are greasing the SDRs by accepting bad SQLs
We’re not getting 80% of pipeline from marketing We’re delivering our target of 70% and then some
But the pipeline is low quality, look at the poor close rate The close rate is poor because of your knuckleheaded sellers
Those knuckleheads all crushed it at my last company Your derail rate’s insane
Lots of deals in this space end up no-decision Maybe they derail because we don’t follow-up fast enough
Our message isn’t crisp or consistent Our messaging is fine, the analysts love it
We’re the greatest thing nobody’s ever heard of We’ve got a superior product that your team can’t sell
We’re being out-marketed! We’re being out-sold!

Once this ping-pong match starts, it’s hard to stop. People feel blamed. People get defensive. Anecdotal bloody shirts are waived in front of the organization — e.g., “marketing counted five grad students who visited the booth as MQLs!” or “we lost an opportunity at BigCo because our seller was late for the big meeting!”

With each claim and counter-claim sales and marketing tighten the deadly embrace. Often the struggling CRO is fired for missing too many quarters, guns still blazing as he/she dies. (Or even beyond the grave if they continue to trash the CMO post departure.) Sometimes the besieged CMO quits in anticipation of termination. Heck, I even had one quit after I explicitly told them “I know you’re under attack, but it’s unfair and I’ve got your back.”

Either way, in whatever order, they go down together. Each one mortally wounds the spirit, the confidence, or the pleasure-in-work of the other.

How to Break Out of It

Like real double drownings, it’s hard for one of the participants to do an escape maneuver. The good news is that it’s not hard to know there’s a problem because the mess is clearly visible to the entire organization. Everyone sees the double downing. Heck, employees’ spouses probably even know about it. However, only the CEO can stop it and — trust me — everyone’s waiting for them to do so.

The CEO has four basic options:

  • Take some pressure off. If the primary reason you’re missing plan is because the plan is too aggressive, go to the board and reduce the targets. (Yes, even if it means reducing some expense budget as well.) As Mike Moritz said to me when I started at MarkLogic: “make a plan that you can beat.” Tell them both that you’re taking off the pressure, them them why (because they’re not collaborating), and tell them that you’ve done your part and now it’s time for them to do theirs: collaborate non-defensively to solve problems.
  • Force them to work together. This the old “this shit needs to stop and I’m going to fire one of the two of you, maybe both, if you can’t work together” meeting. A derivation is to put both in a room and tell them not to leave until either they agree to work together or come out with a piece of paper with one name on it (i.e., the one who’s leaving). The key here for them to understand that you are sufficiently committed to ending the bullshit that you are willing to fire one or both of them to end it. In my experience this option tends not to work, I think because each secretly believes they will be the winner if you are forced to choose.
  • Fire one of the participants. This has the effect of rewarding the survivor as the victor. If done too late (before death but after the mortal wound — i.e., after the victor is far along in finding another job), it can still result in the loss of both. To the extent one person clearly picked the fight, my tendency is to want to reward the victim, not the aggressor — but that discounts the possibility the aggressor is either correct and/or more highly skilled. If they are both equally skilled and equally at fault, a rational alternative is to flip a coin and tell them: “I value you both, you are unable to work together, I think you’re equally to blame, so I’m going to flip a coin and fire one of you: heads or tails.” An alternative is to fire one and demote the other — that way it’s very clear to all involved that there was no winner. If fights have winners, you’re incenting fighting.
  • Fire both. I love this option. While it’s not always practical, boy does it send a strong message about collaboration to the rest of the organization: “if you fight, are asked to stop, and you don’t — you’re gone.” Put differently: “I’m not firing them for fighting, I’m firing them for insubordination because I told them not to fight.” Odds are you might lose both anyway so one could argue this is simply a proactive way of dealing with the inevitable.

One of the hardest things for executives is to maintain the balance between healthy cross-functional tension and accountability and unhealthy in-fighting and politics. It’s the CEO’s job to set the tone for collaboration in the company. While Larry Ellison and his disciples may love “two execs enter, one exec leaves” cage fights as a form of corporate Darwinism, most CEOs prefer a tone of professional collaboration. When that breaks down, weak CEOs get frustrated and complain about their executive team. Strong ones take definitive action to define what is and what isn’t acceptable behavior in the organization and put clear actions behind their words.